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Note on Terminology
All translations are done by the present author unless indicated otherwise. The
original transcripts have been placed in the footnotes when considered useful.
When readability could improve by using a ‘v’ instead of an ‘u’ such substitutions,
have been made. Where applicable, the readability of the text has been enhanced
through modernised punctuation. For instance, a slash has become a comma, and a
hyphen has replaced a colon. Parentheses replace the ‘|:’ and ‘:|’ signs.
Coinage
Reichsthaler The Reichsthaler was the currency of the Holy Roman Empire. It was
worth 25.98 g of silver.1
Livres The currency of the Kingdom of France during the studied period:
Livres Tournois, worth approx. 8.68 g of silver.2
Weight
Malter One (Nassauer) Malter of grain was the equivalent of 1 Hectolitre. The
worth of grain is measured in grams of silver, using the yearly average as
calculated by Thomas Rahlf.3
Kilocalories (kcal)
Another way of measuring the significance of food supplies and the tax burden is by
calculating its value in kilocalories. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
of the United Nations has estimated that 2.100 kcal is the bare minimum humans
need. If people have a lower intake, they are starving and will eventually die: in other
words: this is ‘food insecurity’.4 Even though the FAO is a modern-day organisation,
1Christmann (2002), p. 213.





the calculations made are applied worldwide for all nations. As this seems to be the
only standard—at this point—that is applied across different societies, its basic
calculation of food insecurity has been used in this study for comparative reasons.
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“Plus capable de classer avec rigueur et de critiquer les
rapprochements, il peut espérer aboutir à des conclusions de
fait à des conclusions de fait à la fois beaucoup moins
hypothétiques et beaucoup plus précises.”— Marc
Bloch (1928), “Pour Une Historie Comparée Des Sociétés
Européennes”, 19.
1.1 The Problem and Its Study
The seventeenth century was the era of dynastic warfare within Western Europe. It
has often been assumed that this coincided with and even accelerated the develop-
ment of the planned bureaucratic state. This perception is known as the Tilly thesis:
‘War made the state, and the state made war.’1 Charles Tilly’s compelling moderni-
sation theory suggests that warfare demanded a new development within the state-
building process to cope with significant fiscal demands. This development did not
go without opposition, but, according to Tilly, the objections came from outsiders to
these activities.
Contrary to the modernist view of the seventeenth century, I argue that there was
no deliberate—or accidental—state-building going on at the time. I have two
arguments for this; one is historical, and the other one more linguistic
(Begriffsgeschichte). The first argument against state-building is that in the historical
reality of the seventeenth century, there were no states. What did exist were
dominions: lands in the hands of dynasties, without clearly marked borders. Though
there were imperial cities and (federation-) republics, the majority of dominions thus
consisted of lands in the hands of dynasties. Within feudal structures, these lands had
become hereditary, intimately tying the princes and their nobility together. In
addition to this traditional hierarchical structure, patron-client relationships—for
example, witnessing a marriage, or baptism—could also unite nobles or clergy to
the ordinary people, or the lower nobility to those of higher birth. I cannot stress
1Tilly (1975), p. 42.
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enough that the absence of states, or rather, the presence of dynastically ruled lands,
is of crucial importance to understanding early modern societies. Influential socio-
logical interpretations of history—such as Tilly and Max Weber—have shifted the
focus to the institutions (organisation of power), ignoring the legitimacy of power
(nature of power).2 By ignoring the nature of power, it becomes difficult, if not
impossible, to explain critiques on warfare, bureaucracy, and taxations. The quest for
glory, religious conversions, or wars of succession: all could personally trigger
disputes amongst families. In order to finance warfare, offices were created and
sold. An example of such an office was that of tax farmer: paying a set amount of
money to the prince, in return for the right to collect—potentially much more—
money within a specific area. Tax farming did not lead immediately to the creation of
a bureaucracy, but in the long run, taxations did become institutionalised. Dominions
did not become detached from their dynastic houses until the eighteenth-century
revolutions, or with the constitutional reforms in the nineteenth century at the latest.
It was not until then that states came into existence. In short, Tilly's theses cannot be
applied to the early modern period, due to the absence of states; dynasties waged war
to protect and expand their dominion(s).
Opposition to both dynastic warfare and to attempts to change existing govern-
mental structures did not solely come from outside these structures. It also came
from within: the nobility perceived warfare as a threat to the welfare and well-being
of the inhabitants; and, indeed, they feared a loss of power. They consequently
adopted ‘fatherland’ terminology—words such as fatherland, Patria, patriot,
natio—to stress the need to safeguard the common good within the principality. I
have found several documented examples showing that the nobles stayed within
acceptable terminology, but did so with an adaptation. As vassals, they had pledged
their loyalty to their prince, and critiquing his policy could—and, undoubtedly,
would—be explained as an act of rebellion or treason.3 However, facing warfare,
destruction, and what the nobility perceived as financial extortion, noblemen tem-
porarily adopted a presupposed office of a patriot.4 This office allowed them to stand
up, voice concerns, and protect the fatherland against the tyrannical rule of an
absolutus Dominatus. This ‘office’ allowed them to critique possible threats to
their fatherland by indicating that they—that is, the nobility– did stand up to protect
its welfare, without pointing the finger at the perpetrator: the prince. It was mainly
under threat of war, and with apprehension about this situation, that the nobility’s
innovative use of fatherland terminology was triggered, to avoid association with
open rebellion.
The second argument against state-building lies within the use of the term state.
Applying that modern-day term in the early modern context flaws our understanding
2von Friedeburg RCF (2010) State Forms and State Systems in Modern Europe. In: European
History Online (EGO) published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz. http://www.
ieg-ego.eu/friedeburgr2010-en. Accessed 30 January 2019.
3The specific term is: lèse-majesté.
4von Friedeburg (2012), p. 25.
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of a state, as it is loaded with connotations and presumptions. Both constitutional
and legal historians suggest that the term state in the sixteenth and seventeenth
century did not have the modern meaning of a public institution. Hence, the term’s
application gives rise to needless confusion. In our current usage, the concept of state
refers to both a government as a legal person, controlling a country and the country
itself.5 The term state in the seventeenth-century vocabulary should be understood as
what we would now see as the state of a nation, or the state of an argument, which is
not even close to a nation-state. In other words, state (derived from status) referred
to a condition of something or someone.6 Applying a modern-day term is anachro-
nistic and superfluous, as we can simply call the political entities for what they were:
kingdoms, principalities, duchies, counties, imperial cities, or federations. A precise
word-choice allows us to keep a sharp focus, without—unconscious—modern-day
connotations that have crept into the understanding we have of a state.
The focal point of this study is the period of the 1640s to mid-1650s. These
roaring years were characterised by several violent events, for example the Thirty
Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire, the Franco-Spanish War between France
and Spain (1635–1659), and the so-called Eighty Years’War, a civil war in the Low
Countries. These wars were not only fought against an external aggressor, but can
equally be seen as internal strife triggered by reactions to dynastic aspirations,
religious disagreements, and financial issues. Around the same time as the Civil
War broke out in England, Naples’ Tommaso Aniello (Masaniello) led an uproar
against the risen taxes imposed by their Habsburg ruler (1647), and France experi-
enced the Fronde. Each of these examples illustrates the phenomenon of internal
disorder. These events all happened at the time of the creation of the Peace of
Westphalia (1648), which is often viewed as the birth of the ‘modern state’.
Interestingly, while shifting the focus to less often studied principalities, the same
phenomena of internal strife and objections from the nobility are found.
In this study, I expose institutional reasons for mobilising fatherland terminology
within Jülich and Hesse-Cassel, both being within the Holy Roman Empire. I do so by
contrasting it with the French structure in which the particularist province of Brittany
forms the pivotal example. These cases are not meant to represent the situation within
the entire Holy Roman Empire or France but may serve as starting points for possible
further research. The cases are a depiction of the situation in the principalities above
within their given context. It was the specific context that did—or did not—allow the
use of fatherland terminology. In that respect, this work contributes to the understand-
ing of the construction of the Holy Roman Empire: what were the duties and
obligations of princes and the limits to their authority, and when could the emperor
intervene? The selection of principalities for this study—Jülich, Hesse-Cassel, and
Brittany—requires a more elaborate explanation. To appropriately position this current
study, we first have to understand the early finds of Robert von Friedeburg in the
2000s and the research of Ingmar Vroomen on the Dutch Republic (2012).
5Ibid., p. 22.
6von Friedeburg (2002), p. 16.
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In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Von Friedeburg published exten-
sively on the use of fatherland terminology between 1646 and 1651 in the princi-
pality of Hesse-Cassel. He discovered that the use of these words was not to
differentiate between various cultural groups, but that these words were used
structurally in order to express concerns within a conflict on the legitimacy of
politics and policy.7 The hierarchical power relations that existed made it challeng-
ing to address such issues without being accused of open rebellion. Consequently,
Von Friedeburg shows, asserted to act out of love for their fatherland and stepped
outside the current power balance to discuss what they perceived as problematic
situations. This study fits into extensive research on resistance.
The Dutch Republic had an entirely different power structure than Hesse-Cassel:
the number of noblemen was much smaller than in the Holy Roman Empire. More
importantly, no prince held sovereign powers—at least, not formally. The stadt-
holder may have had such aspirations, but was still an officeholder appointed by the
Estates-General (as commander-in-chief of the army), or by the Gewestelijke Estates
(as head of the daily provincial government) respectively. It is important to realise
that the Dutch Republic was a federation, meaning that each of the gewesten—
commonly referred to in modern language as ‘provinces’—were, in fact, particularist
republics within a federation. The power balance in the Republic’s states focussed on
its cities. Within the cities, there was a tension between the regents and the burghers
(citizens). Vroomen studied the application of political language in Dutch pam-
phlets, especially fatherland terminology between 1618 and 1672.8 He focussed on
especially tumultuous moments (1618–1619, 1650; 1672) in order to see what rift
the events had on the vocabulary of political opponents. Vroomen argues that,
although there are many differences within the constellation of the Republic, there
is also a parallel: the position of the nobility and the burghers was—on a meta-
level—comparable. Neither one of them considered themselves to be subordinate
either to the prince nor the regents respectively, while, technically, they were.9 The
burghers had used to hold privileges—such as carrying arms—but had been facing
restrictions and the loss of political influence since 1581. Vroomen explains that the
resulting friction between the demand that they participate in times of war (such as
the defence of the city) versus their decline in influence, gave rise to the use of
fatherland terminology. The disgruntled inhabitants became patriots in order to
defend their traditional rights and privileges.10 Vroomen shows that the terms
fatherland and patriot occurred in 53% of the—in total—1670 pamphlets he stud-
ied.11 The burghers expressed their concerns about ongoing politics and critiqued
the policy of the regents in these texts. William III, the Prince of Orange, did also use
7von Friedeburg (2001, 2005a, 2007).





this terminology and those in favour of a sovereign government applied this termi-
nology more often than their opponents (often referred to as ‘Republicans’).12
The research of Von Friedeburg on Hesse-Cassel and Vroomen on the Dutch
Republic shows that within these small territories with entirely different constitu-
tional constellations, the same terminology was applied. This outcome gave rise to
several hypotheses and formed the trigger for this current study. Firstly, when—in
small territories—the interests of a subordinate group were confined, fatherland
terminology was used to address the situation. Secondly, fatherland terminology
was used by relatively homogeneous interest groups—burghers, or (lower) nobility,
who expressed their critique on politics, as there were only limited options to bring
about change. Testing these hypotheses is fascinating, as it allows us to learn more
about political resistance to change from within the established groups close to the
prince: the nobility.
The principality of Jülich was positioned close to the Dutch border, which
influenced the region. Its history is known for its turmoil, due to a war of succession
in the early seventeenth century; and to troops passing through amidst the Thirty
Years’War. Hesse-Cassel has been (re)studied, as the Althessische Ritterschaft held
additional sources in their archive allowing to study the conflict between the
landgrave13 and the nobility until 1655.14 The history of Hesse-Cassel is as tumul-
tuous as that of Jülich: the landgrave had turned to the Calvinist religion, resulting in
a forced exile. Upon passing away, his minor son inherited his lands. His widow
pledged to uphold her late husband’s will and set out to regain the occupied
principality. To contrast these two small principalities I have chosen the large
particularist French province of Brittany, due to its vast amounts of land. Brittany
had heterogeneous interest groups: both lower and high nobility inhabited the lands.
While France actively participated in warfare, Brittany faced only an increase in
taxes, without the horrors of destruction or the billeting of soldiers.
1.2 Definitions and the Development of Terminology
Though I reject the idea of state-building already taking place in the sixteenth and
seventeenth century and being instrumentally used by princes to work their way
towards ‘absolutism’; I do agree that princely governments faced a continuous
process of decision-making. Consequently, by reacting to unwanted situations,
illegal behaviour was condemned and positive behaviour was stimulated—the aim
of bona politia as a philosophy in legal history15—and, with every step, it became
clearer what should and should not be done. As there was no focal point on the
12Ibid., pp. 250–251.
13In the Holy Roman Empire, a landgrave only answered to the emperor.
14Neu (2013).
15Simon (2004).
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horizon, and so we can neither consider this as working towards a specific goal nor
as state-building; instead, it was aimed at protecting property and prosperity within
the dominion and with that, ultimately securing the position of that dynastic house’s
government.
In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the current status of literature on the
development of early modern principalities. This exposure to modern scholarship is
not meant to give a complete portrayal of the literature but as a general account of the
topic. Understanding its development is instrumental in being able to understand the
rise and use of fatherland terminology as well as why patriots deemed it necessary to
protect their fatherland. However, first, the terminology to replace the generally used
term ‘state’ needs to be determined, as well as how we refer to ‘assemblies’ in the
early modern period.
I urge the use of terminology as close to the historical reality as possible. That is,
referring to, for example, ‘principalities,’ rather than using the modern-day container
concept of ‘state’. Avoiding modern-day concepts can be challenging, as historians
may find the need to distinguish and specify entities towards others befalling under
the rule of the same prince. Such a distinction can be made with newly invented
terminology, or, jargon: not to obscure the language, but to avoid unnecessary
confusion and modern connotations. In order to indicate the position of principalities
and their ruler, several theorists have been searching for terms to characterise the
nature of principalities in catchphrases—bearing the notion of their long history in
mind. In the past decades, such catchphrases have incorporated three aspects: (1) the
changeability of the combinations of principalities under monarchical rule, (2) the
dynasties involved, and (3) various traditions represented within an entity.16 Several
terms have been thought of to grasp these aspects: for example, (a) dynastic states,
(b) composite monarchies, and (c) dynastic agglomerates.17 The term dynastic states
emphasises the influence of monarchies on the country’s formation and organisa-
tion.18 Shortly after, the term composite monarchies introduced both the heteroge-
neity of a monarchy and the various individual countries that were united.19 In a
critique of these terms, John Morrill suggests the term dynastic agglomerates.
Morrill argues that, for example, neither the Iberian monarchy nor the Swedish
monarchy remained the same over time: they sometimes added and sometimes lost
territories.20 Morrill’s catchphrase means to emphasise the unstable, changing nature
of the entity. The individual principalities that became united could fall apart after
the death of their ruling house and face separate futures.21
16Oestreich (1974).
17Scott (2017), p. 45; Morrill (2017).
18Bonney (1991).
19This term was first suggested by H. G. Koenigsberger in 1975, see: Elliott (1992).
20Morrill (2005), pp. 2–3.
21Ibid., p. 9.
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Morrill’s suggestion seems to be the most appropriate definition of the
seventeenth-century principalities, for he does not use the disputed term state. He
does take into account both the origin and the changing nature of the entities, with
the remark that the core of the larger principalities remained more or less stable. A
principality is a geographical area which fell under the jurisdiction of a certain
prince, whose borders were decided upon by custom, and which was passed down
from generation to generation of rulers unless it was conquered.22 Disintegration
could also happen through the absence of a successor, and so, again, the term
dynastic agglomerate is necessary to realise why different dynastic houses could
inherit the unique parts. Additionally, while composite monarchies may have the
connotation that principalities are merged into one (‘melting pot’), dynastic agglom-
erates do hold the uniqueness of each entity in high esteem. This stress on ‘unique-
ness’ makes it easier to understand why, for example, the nobility in one part of a
dynastic agglomerate reacted with displeasure to violations of customs, while those
elsewhere may have been compatible.
In 1959 Francis Carsten published his Princes and Parliaments in Germany. He
explicitly chose not to refer to ‘the meetings of the clergy, nobility, and towns’23 as
parliaments rather than estates. He considered the latter to be too ambiguous, and
claimed that in comparison with the English Parliament, those in the German lands
held the same function. Though not elected—as in the House of Commons—the
German ‘parliaments’ did represent their ‘country’, despite their powers declining
after the sixteenth century. Carsten is indeed right that the term ‘estates’ is an
ambiguous term, for it mainly referred to someone’s status based upon birth (clergy,
nobility, and commoners) and not-so-much to the political role they could have, as
there was much heterogeneity within the estates. Alternatively, according to Peter
Blickle, there was a ‘representation by estates in diets.’24 While Carsten resorts to the
term Parliaments, this too is a problematic term. In France, parlements were courts
of justice, while the meetings of clergy, nobility and towns were called états. The
German meetings were named Landstände. In both cases, there was no election. In
France, travel distances and costs could form a severe obstacle to joining the états,
especially for the lower nobility. The German principalities had, due to their small
size, a lower threshold for travel distance, but there were relatively few noblemen,
clergymen (if any) or towns to be present. Indeed, Carsten is right that the
Landstände eventually became institutionalised and, later on, evolved into popular
representations of society after the Revolutions. As we want to stay as close as
possible to the historical reality at the time, I refer to the German meetings as
Landstände and the French as états.
Resistance, Representation, and Community are not only frequently researched
and inter-related topics, but also the title of the 1997-edited volume by Blickle. Here,
resistance is explained as the common man rising and articulating his discontent
22Soen et al. (2017).
23Carsten (1959), chap. preface.
24Brady (1997).
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regarding ongoing policy. Blickle’s own countless studies on the ‘gemeine Mann’
(common man) and his revolts suggest a heterogeneous group: the farmers, citizens
of cities, and people living in mountainous areas (Bergknappe).25 The cities had a
pioneering role in the development of ‘tax systems law codes, bureaucracies, and
juridical management of conflicts’ according to Thomas A. Brady.26 Their impor-
tance was undoubtedly significant, as shown by Italian cities that became indepen-
dent jurisdictions and started to exert their influence over surrounding rural
communities.27 The development of a properly functioning legal system was prob-
ably ‘[. . .] a demand of those who were weak, not those who were strong.’28 Blickle
ends his conclusions with the remark that kings had to legitimise their policies by
securing justice, keeping peace and providing welfare.29 He stresses that these
values may have been in response to the demands of ordinary people. In either
case, they were complementary to each other and kept princes in power. In other
studies, Blickle adds that the Peasants’War was an attempt to breach crises that were
caused by hierarchical relationships: the so-called revolution of the common man.
Returning to the vital role of cities, Maarten Prak’s Citizens without Nations
complements the abovementioned volume while focussing on urban citizenship in—
mainly—Western Europe and contrasts this with China and the Americas.30 Prak
shows that citizens were prominent members of society and actively participated in
public life (for example, by defending the city). He also stresses that the role of
citizens was not fixed, but changed continuously if not abruptly. MaxWeber claimed
that Europe’s successful domination of the world had resulted from their public
organisation. Prak disagrees as Asian and American cities were also prosperous and
indeed had to a degree’ economic dynamism and social well-being’.31 Prak turns the
idea upside down: he claims that where principalities learned from the needs that
were pushed forward by citizens, they became successful. The formal communal
membership of citizens was meant to organise society, for example, who could hold
a position in the council and have a role in the guilds. It was mainly male-dominated,
but not exclusively so. Prak focusses on the prosperous regions of Italy, the Low
Countries and England were the majority of people lived in cities, and it is their
political interests which became dominant, as they furthered economic prosperity.
In the literature discussed above, we have seen that cities played a significant role
in voicing their needs and, consequently, in the development of directive legislation
to further economic prosperity. However, this prominent urban role does not explain
what would happen if a prince did whatever he pleased and pursued a personal
interpretation of a situation. Commenting on princely policy was a dangerous thing
25Ibid.; Blickle (2014).
26Blickle (1997), p. 337.






to do, whether the disagreement was caused by religion, economic decisions, or
going to war for dynastic reasons. Such commentary was not something ‘new’.
Mirrors for Princes as a genre of politically oriented texts were published through-
out the Middle Ages to instruct princes on their proper conduct—though they could
also function as job applications such as Machiavelli’s Il Principe (1513–15; 1532).
The translation of Aristotle’s politeia by Willem van Moerbeke and the com-
mentaries on the work of Thomas Aquinas had a significant impact on medieval
governments: due to their mistranslation, derivatives of the word Politeia became
associated with the Latin word civitas.32 It was interpreted as an organised group of
people, living together under laws or in a city, rather than the far less defined Greek
original. Based on this influential commentary, and within the genre of Mirrors for
Princes, princes were taught their—new—duties and goals as a doctor were to keep
a patient healthy, through dietary restrictions: a prince needed to secure his society
by administering the legislation.33 Initially, the focus of politeia was on how society
functioned; however, due to its translations, the term became associated with the
institutional organisation of society.34 These institutions were responsible not only
for the creation and implementation of legislation but also for its control. By
controlling legislation and ‘keeping the patient healthy’, the core business of gov-
ernment was to ensure the common good of the res publica. The focus here was on
how a prince should behave, and little was said on what subjects could do against
improper behaviour. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century reactions to princely
politics could go in two directions. Firstly, the most extreme reaction was a person
committing regicide. Secondly, still dangerous but less extreme, was a small group
commenting either orally or written on the prince’s policy.
It is essential to understand that neither of these actions were caused by the idea to
rid a country of a certain prince, but that they were triggered by crises. A monarch
turning into a tyrant and abusing his powers could cause distress, for at the very least
the law of nature and customs were supposed to bound a prince.35 In certain
countries, such as France and England, there was the belief that the king had been
anointed by God, through divine rights. Hence, he only answered to God and could
not be held accountable by inhabitants. Around the 1570s, a shift can be perceived
under the threat of religious warfare. Authors were keen on solving the problems at
hand: either by stating that the prince would have all power and no objections could
be made (Henning Arnisaeus) or only magistrates with a particular office (‘ephors’)
could correct the monarch (Johannes Althusius). Unfortunately for some kings,
32Mager (1988), pp. 76–77.
33Simon (2004), pp. 12–13, 19. In German political writing, active interventions, or pre-emptive
legislation, are now known as policey or police-legislation in the German field of research (policey-
geschichte).
34Mager (1988), p. 77.
35von Friedeburg (2004), p. 11.
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people objected to their policy and did in fact kill this person they classified as a
tyrant.36
With time, more normative rules were trusted to paper. This normativity fits
between formal law and traditional statutes, customary law, and social norms. These
normative rules could thus come in a plurality of forms; therefore, literature regularly
refers to these various types as multinormativity.37 It was not only social norms and
predecessors of voluntaristic laws that were formalised; the regulation of the rela-
tionship between the prince and his subjects was—step by step—written down. This
formalisation is broadly studied by those occupying themselves with
Verfassungsgeschichte, or constitutional history. Whether these noted rules of
engagement can already be seen as a principality’s ‘constitution’, can be debated.
However, the fact of the matter is that these normative rules regulated the relation-
ship and were agreed upon by parties involved. Moreover, they were easy to refer to
and therefore less disputed than biased commemorations of histories, written down
upon the request of one party.
One of the closely linked themes to Verfassungsgeschichte is the monopolisation
of violence (Staatsgewalt) as has been described by Wolfgang Reinhard.38
Reinhard’s focus is on a society’s political order and how princes were victorious
in gaining the upper hand in discussions with the nobility, ending communities’
autonomy. Initially, this happened through power-relations between the prince’s
government and the peripheries, through patron-client-relationships. Reinhard’s
account is specifically focussed on the triumph of princes, which gives a longitudinal
overview that may result in overlooking small but significant moments of protest,
that may have altered the course of history.
Here we circle back to the nobility and their role in early modern society.
Reinhard seems to suggest that their influence waned since the sixteenth century,
while the role of the monarch grew. This division of roles touches the topic of
‘dualism’ which has been studied broadly in the light of the Ständeforschung (the
study of the Landstände in German principalities). Otto (von) Gierke described it as
a dichotomy between ruler and society. At the same time, Volker Press stressed that
this division was not so clear-cut as people could belong to both the Landstände, the
bureaucracy, as well as the princely court.39 As a result of the vagueness of the term,
researchers studied conflicts of the Landstände in the 1970s. Rainer Walz concludes
that there were various types of conflicts between the Landstände and their prince.
Gabriele Haug-Moritz went even further, concerned that the idea of Dualism
obscures studying the historical reality.40 Consequently, Haug-Moritz advises
36See the several contributions in von Friedeburg, Murder and Monarchy.
37Günther K (2014) Criminal law, Crime and Punishment as Communication, Normative Orders.
In: https://www.normativeorders.net/de/publikationen/working-paper. http://ssrn.com/
abstract¼2532868. Accessed 12 January 2020; Duve (2017).
38Reinhard (2000).
39Neu (2013), p. 42.
40Haug-Moritz (1992), p. 14.
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against the use of the term, while Tim Neu disagrees and pleas for rebranding the
terms by looking at legalistic claims and ongoing procedures. He explains in the
contextualisation of his 2013 study on Hesse-Cassel that there can be a form of
Dualism. For, so he says, when there are two actors—an individual one (prince) and
a collective one (Landstände)—who act as legitimate, political representatives come
forward to speak legally on behalf of all.41
That raises the question of how one can speak on behalf ‘of all’? Especially when
speaking concerns the critique of a prince. Above, I briefly mentioned that the
nobility adopted a presupposed office of a patriot. As this may sound exotic and
special, it requires specification. Moreover, the terms patriot, Patria, natio, and
fatherland do need further elaboration—as our perception of the terms has been
profoundly influenced by the Revolutions of the 1780s and 1790s. Therefore,
projecting modern-day concepts backwards risks interpreting concepts in ways
contemporaries would not have.42 Indeed, the (modern) patriots of the French
Revolution felt connected to France, and the early modern patriots using the
terminology in the 1640s did express a specific affiliation: however, I argue that
these affiliations were not the same.
The 1980s saw many publications on nationalism, due to the contemporary
academic interest in modernism—most of these publications came from sociologists
and anthropologists, not historians.43 Modernity, industrialisation, urbanisation,
secularisation, and democratisation were analysed as new features, as they did not
exist in the early modern period.44 The views on nationalism expressed by the
modernists suggest that there was no ‘real’ nationalism before 1780.45 Based on
their publications, a list of characteristics that make this nationalism exclusive to the
post-revolutions period could be created. Nationalism in the post-1780s-period is
intertwined with the modern concept of ‘state’: sovereignty by the state, a fixed
territory, inhabitants, legislative power, body politic (as a legal person and repre-
sentative of the country), and bureaucracy. It assumes the same culture, language,
and history; in other words: an identity. In order to construct an identity, concepts of
‘othering’ and ‘raising self-awareness’ are used. Nationalism has a strong moral
imperative: the creation of unity and polarisation from other groups.
The fundamental objection to the idea that there was no nationalism before the
1780s is that themodernists assume that nationalism was fuelled by industrialisation,
ergo that there would have been no nationalism in non-industrialised ‘states’.46
41Neu (2013), p. 55.
42Jensen (2016).
43Hirschi (2011), pp. xi and 1.
44Stein et al. (2010), p. 24; Vroomen (2012), p. 9.
45Breuilly (1993), Anderson (2006), Gellner (2008), Hobsbawm (2012).
46Other theories on the premeditated development of state building are consequently dismissed.
These theories would be, (1) the Marxist theory of suppression of the people given by Eric
Hobsbawm or, (2) the theory of Marc Raeff that state-building was developed in order to increase
prosperity. See: Hobsbawm (1954), Raeff (1983).
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Another objection is the rigid break that is perceived to have taken place in the 1780s
with the American Revolution, as languages do not evolve so quickly. An emphasis
on the speed of change is questionable. Critique of the rigid divide between
pre-modern and modern societies has led to a movement stressing that the roots of
both modern-day patriotism and nationalism can be traced back as far as the Middle
Ages—known as the primordialist approach. This interpretation seems to be driven
by an inherent desire to find continuity in history and an attempt to embed a culture,
religion, and identity in a long tradition.47
A source-based analysis potentially prevents jumping to flawed interpretations.
Conal Condren, a historian and political theorist, laid the foundations for an entirely
new perspective with his 2006 Argument and Authority.48 According to Condren, a
common feature of the early modern era was the claim of—presupposed—offices.
For example, a midwife could—in case of an infant’s imminent death—baptise it, to
prevent its doom in hell. At that moment, she did adopt the duties of a priest to save
the child’s soul. Admittedly, it only happened in cases of emergency, but under those
circumstances, it was a standard procedure and one taken for granted. This example
shows a historical actor claiming a presupposed office (officium). According to
Condren, this was quite common, but ignorance of this phenomenon can lead
historians to misinterpret sources. What does ‘presupposed office’ mean? An office
should be interpreted as a ‘duty’, dignitas or ‘task’ that one could adopt in an
emergency.49 Condren explains that too little attention has been paid to how people
talked about offices, and what these offices entailed. Based on his study of many
sources, Condren suggests that researchers should look for what authors at the time
took for granted.50 A ‘presupposition is something that in a given context is taken for
granted; it is apt to be relatively general and constant but may be disclosed in a finite
array of differing propositions.’51 In other words, certain aspects of daily life are too
insignificant to describe in detail. When people speak or write, they assume that the
receiving party knew the context. Due to these unwritten assumptions, many aspects
of daily life are hidden under a veil of presupposition. Those claiming a presupposed
office adopted a persona. A persona was a ‘mask’, a reference from the Greek
theatrical world, which indicated a division between the individual and the function
he fulfilled.52
In this study, I show that when the nobility used fatherland terminology, they
were adopting a presupposed office. The nobility’s deliberate choice to summon
other patriots to meetings means that those people knew what this meant, what was
expected of them and acted upon that request. Consequently, they adopted the
persona or office of a patriot. I argue that adopting the office of patriot should be
47Hirschi (2011), p. 4; Clark (2000).
48Condren (2006).
49Schmidt (2007), pp. 32 and 40.
50Ibid., p. 2.
51Ibid., p. 3.
52Condren (2004), pp. 49–50.
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seen in the light of Condren’s explanation. In accepting the persona of a patriot, one
had the duty to expose severe government missteps: something a commoner could
and should not attempt to do. Being a patriot was not an empty title. Accepting the
task or ‘office’ of patriot meant taking on all the obligations it entailed, upholding the
principality’s claims, duties, and traditions, as well as protecting its inhabitants from
the princely usurpation of power.53 The claims of this office of patriot were
prompted by their context, for example, the increasing burdens of warfare and
ensuing taxation and debt in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.54 The inhab-
itants suffered from ongoing warfare, according to the remarks of the Landstände.
The nobility argued against additional tax burdens not only out of compassion for the
subjects, but also because of their vested interest in peace. Tenants were unable to
provide part of their harvest to their feudal lords when taxes heavily burdened them.
For landowners to demand their rightful share during wartime would cause distress,
starvation, and ruin the land even more. When the nobility—as patriots—spoke out,
protecting their tenants and their interests, they criticised the policy of the prince.
Such a critique could well be interpreted as a rebellion against the prince, and an
uprising would mean unrest. It could lead to civil war and even regicide or—
justifying it from the killer’s perspective: tyrannicide.55 It would seem that such
harsh criticism could only be voiced when it was under the cloak of loyalty to the
principality.56 Acting on behalf of and in defence of the fatherland was what made a
person a good patriot.57
Hence, the seventeenth-century use of the words patriot and fatherland was
distinctively different from their late eighteenth-century use during the French
Revolution. I argue that the nobility used fatherland terminology only when they
felt threatened by the consequences of war and faced desolation and loss of power.
Offices themselves, as Condren shows, were no novelty. People assumed that power
relations occurred in combination with the rights and duties they encompassed
during the seventeenth century. Offices, together with patron-client relations, tied
the whole community together, controlled it, and helped create a functioning soci-
ety.58 The function someone held within society also provided privileges and
liberties. All of this was well established but poorly studied.59 What was new in
this period was the introduction of the office of a patriot to enable open criticism of
policy. The nobility had always held the position of a counsellor, which was their
birth-right. However, their position of critics to their prince’s politics was new.60
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a ruler’s dynastic claims legitimised
53Condren (2001, 2005).
54von Friedeburg (2005a).
55See various articles on Tyrannicide and Monarchomachs in: von Friedeburg (2004).
56Romein (2014).
57Condren (2001, 2005).
58Dunkley (1981), Kettering (1986, 1992), Schalk (1986).
59Condren (2006), pp. 1–12.
60Ibid., pp. 149–171.
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his position. In the long run, this could lead to ruling a dynastic agglomerate.61 It is
therefore not surprising that the patriots should explicitly request the prince to act in
their fatherland’s best interest and to honour their traditions: many rulers were born
in other parts of the dynastic agglomerate.62 The acclaimed patriots were deeply
involved in the principality’s administration, as is illustrated by their references to its
history. Subsequently, they requested a similar involvement on the part of their
prince.
Maurizio Viroli argues that political terminology underwent some severe changes
by the end of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century.63 It became a whole
new genre. Whereas medieval kings found legislation, which was based on either
consent or divine law; the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a transformation
to the ‘reason of state’ or ‘a government based on coercion’.64 What is essential here,
is Marianne Klerk’s observation that whenever ‘reason of state’ is being discussed,
authors addressed the ‘notion of rulers pursuing their interests, not ‘states’ pursuing
‘national interests’.65 The two are hard to discern, since government over a princi-
pality was not much different from the rule over the princely inheritance. Dynastic
ambitions of expansion often formed the core of a prince’s motivations to wage
war—often under the pretext of defending one’s possessions. In the seventeenth
century, these phenomena were especially prominent. Princes were forced to partic-
ipate in war, or risk losing their principalities, requiring vast sums of money. One
way to obtain the necessary funds was by raising taxes, but it was faster to obtain
loans. Hence, new beneficiaries stepped forward: financiers who gained interest by
lending money or who bought prestigious new offices in exchange for large sums of
money. Subsequently, the nobility saw their influence diminish as these new stake-
holders gained power outside the traditional hierarchical sphere. The princes and
nobility struggled to overcome war and internal conflicts, testing the limits of
princely powers in the process.66
Interestingly, it was not solely a matter of dynastic competition to possess as
much land as possible and eliminate competitors in the process, nor of the religious
enmity between Catholics and Protestants. There was a distinctive conflict going on
between princes and their nobility.67 The nobility, facing rivalry and expensive
warfare that drained all the resources from their lands and tenants, spoke out against
the situation. Henri II, Duke de Rohan (1579–1638) in his De l’interest des Princes
et les Etats Chrestienté (1638) observed that reason of statewas mostly synonymous
with the princely pursuit of interests. Duke de Rohan was famous, or notorious, as a
Huguenot leader and wrote his book while in exile. His ‘radical secular vision’,
61Morrill (2005).
62Oestreich (1974).
63Viroli (2005), pp. 2–3.
64Klerk (2016), p. 7.
65Ibid., p. 7.
66von Friedeburg (2012), p. 17.
67Ibid., p. 18.
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which focussed on personal interests and rational decisions, was undoubtedly a
novelty within the genre of political writings during the seventeenth century.68
Duke de Rohan’s work became what can be seen as a standard work, to which one
could refer without having to name the author. He coined the change in policy as
‘new monarchy’ in his famous work De l'intérêt des princes et des États de la
chrétienté.69 The innovative aspect of these so-called new monarchies referred to the
change in the style of government: the rise of new stakeholders providing the money
for the warfare. New argumentation had to be developed but within the accepted
terminology. The princes and their advisors had to substantiate the underlying
administrative changes of shifting power to the new stakeholders. The nobility
attempted to argue their case against this new type of war policy and changing
government, as they feared losing their position.70
As a consequence, both the prince and the nobility responded to the situation. The
nobility reacted to the devastation of their lands and asserted they felt the duty to
protect the principality’s population from high tax burdens.71 The nobility formed
the one stable factor in the fief, in earlier centuries known as a benefice, and as power
brokers they were dependent on the dynasty’s survival.72 Fierce reactions were
provoked by princely claims of ‘necessitas’ when requisitioning taxes without the
nobility’s obligatory consent. The princely solution, namely the—temporary—usur-
pation of power, led to the accusation of establishing an absolutus Dominatus. Such
a situation was consistently addressed by using fatherland terminology. Absolutus
Dominatus is not to be understood as a founding rule based upon ‘absolutism’,
because this term was only invented after the French Revolution, just like the term
‘centralisation’.73 But what does it mean? As Mario Turchetti explains, the Latin
term dominus was the Latin equivalent of the Greek term tyrant. He claims that
Cicero ‘[. . .] attributes to him [the dominus, CAR] the characteristics of a tyrant,
merely sliding the notion of private law into the realm of public law. In this field, the
dominus is the person who imperils public liberty.’74 For instance, kings could claim
to be the Dominus of a particular area, such as Lord of Ireland (Dominus Hiberniae).
The term tyrant should not be confused with the term despot. Turchetti, drawing
upon historical examples, accurately distinguishes between a despot and a tyrant by
defining them as follows:
Despotism is a form of government which, while being authoritarian and arbitrary, is
legitimate if not legal, in some countries, whereas tyranny, in the most rigorous sense, is a
form of government which is authoritarian and arbitrary and which is illegitimate and illegal,
68Dewald (2018), p. 71.
69Modern edition by de Rohan (1995), p. 162.
70von Friedeburg (2012), p. 28.
71Ibid., p. 25.
72von Stieglitz (1994), p. 2; Kettering (1986), Dunkley (1981).
73Burgess (1996), pp. 17–62; Bonney (1987).
74Turchetti (2008), p. 163.
1.2 Definitions and the Development of Terminology 15
because exercised not only without, but against the will of the citizens, and also scorns
fundamental human rights.75
Being aware of the distinction between these two terms is essential.
The serious accusation of establishing an absolutus Dominatus meant that tyran-
nical rule was looming, an illegal form of government and power abuse which would
threaten the population as well as the fatherland (Patria). The arbitrary rule that
would result from tyranny meant that a prince could rule without respecting the
law—except for the laws of nature and the God-given laws. When the nobility
wanted to discuss such potential abuse, their vocabulary for political argumentation
included patriot, Patria and fatherland and, to a lesser extent, nation. A polemic
emerged in which fatherland terminology was used in defence of the rights of the
nobles and the general population to critique princely politics.76 When cooperation
with the prince would ensure their influence and enabled the états to uphold their
privileges and traditions, the use of fatherland terminology was avoided.
The legal phrase absolutus Dominatus should not be confused with the French
monarchie absolue which indicated the French king’s independence from other
earthly authorities (for example the Pope). This terminology referred to puissance
absolue or pleine puissance.77 These terms could be used in the context of the king
overcoming the resistance of a Parlement (the court) and were used in Lettres de
jussion. The king would not use his position asmonarch absoluewhen making laws,
meaning that royal ordinances did not carry this terminology.
Let us just briefly examine fatherland terminology and consider their etymology.
First I will make some remarks about ‘pays’, Patria and the related term patriot,
followed by some clarifications on fatherland and natio. This recital is essential to
understand what contemporaries understood them to be, putting our perception as
influenced by the Revolutions aside.
The French word pays, which nowadays means ‘land’, was derived from the
Latin word pagensis or pagus, meaning stronghold or so-called ‘gou’. It referred to
the village which belonged to the stronghold.78 Depending on the context, the term
pays could refer to a town and immediate surroundings, to a small district, like a
bailiwick, to a “province” (Brittany), or even to the kingdom of France—which
became more common during the sixteenth century.79 The French la patrie could be
interpreted as ‘[. . .] pays où l’on est né et auquel on appartient comme citoyen’.80
The term patriaux or ‘co[m]patriotes’ was introduced in 1531 and referred to those
who lived in the same geographical area—which could either be the whole princi-
pality or the region in which one lived. In the French context, the ‘native region’
(German: ‘Heimat’) or patrie had been used ever since the time of Gregory of Tours
75Ibid., p. 160.
76von Friedeburg (2012), p. 29.
77Collins (2021).




(538–594), who used the Latin patria. However, the term referred strictly to a region
or province, and not to a principality.81 Hence, the terms patrie et provinciae regni
were often combined.82 Despite this clear origin, some authors believe that the word
pays and patrie or patria may have the same stem.83 The latter two terms, however,
are considered to have a far greater emotional resonance in times of crisis. The term
pays did not have this connotation.84 The term patriot was used in the context of
copatriotes or compatriots, which meant the inhabitants of the same city as a
synonym to concitoyens.
In the Holy Roman Empire until the eighteenth century, the term patriot was
synonymous with a fellow-citizen or countryman, usually, one who possessed a
house.85 Traditionally, the patriots listened to the ‘father’. An adjectival form of the
word was unknown until the eighteenth century when ‘patriotism’ came to mean the
same as the love of the fatherland, or love for one’s people.86 However, the much
earlier used word patriot was usually accompanied by positive adjectives such as
‘good’ or ‘loyal’.87 In the German principalities, the term Patria can be traced back
to the sixth century.88 It is, however, essential to be aware that the use of the same
word does not automatically imply that it had the same meaning throughout time.
The terminology of patria became linked to a geographical area—terra, regio or
provincia,89 and a tribe. The extent to which it applied to either of the situations
above, is contested and seems to have changed over time.90 The word patria is often
accompanied by adjectives indicating the sphere it applies to: for example, heavenly
or divine.91 It could, of course, also apply to a worldly dominium.92 One thing is
sure: it did not refer to nationalism.93 Over time, patria became a multi-faceted term,
with a strong emotional dimension.94
The term ‘vaterland’ or ‘faterlant’ had been used since the eleventh century.95 It is
considered to be roughly equivalent to the Latin Patria and was used in the context
of the land where one is born, or the people to whom one belongs.96 The terms natus,
81Ibid., p. 333.
82Ibid., p. 333.
83Lewis (1968), Dupont-Ferrier (1940, 1929), Guenée (1967).
84Gougenheim (2008), p. 333.
85Pfeifer (1989a), p. 1242.
86Ibid., p. 1242.
87Kluge and Seebold (2009), p. 617.
88Eichenberger (1991).
89Ibid., p. 39.





95Pfeifer (1989b), p. 1886.
96Ibid., p. 1886.: ‘Land, in dem man geboren ist, zu dessen Volk man gehört.’
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natio, and nation are, in the French case, derived from la naissance, which means
‘birth’.97 When turning to Latin, the term natio came from nasci, which meant ‘to be
born’.98 During the Middle Ages, the term was used to indicate to which family
someone belonged (in other words: their place in the social order). However, it could
also refer to the region of one’s birth or group of students—with various back-
grounds—at universities.99 In 1611 the word nationaire was found which equalled
compatriote; that is, those who were born and raised in the vicinity.100
In the ‘German’ language, natio first appeared in the fourteenth century (Lat.
natio, genitive nationis), when it meant tribe or lineage.101 During the sixteenth
century, it came to refer to ‘all born in the same land’.102 The word is frequently
found in reference to the whole empire: the Holy Roman Teutsche Nation.103 Two
centuries later it became synonymous with ‘all those belonging to the same com-
munity (Gesellschaft), descent, land, language, laws, and government’.104
1.3 Methodology, Sources and Structure
This book offers a comparative study on the use of fatherland terminology in three
principalities. Using a comparative perspective allows us to see parallels between the
entities, but, more importantly, it allows us to see exceptional situations. It gives
room for a researcher to break free from an imposed idea and test grand old
narratives.105 Still, it is striking that so few comparative studies have been conducted
to contrast principalities or Imperial Cities in the Holy Roman Empire. Monographs
on individual entities do exist, and I connect these in this study, by restudying the
source material and placing it within a broader framework: the use of a presupposed
office to comment on ongoing politics. For Jülich, the work of Rainer Walz on
Landstände is essential. The political conflict in Hesse-Cassel has been thoroughly
studied in the works of Tim Neu, Armand Maruhn, and Robert von Friedeburg. Jim
Collins has published many useful studies on Brittany.106
This study features the argumentation used by the nobility in reaction to their
princes’ new policy. The spiralling effect of dynastic competition, the intensification
of warfare, and consequently, the increased demands of taxations to pay their armed
97von Wartburg (1955), p. 41.
98Ibid., p. 42.
99Guenée (1967).
100von Wartburg (1955), p. 41.
101Kluge and Seebold (2009), p. 583.
102Pfeifer (1989a), p. 1155.
103Schmidt (2007).
104Pfeifer (1989a), p. 1155.
105Bloch (1928).
106Walz (1982), Maruhn (2004a, b), von Friedeburg (2003, 2005b, 2010).
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forces, could have resulted in an increase of sovereign power at the expense of the
old elite: the nobility. The nobility considered the princes’ usurpation of power and
attempted to organise taxation a threat centrally. They argued against war and the
princes’ policies because these were linked to the specific crisis at hand. In other
words, the conflict between the princes and the nobility was the result of the crisis at
hand: warfare.
So, how do we investigate the early modern noble’s use of fatherland terminology
in such a crisis? It is tempting to search primarily for printed sources, but of these
there are only few. Apart from historiography, the source material of this study
includes political pamphlets—both written drafts and printed, reports on assem-
blies—Landstände Akten and Assiettes—but also legal suits, such as a massive court
case to the Imperial Chamber Court. Furthermore, files containing tax reports and
letters were studied for context and applied terminology. Using this wide-ranging
source material, I will compare the political use of fatherland terminology in the
principalities of Jülich, Hesse-Cassel, and Brittany in the period 1642–1655. This
ambitious geographic exposure and time-span, also means that I have had to make
selections that need some clarification. One of the limitations of this study is its
representativeness. Reports on meetings voice the opinion of those present, and
likely not dissident voices. For example, in Brittany, a group dramatically under-
represented were the impoverished, lower-ranked nobility who could not afford to
attend an assembly. Their voice was not recorded, and can consequently not be
studied here.
Another limitation is the exclusion of the prince’s perception of the situation. My
focus has been on the nobility’s perception and their application of terminology.
Here and there, I may have added prince’s remarks that were quoted by the nobility,
but they did not cite him on a consistent basis. An exception to this is the lawsuit in
Hesse-Cassel, which contains the landgrave’s replies. I do think the princely reac-
tions are interesting, but that would be an entirely different study. Finally, some may
object to the lack of literary sources in this book—such as Hans Jacob Christoffel
von Grimmelshausen’s Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus. This omission is a
practical restraint of a corpus of source material that is already broad.
This study departs from the idea that the usage of fatherland terminology in
monarchies could be influenced by the homogeneity or heterogeneity of society, as
well as the economy of scale of the principality. The principalities are each discussed
in separate chapters. Cross-referencing has been avoided as much as possible, as this
distracts from mapping-out the nobility’s argumentation per specific principality.
The proper comparison is reserved for the conclusion. The study itself has been
divided into two parts: the Holy Roman Empire and France.
In the first part of this study, the cases in the Holy Roman Empire are discussed.
In Chap. 2, various studies conducted in the past decades are discussed to lay the
foundations for the two German case studies that follow. It focusses on the devel-
opment of political thought which was crucial for the perception of responsibilities
of those in government, and of those subjected to it. Furthermore, the use of
fatherland terminology in other political contexts is explained. Jülich—Chap. 3—
had a turbulent history during the early seventeenth century. A war of succession
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broke out among relatives of the late duke, who had no direct heirs. When his nearest
nephew and grand-nephew divided the lands amongst each other, the situation was
not recognised by the emperor, not least because of religious disagreements. When
the Thirty Years’ War broke out, those living in Jülich found themselves on the
crossroads of armies passing through. The de facto duke attempted, to the dismay of
the nobility, to levy taxes to raise an army to protect the principality. Levying taxes
resulted in the use of fatherland terminology.
In the Lower Principality of Hesse-Cassel—Chap. 4—the nobility considered
themselves to be genuinely loyal patriots. They had supported the landgrave’s family
even when he went into exile. Moreover, they pledged themselves to his minor son
only hours after he passed away. This vow prevented the principality from going into
the hands of the late landgrave’s cousin, who ruled over Hesse-Darmstadt. Thus, the
nobility went against the emperor’s wishes and was still facing the occupation of
their lands. The regent-landgravine took up arms and commanded an army to free
her son’s inheritance, but she had to pay her armies too and requisitioned money
from the people. This taxation met with fierce reactions from the nobility, who—as
loyal patriots—wanted to protect their already poor fatherland. According to the
Hessian nobility, their traditions were violated.
The second part focusses on France, in the case of Brittany in particular. In
Chap. 5, the French political developments and thought are discussed: when was
fatherland terminology used in the French context? It focusses mainly on the period
1570–1620s as an introduction to the next chapter, it focusses mainly on the period
1570–1620s, when French political language changed fundamentally. The sixth
chapter focusses on the particularist province of Brittany. As one of the few
remaining pays d’état it held a unique position in the French Kingdom: it could
decide matters of taxation by itself. That is, the états had to agree to pay a certain
amount of money—but they decided how it was collected. The nobility was
divided—for and against Mazarin’s government in Paris. However, due to the
ongoing warfare, the Parisian government demanded a contribution from Brittany.
These issues caused tension among the (high) nobility but did not result in the use of
fatherland terminology. The nobility sought a different approach to politics: working
with the Parisian authorities, rather than objecting to them.
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Political Language in the Holy Roman
Empire (1500–1650s)
The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, as its full name read, became
institutionalised in Nuremberg and Metz with the Golden Bull of 1356/57.1 This
document contains the complex structure of the empire: it was a compilation of self-
governing ecclesiastical and secular principalities and imperial cities. The Golden
Bull refers to the Sacrum Imperium Romanum, thus pretending to be a successor of
the Western-Roman Empire. The role of the pope was minimal, as power lay in the
hands of the King of the Romans, being the emperor.2 Seven prince-electors elected
the emperor. This act united the various parts of the vast realm.3 The entities within
the Holy Roman Empire were part of a multi-layered system. Firstly, the principality
itself with the prince and the Landstände. Secondly, the principalities were part of
one of the ten Circles (Kreis)—administrative groups who organised of typical
defensive structure, collected imperial taxes and tried solving problems amongst
themselves. Thirdly, all were subordinate to the Imperial Diet, the Imperial Chamber
Court, and the Aulic Council.4 The prince and his subjects—including the nobility or
the Landstände—could each turn to these legal bodies when in need of legal counsel
or mediation. Despite this overarching feudal hierarchy (Reichslehensverband),
princes endeavoured to consolidate their policy, jurisdiction and create freedom of
action for themselves.5
This chapter bridges the development of fatherland terminology and princely
attempts to consolidate dynastic ambitions and possessions within an area. Many
political theorists at the time did not focus on a specific individual principality while
1von Friedeburg (2011), p. 31; The Avalon Project : The Golden Bull of the Emperor Charles IV
1356 A.D. In: The Golden Bull of the Emperor Charles IV 1356 A.D. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
medieval/golden.asp. Accessed 15 February 2019.
2von Friedeburg (2011), p. 31.
3Press (1994), p. 439.
4Oestmann (2012).
5Romein (2014), pp. 277–278; von Friedeburg (2013), p. 293.
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articulating their political thoughts. However, their writings were influential
throughout the Holy Roman Empire, inspiring princes and many patriots who
found themselves in similar situations in the face of dynastic ambitions—often
combined with an increase in warfare (Map. 2.1).
2.1 German Political Thought (15th–17th century)
During the fifteenth and sixteenth century, a transformation in political thought
within the numerous principalities of the Holy Roman Empire became apparent in
publications. Scholars adopted five interconnected elements in their writings. Firstly,
classical thought infused German thinking, as the works of Aristotle and Cicero
regarding the polis were applied to the princely fiefs.6 Consequently, the strategy of
implementing princely policy became strongly connected to an ‘interventionist
Map. 2.1 Holy Roman Empire (seventeenth century). Map by: Robert Mordon, A new map of
Germanie (1673). [Scale: ca. 1: 2,750,000]. Map reproduction courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal
Map & Education Center at the Boston Public Library. https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/
commonwealth:cj82kx488. Accessed November 23, 2020
6von Friedeburg (2016), p. 164.
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government’ with coercive legislation—which became known as the genre of
Policey.7 The word entered the German sphere in 1466, in an imperial charter of
Emperor Frederic regarding the ‘Pollizey und regirung’ of the city of Nuremberg.8
Secondly, and strongly connected to the first point of the rise of Policey, was not so
much an adherence to hierarchical order but an emphasis on—what Von Friedeburg
calls—function, being the welfare of the inhabitants.9 Thirdly, the development of an
increasingly well-defined spatial fief since the 1530s10 as a jurisdiction over which
the prince lorded with—more or less—clear-cut relations between ruler and sub-
jects.11 Fourthly, natural law was accepted as being of fundamental importance.12
For instance, it became possible to defend oneself against oppression or resist a
prince, whereas in earlier times one was always to obey a ruler.13 Fifthly, in line with
the thinking of Melanchthon and Althusius, it became accepted that subordinates of
a supreme magistrate (for example, a prince) could take up an office. In the writings
of Melanchthon and Althusius, an example of such an office-holder was ‘ephor’
whose duty encompassed censuring the supreme magistrate.14 The eligibility of a
person for the position of ‘ephor’ differed from thinker to thinker.
The period 1580–1620 was one of relative prosperity, yet one of a religious tug of
war that had to be solved politically and legally.15 It was on this playing field that
German political thought met with the reception of Bodin; shortly followed by the
cruelties of the Thirty Years’ War and post-war period (1648).16 The changes in
political thought described above trickled down into society and were put into
practice. As we will see in the cases of Jülich and Hesse-Cassel in the following
chapters, noblemen adopted the office of patriot in order to object to princely policy.
At the same time, while they resisted their duke or landgrave, they eagerly tried to
avoid any association with rebellion or lèse-majesté, as these were capital crimes.
While the Duke of Jülich and Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel acted according to what
they considered was best for their principality; the nobility perceived these actions as
an infringement of the fatherland’s privileges and their own.
The French author Jean Bodin had an unequalled influence on German political
thought. With his Les six Libres de la République (1576), in which the discussion of
sovereignty is central. Bodin explained that the maiestas, or sovereignty focussed on
one single person wielding all power—with some exceptions—within a ‘state’.
7Romein (2014).
8Iseli (2009), p. 15.
9von Friedeburg (2016), p. 165.
10Ibid., p. 144.: as protestant princes wanted to have control over the clergy in their lands, as such, it




14von Friedeburg (2016), p. 167.
15Ibid., p. 168.
16Ibid., pp. 168–169; von Friedeburg (2013).
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However, within the Holy Roman Empire, this notion was problematic. Neither the
personal maiestas of the emperor, nor the real maiestas of an assembled diet, nor
even the individual princes fulfilled the requirements of Bodin’s sovereign.17 Within
Bodin’s thesis, there was no room for small principalities within a large entity, such
as the Holy Roman Empire. Creatively, scholars sought new interpretations in
representation (Johannes Althusius), or sovereignty exercised by a group of people
(Henning Arnisaeus).18 Althusius’ interpretation in particular can be perceived as an
underlying current in the studied sources from both German principalities as we will
see in the next two chapters.
Bodin’s primary influence should, however, be sought in the burgeoning field of
politics (politica). The main focus of this new field of study was the organisation of
prudence (prudentia) within society.19 Here, Hermann Conring (1606–1681)
interpreted this science as ‘leading and keeping together the civil community.’20
Thanks to Bodin, politica began to receive much attention. Nonetheless, we are
lucky if we find only a few direct references to Bodin, as his ideas mainly set in
motion the use of fatherland terminology.
2.2 German Fatherland Terminology
With its origins in the Latin language, the early usage of fatherland terminology
focusses on the Latin use of the words Patria and natio. Ernst Kantorowicz claimed
the term Patria as ‘an almost obsolete political identity in the earlier Middle Ages’,21
stating that it was merely used either to refer to one’s homeland or habitat,22 or to the
Christian heaven.23 Thomas Eichenberger objects to this stance, having found texts
throughout Europe that use the term Patria, although, admittedly, there are not
many.24 In the medieval context, Eichenberger distinguishes between several
usages. Within geographical references, the term Patria was often used to indicate
the place where a particular tribe lived.25 It could refer to the place one felt at home
or was born (Patria nativitatis).26 Furthermore, some medieval texts certainly had
political references. In the early medieval time, Patria was connected to the gens
17von Friedeburg (2016), p. 296.
18Ibid., p. 298.
19. Ibid., pp. 296, 318.
20Ibid., p. 312.
21Kantorowicz (1957), pp. 232–233.
22Kantorowicz (1951), p. 476.
23Ibid., p. 475.
24Eichenberger (1991), p. 15.
25Ibid., pp. 37–45.
26Ibid., pp. 46–70.
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(tribes).27 During the Merovingian and Carolingian rule, Patria became interchange-
able with the jurisdiction that these kings ruled.28 This latter application, as a
regnum, is abundantly present in texts from the ninth century onwards and became
introduced in legislation as well.29 Person Gobelinus (1358–1421) described a
jurisdiction as:
political borders, which rarely had the shape of a clear and officially accepted demarcation
line; rather, they formed a frontier region marked by overlapping territorial claims as the
local authorities had allegiances to rulers on both sides.30
A prince could claim the title pater patriae to stress his superiority and good
intentions over his regnum. Alexander Schmidt describes how patriots and love for
the fatherland were notions applied to the Holy Roman Empire during the sixteenth
century. His lengthy descriptions show how various authors of political tracts used
the terminology to focus on imperial structure, mainly to avoid competition among
individual princes.31
The Italian Francesco Petrarch used the term natio with its old connotation, being
that of barbarian or uncivilised.32 By using this vocabulary in Latin texts, the
Italians put themselves on a pedestal, claiming to be better than other people and
kill any possible discussion. The latter intention was not achieved, as it fuelled
scholars to stress how civilised their own people were and how beautiful their
fatherland was. Many authors wrote as pen-pushers for princes, putting their argu-
ments in favour of the emperor initially, and later of the lower German princes.33
Still, the application of this terminology was not common in the German language
itself before the Reformation. The use of the Latin language was either to enable
foreign readers to understand the text, or, just because scholarly texts in the vernac-
ular were not held in high esteem.34
Kantorowicz sees three reasons for such a spectacular rise of the vocabulary of
Patria from the thirteenth century onwards—although he denies much presence in
previous eras. Firstly, there is a new focus on individual kingdoms in combination
with the emotional value attributed to the classical use of the vocabulary of patria.
Secondly, the language entered the secular sphere, stating that sacrifices had to be
made for the Patria such as paying tax. Finally, Patria became a glorified,





30Hirschi (2011), p. 105.
31Schmidt (2007).
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The adoption of the terminology of being a loyal patriot who defended the Patria
or fatherland—in the common language—developed during the second half of the
fifteenth century. Robert von Friedeburg points out that Jakob Spiegel’s Lexicon
Iuris Civilis referred to patria as early as 1549. Having cited among the listed
meanings (significationes) of patria, the ‘patria potestas’ (the legal power of the
father over his family), Spiegel also interpreted patria as ‘provincia’, a spatially
defined district.’36 The patria held all power necessary to establish and uphold order.
The combination of ‘provinces’ upholding ‘order’, influenced Althusius’ arguments,
for they became interpreted as legal entities. The heads of these ‘provinces’ held the
maiestas, though they had to recognise the superiority of the emperor.37 Importantly,
Althusius was also explicit on the role of the nobility: ‘[t]he estates, and in particular
the knights, are under the obligation to defend the province, their fatherland.’38
In his discussion of the Holy Roman Empire’s political discourse, Schmidt
focusses on the love for the fatherland and its positioning within the religious
conflicts.39 Schmidt studies the use of fatherland terminology in the work of political
theorists between 1555 and 1648, in reference to the Holy Roman Empire as the
fatherland. Such language was an attempt to divert attention away from internal,
religious discord, towards a unified fatherland. Schmidt concludes that protestants
were more prone to publishing pamphlets than Catholics were. Political terminology
was applied to persuade the readers that there was a necessity to act in the case of an
emergency (Notstadsrechtslehre). The pamphlet-authors presented their readers
with arguments that they should not fight in foreign armies, as that would be an
act against their fatherland.40
According to Caspar Hirschi, the adoption of the terminology of a loyal patriot,
fatherland, and patria was ‘to stress the need for political consolidation in order to
force back foreign enemies.’41 The emperor’s first use of the terminology was
applied in internal communications with the German princes to stress feelings of
pride.42 With that, the emperor pushed a feeling of ‘national honour’43 that
overarched all principalities. Hirschi claims that the traditional economy of honour
became ‘overheated’ as there were too many alterations within society.44 These
changes, being the decline in the number of dynasties on the one hand, and, on the
other, the rise of dynastic agglomerates; indeed manifested itself in the Holy Roman
Empire.45 Hoping to cool down competition within the Holy Roman Empire, these
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attempts aimed to direct aggression to outside the empire.46 The princes indeed used
fatherland terminology in that manner, stressing their attempts to protect their lands
as pater patriae. In the chapter on Hesse-Cassel, we will see how this argument was
employed.
Dynastic ambitions and pre-emptive attempts to strike first to protect the father-
land meant an increase in warfare. Some lands were conquered, others merged as the
result of marriages between dynastic houses, others fell apart due to the lack of an
heir.47 Consequently, during the uncertainties of the early seventeenth century, the
nobility sought a means to express their opinions and protect their tenants. The
nobility employed legal specialists and scholars to address their concerns. In the end,
they found themselves applying the same terminology of the fatherland, Patria, and
patriot. Expressing concerns was a tricky business, as it came close to resisting
princely politics. The innovative use of fatherland terminology, as described above,
offered ample possibilities. By claiming to hold the office of a patriot, one bypassed
the conventional hierarchical structure of being subjected to a prince. Placing oneself
outside this structure, it became possible to comment on the situation at hand and to
(re)open channels of communications. With that (renewed) communication, it
became possible to discuss a new power structure, which became evident after the
Thirty Years’ War. As Tim Neu shows, this gave room to bring the concept of
political representation to the table.48
As mentioned above, Schmidt has studied the fatherland discourse of the Holy
Roman Empire as unifying rhetoric. He acknowledges that the terminology could be
used by the nobility to offer critique, stressing their undisputed love for the father-
land. Schmidt uses Von Friedeburg’s work to exemplify the use of fatherland
terminology within a principality. He explains this as being an adaptation of the
argumentation used for the entire empire.49 Schmidt offers no other examples for
such local use. In the next chapters, I show that the terminology was used in Hesse-
Cassel, but also in Jülich as a means of critiquing policy during the tumultuous times
of the mid-seventeenth century.
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Chapter 3
Jülich: Pamphlets and Cologne
Get-Togethers (1640s–1650s)
In the early months of 1645, the nobility of the German principality of Jülich
assembled in a convent in Cologne. They wanted to discuss what they perceived
to be an abuse of sovereign power by Wolfgang Wilhelm, Count Palatine of
Neuburg, Duke of Jülich and Berg. They accused Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm of
excessive taxation and attempting to implement an absolutus Dominatus in their
principality.1 The duke could not prevent this assembly because Cologne was
outside his jurisdiction.2 The attending nobility considered themselves patriots,
and claimed to act out of patriotic affection for their beloved fatherland and its
inhabitants.3 They referred to themselves, explicitly, as loyal patriots.4 The use of
this terminology implied that the nobles saw themselves as acting for the greater
good of the fatherland. As such, they shifted the focus to their deeds, rather than the
duke’s perceived misbehaviour. The Catholic Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm was not
born in the principality, nor was he officially recognised by the emperor as ruler over
Jülich. The nobles’ statement implied that they considered the duke to be but a
temporary ruler who had come to power as a result of the war of succession
(1609–1614).5 As an already contested duke, the nobility considered his
overstepping of boundaries an even greater offence than if he had been a de jure
ruler.
The above example illustrates how the nobility of Jülich reacted to the ongoing
warfare due to the severe threat it was perceived to pose to the inhabitants, the
1JL Akten 40, 3 March 1645, p. 6.
2Importantly, Cologne was known for its unique position with regard to freedom and liberty. See:
Bellingradt (2011), p. 41.
3JL Akten 40, 3 March 1645, p. 6.
Translations have been made by the author, unless stated otherwise.
4JL 44, 18 May 1648. The German phrase here used is: ‘getrewer Patriot’.
5The legitimacy of his claims were still disputed in the 1640s; see JL 40, 3 March 1645, p. 5; Leffers
(1971); Janssen (1997), p. 195.
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dominant position of the nobility, and the means of existence within the principality.
The small German Duchy of Jülich was situated at the western border of the Holy
Roman Empire. The principality was rich in resources, had a population of just
215,000, and only a few nobles.6 Like in the other Lower Rhine principalities, most
people in Jülich were Catholics, with about 25% of the inhabitants adhering to one of
the protestant religions. The Niederrhein principalities were involved in agriculture,
mining (coal and iron), and the textile industry.7 As such, the area was an essential
granary for the region.
The Lower Rhine principalities, including Jülich, were involved in a war of
succession between 1608 and 1614. The provisional Treaty of Xanten (1614) failed
to resolve the succession issues, only postponing the decision. Neither the inhabi-
tants of Jülich nor the emperor accepted Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm as the new ruler of
Jülich. Throughout the Thirty Years’War, this unresolved succession caused tension
and conflict. The duke wished to protect ‘his’ principalities Jülich and Berg, but he
faced severe difficulties and opposition when endeavouring to obtain the consent of
the nobility. He attempted to remain neutral by buying off armed forces. Unfortu-
nately, this policy resulted not only in soaring costs but also in attracting soldiers in
search of money. The longer the war lasted, the more difficult it became for the
troops to acquire enough food and money, and for the armies to recruit fresh troops.
The nobles felt the duke’s actions harmed the principality; they objected to taxation
without their prior consent. These actions all added to their fear that the duke sought
to extend his power at their expense. The deteriorating situation had four causes.
Firstly, Jülich and Berg were obliged to pay 36,000 and 24,000 Reichsthaler
respectively, each year.8 Secondly, in 1642 Emperor Ferdinand III (1608–1657)
believed that both principalities needed the imperial troops’ defensive presence—
at their own expense.9 Thirdly, taxes, billeting soldiers, and theft burdened the
subjects of the principalities heavily.10 When such payments were not made in
full, or were simply late, noblemen were held hostage until full payment had been
received. Lastly, the nobility of Jülich and Berg objected to the duke’s policy and
blamed him for causing trouble.
Consequently, the nobility met to discuss the welfare of their principality. They
claimed that Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm had caved in to the demands of the Hessian
landgravine, forcing ‘his’ people to pay the price and suffer the consequences.
Referring to the war of succession (1609–1614), during which Duke Wolfgang
Wilhelm had taken control of the principalities of Jülich and Berg and became
6Tornow (1974), p. 5.
7Smolinsky (1993), p. 89.
8Engelbert (1959), p. 69.
For comparative reasons, this would be worth 935,280 grams of silver for Jülich. 1 Reichsthaler
being 25.98 g of silver; according to Christmann (2002), p. 213. This amount can be expressed in
kilocalories that would become available if for example grain were to have been bought with this
money. This can be used to compare the areas with each other.
9Engelbert (1960), p. 38.
10Engelbert (1959), p. 76.
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their de facto ruler, the Imperial commander Lamboy pointed out that the duke may
not have been acting in the best interest of the inhabitants of his principality.11 The
nobility used historical examples specific to Jülich to counter the harmful policy of
Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm. The new duke had started on the wrong foot, which three
examples can illustrate. Firstly, he inherited the duchies and only became a de facto
ruler as Emperor Matthias (1557–1619) did not acknowledge the succession. Sec-
ondly, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm converted to Catholicism shortly before accepting
governance over the principalities of Jülich and Berg, where the population was
predominantly Lutheran. Thirdly, the duke was forced to allow soldier billeting,
from which he extracted large sums of money as well as food from the population.
This combination of factors elicited an angry response from the nobility.
The invitations to nobless assemblies, and the pamphlets written at these events
referred to participants as loyal patriots. They were called to assembly to discuss
protecting the welfare and prosperity of the fatherland. Salient to the argumentation
of the nobility was that the illegal taxes seriously harmed the inhabitants of Jülich.
Although not all amounts are known, the perceived impact was enormous. The
population decreased, and material damages as well as the costs of the billeting of
soldiers added to this perception. As payments had to be prompt, for example,
needing to be delivered within a few days, a lot of pressure was placed upon the
inhabitants as a result, as impatient soldiers demanded their earnings. The pamphlets
and letters show that there was not much room to negotiate any delay in payment.
Despite the nobility’s protests, troops poured into the duchy, setting up camps and
billeting soldiers in houses. With the exception of billeting soldiers, these activities
had been common practice during the first part of the Thirty Years’ War. However,
from 1640 onwards, military activities intensified and were scaled up. By the autumn
of 1640, the living conditions in Jülich had deteriorated enormously. Imperial
Commander Guillaume de Lamboy (1590–1659) had stationed his troops in the
south, while the Hessian troops had settled in the north with the support of the
French.12
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the discussions and deploy the above-
sketched argumentation the nobility of Jülich had. The pamphlets and letters from
the nobility will play a pivotal role in explaining their focus. Rainer Walz has studied
the activities of the Landstände, but he did not specifically focus on their use of
terminology. He did notice that the nobility did not eagerly accept Duke Wolfgang
Wilhelm’s policy and did object. To understand the tensions between the nobility
and the duke, I discuss the dynastic lineage and the history of the principality from
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3.1 Jülich’s Early History Until the War of Succession
(1609–1614)
The dynastic agglomerate Jülich-Guelders fell apart shortly after the death of heirless
Duke Rainald of Jülich-Guelders (c.1365–1423). Duke Adolf (c.1370–1437)
succeeded in gaining control over Jülich and Guelders and merged them with the
Duchy of Berg, and the County of Ravensberg in a personal union in 1423.13 After
Adolf’s death, these principalities were separated and redistributed among various
heirs. During the Third Guelderian War of Succession (1538-1543) Wilhelm V, ‘the
Rich’, Duke of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, (1516–1592) attempted to regain Guelders and
unite the entities again. His Landstände and those of Guelders and of Zutphen
welcomed this attempt.14 This way, conversions to Catholicism could be averted.15
However, the other claimant—Emperor Charles V (1500–1558)—besieged the city
of Düren (in Jülich) in 1543 to ward off the claims of Wilhelm V. An army of 30 to
40,000 men pillaged and burned the city. Wilhelm V was eventually forced to sign
the Treaty of Venlo (7 September 1543).16 With this treaty, authority over Guelders
passed to Charles V.
Wilhelm V maintained control of his other principalities for 52 years, until his
death in 1592. His only surviving son Johann Wilhelm (1562–1609) succeeded him.
In 1585, Duke Johann Wilhelm of Jülich-Cleves-Berg (1562–1609) married Jacoba
of Baden-Baden (1558–1597). Five years into a childless marriage, the worried
nobility started to look for potential successors. The nephews of the duke were
probable heirs.17 The nobility openly discussed the possibility to ask the duke to
annul the current marriage and remarry.18 However, any divorce would have met
with strong opposition from the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II (1552–1612), as
well as the curie. The problems surrounding a divorce were resolved when Jacoba
suddenly passed away in 1597, under suspicious circumstances.19 The negotiations
to conclude a new marriage soon commenced.20 In 1599, Duke Johann Wilhelm
married Antonia of Lorraine (1568–1610). Unfortunately, this union did not result in
any offspring either (Map 3.1).
Claimants to the enfeoffment of the Lower-Rhine Area presented themselves to
Emperor Rudolf II even before Duke Johann Wilhelm’s death on 25 March 1609.
13The Estates of Jülich and Berg did not integrate; they retained certain bureaucratic privileges.
Each of the estates was made up of two curies: the nobility and the main cities. There was no
representation of the clergy within the estates. Janssen (1984), pp. 18, 22. Jülich had become a
Duchy in 1356; Berg in 1380; Cleves followed in 1417.
14Ibid., pp. 18, 24; von Looz-Corswaren (2003), Engelbrecht (1994) and Bers (1970).
15Hantsche and Krähe (2003), p. 36.
16Essink (1973), pp. 44–45; Keverling Buisman (2003).
17Mostert (2002).
18Janssen (1997), pp. 189–192.
19Braubach and Schulte (1925), p. 206.
20Janssen (1997), pp. 189–192.
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Among them were Johann George I. Prince-Elector of Saxony—based upon an old
agreement—and the duke’s close relatives (see below): the houses of Brandenburg,
Palatinate-Neuburg, Palatinate-Zweibrücken, and Burgau. In addition, the various
Habsburg families expressed an interest in the regional developments, as did the
Dutch Republic, France, England, Denmark, and Sweden.21 Furthermore, several
diets, curies, and both the Protestant and Catholic leagues, closely monitored the
course of events (Fig. 3.1).22
This broad political interest in the Lower-Rhine succession was due to the
economic strength and geographical position of its principalities, which bordered
on Spanish and Dutch provinces as well as on the river Rhine.23 The Dutch Republic
felt seriously threatened by the idea of a potential Catholic ally of the emperor ruling
Map 3.1 Duchies of Jülich and Berg (seventeenth century). Map by Willem Janszoon Blaeu,
Iuliacensis et Montensis Ducatus¼De Hertoghdomen Gulick en Berghe (1635). https://collections.
leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:cj82kr34w Accessed November 23, 2020. Map reproduc-
tion courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal Map and Education Center at the Boston Public Library
21Braubach and Schulte (1925), pp. 205–210; Wagner (1977), pp. 63–64; Wilson (2004),
pp. 115, 187.
22Bergerhausen (2011), p. 56.
23The Niederrhein principalities were involved in agriculture, mining (coal and iron), and the textile
industry. See: Smolinsky (1993), p. 89.
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a neighbouring principality and sided with the Protestants. Since the Lower-Rhine
Area was bordering the Republic’s most vulnerable river-area, it was considered
risky for it to be ruled by a pro-Spanish Catholic prince.24 A river-entry had been
made by the Spanish commander Ambrogio Spínola Doria, Marquis of the Balbases
(1569–1630), in 1605-6, when he invaded the Republic. As such, the Dutch had
legitimate cause for concern.25
Three different legal justifications formed the basis of the claims held by relatives
of the late duke and by the House of Saxony to inherit the Lower Rhine principal-
ities.26 Firstly, a claim based upon an old privilege. In 1483, Albrecht III
(1443–1500), Duke of Saxony, had gained the right to inherit the Lower-Rhine
principalities. Emperor Friedrich III (1415–1493) had granted this privilege, and
Maximilian I as King of the Romans (1459–1519) confirmed it in 1486 to both Duke
Albrecht III and Elector Ernst of Saxony (1441–1486). The right to inherit the
principalities had never been revoked, though arguably, this particular right applied
solely to the Albertine dynasty and not to the Ernestine line of the House of Saxony.
It was, therefore, generally considered to be a relatively weak claim.27
Much stronger claims could be based upon a privilege granted by Emperor
Charles V to William ‘the Rich’ in 1546, the Privilegium Successionis (Eng:
Succession Privilege). This privilege stipulated that any male child of the eldest
sister’s family line would be considered to be heir to the principality when the male
line had died out. However, two different interpretations—and thus justifications—
of this privilege exist. The first interpretation reads that if the first possible female
line lacked male heirs—whether they be sons or grandsons—another sister’s sons
would become eligible. The husband of Johann Wilhelm’s niece Anna, Johann
Sigismund, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg (1572–1619), considered that his son
fulfilled this requirement. This son, Georg Wilhelm, (1595–1640) was the great-
nephew of the deceased duke and secured the future succession. According to this
argument, it was important that the eldest sister had male offspring; however, it did
not matter whether this was a son or a grandson—as would be the case of the House
of Brandenburg. The second interpretation of this same privilege reads that the eldest
nephew of the late duke should be considered to be the next in line to inherit the fief.
Consequently, no claims could be made by a grand-nephew as only nephews were
eligible. This interpretation excluded the House of Brandenburg and offered
Wolfgang Wilhelm the possibility of claiming his late uncle’s fief.
In addition to the Succession Privilege, the Privilegium Unionis (Eng: Unification
Privilege) had been bestowed on the principalities by Emperor Charles V in 1546.
Such a Unification Privilege prevented the separation of the principalities without
the emperor’s consent in case of succession. Due to these various rules, privileges,
24Israel (1998), p. 407.
25Ibid., p. 407; W Isaacson (1933), p. 14; Petri and Droege (1976), p. 95.
26Anderson (1999), p. 249.
27Ibid., p. 250.
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and treaties, the succession became a highly complicated matter with many
stakeholders.
In June 1609, Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel (1572–1632) arbitrated in
Dortmund between the two Lutheran princes of Brandenburg and Neuburg, and an
agreement was reached concerning the succession.28 The result was a treaty which
allowed a joint government overall Lower-Rhine principalities.29 With 75% of the
total population of the combined principalities being Catholic, changes towards
Lutheranism were deemed unlikely.30 The treaty, therefore, stipulated the guarantee
of the religious status quo. Despite the quick outcome and otherwise peaceful
conclusion, Emperor Rudolf II (1552–1612) objected to the Dortmund Treaty. At
Rudolf’s request, Archduke Leopold V of Further Austria (1586–1632) occupied the
town of Jülich, and forces were drawn to the borders of the Palatinate as the emperor
wanted to favour other claimants.31 Military tensions rose, as the two Lutheran
princes could rely on the support of the Dutch Republic, England, and France.32
Religion seemed to have become the focal point of—what later became known as—
the first crisis in the war of succession.33 Shortly after the Treaty of Dortmund,
Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel was reminded of an ancient heritage-oath
(Erbeinigung).34 This alliance, which had been passed down for generations, was
meant to protect ruling families from fighting and harming each other’s interests.35
Houses of Hesse, Saxony, and Brandenburg had concluded this heritage oath. It
collided with this treaty of Dortmund, and it endangered the alliance between the
Protestant dukes.36 As a result, Landgrave Maurice was forced to withdraw his
support and keep his distance. With three possible successors—the Houses of
Saxony, Brandenburg, and Neuburg—each referring to a different privilege, it was
painful to (re-)establish an uncontested peace.
On 11 February 1610, just months before to the murder of King Henry IV of
France (1553–1610), the Treaty of Hall (in Swabia) was signed.37 The treaty aimed
to secure the claims of the Houses of Brandenburg and Neuburg. To secure the
princes’ government, other parties—such as the Dutch Republic, England, and
28Smolinsky (1993); Lünig (1713), pp. 69–73.
29Janssen (1984), p. 35.
30Gabel (2002).
31Asch (2005); Two ‘Einzelblatt’ or ‘Flugblätter’ have been published with regard to this event
which lasted from 28 July till 2 September 1610. Harms et al. (1980), pp. 162–163.
32Gabel (2002).
33Israel (1998), p. 407.
34In 1646 the Erbeinigung (heritage-oath) is (again) mentioned in a Hessian document:
Nothwendiger Bericht, darauß zu sehen, Daß nicht allein die, von Hessen-Cassel erlangte
(S.I. 1646) 3.
35Anderson (1999), p. 59.
36Ibid., p. 59.
37Trim (1999), p. 339.
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France—discussed military involvement.38 The unexpected death of Henry IV, in
May 1610, did not undermine French involvement in the conflict, but France’s
ability to act decelerated as a result of the loss their inspiring force and financier.39
The truce with Spain muted the Dutch, too, in defending the interests of the Houses
of Brandenburg and Palatine of Neuburg. Helping the Protestant princes just across
the Republic’s borders by providing a supporting force of 12,250 men could result in
the Dutch having to fight Spanish Habsburg troops and potentially breach the
truce.40 Although it was not certain that any fighting would occur, it became more
likely when Archduke Leopold went to Prague to claim the principalities on behalf
of Emperor Rudolf II.41 The Dutch, with French assistance, regained the fortress of
the city of Jülich, while the Spanish troops occupied the city of Wesel, in the Duchy
of Cleves.42 Although the emperor had not provided the archduke with military
forces, it was clear that the archduke had his consent.
In the meantime, Johann George I, Prince-Elector of Saxony wished to collabo-
rate in governing the Lower-Rhine Area. Negotiations with Johann Sigismund,
Prince-Elector of Brandenburg had been successful, and the two princes had
drawn up a revision of the Hall Treaty. This revision is known as the Treaty of
Jüterbog (March 1611), which now had to be ratified by the third party directly
involved: the House of Palatine Neuburg.43 Neither the emperor approved of it, nor
did Philip Louis, Count Palatine of Neuburg (1547–1614), father to Wolfgang
Wilhelm, agree to the alterations of the Hall Treaty.44 Subsequently, Johann Sigis-
mund, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg withdrew his initial support to the Jüterbog
proposal. However, it was too late, as he had lost much of his credibility by
negotiating in the first place.
Nevertheless, the House of Wittelsbach—to which Count Palatine of Neuburg
belonged—was left to explain to its international allies why it had not assented to the
Jüterbog plan in the first place, it having been designed to lead to peace. The allies
stressed the importance of reopening the negotiations. However, the emperor beat
them to it by initiating a neutral committee to prepare a cordial agreement with all
principal claimants.45 Both the Catholic League and its Protestant counterpart then
attempted to strengthen their positions by luring the Prince-Elector of Saxony into
their camp. At the same time, the emperor attempted to reform the Catholic alliance
to benefit the interests of all princes, in a similar attempt to woo the House of
Saxony.46 This tug-of-war lasted until 1614.
38Lünig (1713), pp. 76–78.
39Asch (2005), p. 30.
40Ibid., p. 31; Trim (1999), p. 340.
41Trim (1999), p. 340; Bergerhausen (2011), p. 56.
42Asch (2005), p. 31.
43Anderson (1999), p. 139.
44Ibid., pp. 139–147.
45Ibid., pp. 142–143.
46Asch (2005), p. 32.
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Wolfgang Wilhelm of Neuburg converted to Catholicism on 19 July 1613.47 He
was perhaps prompted by anxiety that Johann Sigismund, Prince-Elector of Bran-
denburg might acquire the principalities for his son, or perhaps because he feared
that another Catholic prince—other than one of the previously mentioned claim-
ants—might be favoured. His interests in the Catholic princess Magdalena of
Bavaria (1587–1628) certainly also contributed to the religious change. His conver-
sion was kept a secret—even from his father—until 25 May 1614. From this date on,
inhabitants of newly founded convents arrived in Jülich and Berg.48 Protestant
believers in Jülich and Berg received a reassurance: as fellow-Christians, they
needed not to convert.49 Catholic princes united together, with the backing of
Spain and Austria, to support Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm. At the same time, Georg
Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg, changed his religious preference to Cal-
vinism. This conversion ensured his alliance with England and the Dutch Republic,
as well as with other Protestant principalities, e.g. the Palatinate.50
The tension increased in early 1614, and the threat of another war was imminent.
The Northern Netherlands preferred to see peace restored at its border. Military
governor Frederik van Pithan (1552–1632) of the Dutch forces felt the need to
request more troops on 5 May:51 a second crisis started. The movement of Dutch
troops was interpreted as an act of aggression, despite explanatory letters sent to both
the Johann Sigismund, Prince-Elector Brandenburg and the Duke of Neuburg. The
Republic was, after all, helping the Calvinist pretender, and even expelled the
Catholic contester from Düsseldorf.52 In August, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm
requested the help of 15,000 soldiers from the Habsburg Netherlands to secure his
control.53 Finally, under the supervision of France and England, the truce was
ratified in November.54
The Treaty of Xanten of 12 November 1614 concluded the war of succession and
warfare finally ceased. Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm and Johann Sigismund, Prince-
Elector of Brandenburg were both acknowledged to be heirs of the land, but not
accorded the status of de jure rulers.55 The treaty itself was a provisional agreement
dividing the government over the lands; it did not divide the dynastic agglomerate, as
this would go against the imperial Privilegium Unionis of 1546.56 This arrangement
was meant to avoid more conflict but failed, as the religious disputes did not end. The
47Janssen (1984), p. 35; Mader (2004), pp. 109–142; Hufschmidt (2004); Anderson (1999), p. 146.
48Ackermann (2004), p. 92; Motte (2002).
49Ackermann (2004).
50Petri and Droege (1976), p. 107.
51Considering the 1609 struggle as the first crisis.
52Anderson (1999), pp. 152–155, 163–170.
53Parker (1997), pp. xvi–xviii, 25.
54Ibid., p. 27.
55Lünig, Das Teutsche Reichs Archiv, 82-86; Petri and Droege (1976), pp. 109–111; Asch (2005),
pp. 26–34.
56Lünig, Das Teutsche Reichs Archiv, 82–86; von Looz-Corswarem (2014).
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prince-elector wanted freedom of religion, whereas Wolfgang Wilhelm did not.57 It
all came down to a conflict of interest, over how best to govern principalities and
their churches, especially since both possessors had changed faith. Duke Wolfgang
Wilhelm accepted the influence of the bishops, whereas Johann Sigismund, Prince-
Elector of Brandenburg did not.58 The bishops’ influence would be accepted until
1624—the year of additional provisional agreements on religious matters.59 From
that year onwards, Protestant meetings were forbidden; 4 years later, the Protestant
Latin School in the principality of Jülich closed.60
3.2 Jülich Until the Peace of Prague (1635)
Despite the Provisional Treaty of Xanten, the inhabitants of the principalities had
difficulty accepting either Johann Sigismund, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg, and
his successor Georg Wilhelm, or Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm. Failure to honour
existing privileges and to obtain the nobility’s consent in matters of taxations
contributed to the tense relationship. The emperor did not accept the two princes
as legitimate heirs either.
In 1621, Spínola sent 10,000 men to the town of Jülich in order to secure the land
west of the river Rhine. As the Spanish-Dutch truce had ended, the principality of
Jülich was seen as an advantageous base of operations. The nobility of the nearby
Duchy of Berg protested against the presence of Dutch garrisons stationed in its
principality. In addition, the two de facto rulers Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm and Georg
Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg opposed each other’s religious policies.61
The Spanish soldiers extorted the inhabitants of the principality of Jülich. The Dutch
tried to influence policy by way of catching and stretching (Germ.: Fangen und
Spannen) hostages, especially clergymen.62 In response, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm
raised an army of 2500 men to protect both ‘his’ principalities, and he even managed
to control the County of Ravensberg in 1622 temporarily.
In 1624, this was the first Landtag since the assembly of 1611. Many grievances
were put forward, caused by the problematic situation. The nobility eventually
consented to the requested taxation but only for defensive military purposes.63
However, more was levied than previously agreed. This discrepancy led to opposi-
tion from the nobility, as the money was spent on an army to fight the Georg
Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg. A new Landtag convened in 1625. It
57Engelbrecht (1994), p. 155.
58Jaitner (1973), pp. 69–76.
59Leffers (1971) and Ackermann (2004).
60Leffers (1971), Ackermann (2004) and Smolinsky (1993).
61Ackermann (2004), Leffers (1971) and Dahm (1951).
62Wilson (2010), p. 331.
63Walz (1982), pp. 43, 146–149.
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seemed that the duke attempted to gain the upper hand during this meeting, while the
nobility emphasised their privileges. These privileges included the right to organise
assemblies without the duke’s presence, as part of the ‘landständische’ freedom
(ständische Freiheit), and subsequently, they organised just such an assembly.64
As a consequence of the unauthorised increases in taxation in 1624 and 1625, the
nobility lodged a complaint at the Aulic Court in 1626, hoping to obtain a verdict
concerning the violation of their privileges.65 Indeed, in 1627 a Pönal mandat
(Engl.: penal mandate) was issued to prevent taxation without the necessary consent
of the nobility.66 This Mandatum cassatorium et inhibitorium67 stated that Duke
Wolfgang Wilhelm would be fined 100 Goldmark if he ignored the nobility’s
privileges again. The duke’s presence in court caused a suspension of the ruling;
however, this did not mean that his actions were accepted. The emperor himself
vouched for the nobility’s safety and their protection.
A year later, imperial military victories threatened the position of the duke. These
successes reaffirmed that the emperor could reclaim and regain the Lower-Rhine
Area by force. The duke undermined his position even further by—again—
requisitioning taxes without consent. The emperor had guaranteed the safety of the
nobility, and a new legal complaint was filed. During the long Landtag (Sept. 1628-
April 1629) the Prince-Electors of Bavaria and Cologne mediated.68 On the agenda
were: (1) the duke’s willingness to participate in warfare; (2) the levying of taxes
without consent; and (3) the exercise of office by foreign employees. They reached a
compromise on 25 March 1629, in which neither of the complainants gained the
upper-hand.69 The Landstände sought the emperor’s recognition of this compro-
mise. However, if they did not succeed, they could go to the Aulic Court to pursue
legal recognition and enforcement of the compromise.70 At the next Landtag in
1631, it became clear that both the Landstände and the duke had accepted the
compromise.
Between 1629 and 1631, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm and Georg Wilhelm, Prince-
Elector of Brandenburg made an agreement not to dispute each other’s claims for
25 years, which should prevent them from losing the Lower-Rhine principalities.71
Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm also concluded a neutrality pact with both the Spanish and




67With such a mandate, claimants were protected as well as their possessions (inhibitorium) and
were also protected from prosecution (cassatorium). See: Neu (2013), p. 194; Romein
(2015), p. 122.
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had allowed Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm to pursue this in 1630 and accordingly
acknowledged the successful agreement (1635).73 Despite the acclaimed neutrality,
troops continued to march through the principality as a result of its ideal geograph-
ical location.74
In 1632, foreign troops started plundering the principalities of Jülich and Berg
once again. First the Swedish armies, then the imperial forces, and later on the
Hessian troops all passed through the Lower-Rhine Area, leaving destruction in their
wake. Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm struggled not to enter the war, but peculiarly
enough, it was the emperor himself who caused problems when it came to
maintaining the precarious balance.75 Firstly, the emperor used the principalities
of Jülich as the assembly point for his troops. Secondly, the emperor seemed to
assume that long-term billeting would not cause any problems.76 Thirdly, the
imperial army had to be financially supported by the inhabitants, even after the
Peace of Prague (1635). Fourthly, the burdens of war—such as arson, damage to
houses and fruit trees by soldiers, the severe disruption of trade, and extortion—were
seen as unavoidable, and generally took place with impunity.77 The emperor did not
consider any of these issues to impede the neutrality of Jülich.
In 1633, the nobility did not attend the Landtag altogether in protest. Their
absence meant that it was impossible to obtain approval for taxations. As a result,
the duke’s levying of taxes became illegal.78 However, between 1635 and 1649, the
nobility established their system to tax the commoners, concerning their traditional
privileges.79 Unable to communicate with the duke’s council, the nobles assembled
in 1634 without notifying him, pointing to their right to organise assemblies.80 While
gathered, the nobility criticised princely politics. This critique focussed on two main
issues: (1) that the nobility had not been consulted; and, (2) that the duke’s armed
forces remained present in the principality.
3.2.1 Until the Peace of Westphalia (1648)
In January 1636 a pamphlet was distributed in the Duchies of Jülich and Berg
announcing the imperial request to provide 2000-foot soldiers as well as
300 horses.81 The request could not be refused, despite the expressed understanding
73Engelbert (1959), p. 67.
74Kaiser (2002), pp. 182–188.
75Walz (1982), p. 45.
76Kaiser (2002), pp. 182–188.
77Ibid., p. 193.
78Walz (1982), p. 61.
79Ibid., pp. 112–118.
80Ibid., p. 47.
81JL Akten 47, 7 Januari 1636: 297 v-298 r.
3.2 Jülich Until the Peace of Prague (1635) 47
that this would burden the principalities. The pamphlet stressed that the contribution
was necessary to provide the principality’s defences. The situation in Jülich-Berg
and Cleves-Mark deteriorated even further from 1639 onward: armed forces from
Hesse-Cassel invaded the Lower-Rhine Area in need of resources and recruits.82
These troops successfully applied pressure on Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm, resulting in
monthly fees totalling 60,000 Reichsthaler per year: 36,000 Reichsthaler for Jülich,
24,000 for Berg.83 The duke had hoped that these payments would result in the
withdrawal of troops, but instead, they attracted more foreign troops who hoped to
extract money. These included imperial forces in 1642, who claimed that they
constituted a protective presence, since neutrality was impossible.84 Consequently,
the people of Jülich and Berg paid higher taxes and experienced an increase in the
billeting of soldiers.85 The nobility blamed the deterioration of affairs on the duke’s
policy, which the nobility had previously objected.
In mid-January of 1642, the town of Uerdingen was besieged.86 The presence of
the various armed forces resulted in the only battle fought in the Lower-Rhine Area
during the Thirty Years’ War, the battle at St. Tönis-Haide near the town of
Kempen.87 Catholic armed forces of Cologne and the emperor’s army clashed
with the joined forces of France, Weimar and Hesse-Cassel. As Hesse-Cassel
outnumbered the imperial forces, they decided to attack before the arrival of the
Catholic reinforcements. Imperial Field Marshal, Melchior Graf von Gleichen und
Hatzfeldt (1593–1658) led these troops and was en route to assist Guillaume de
Lamboy’s army. Outnumbered and lacking the protection of a strategic position, the
Imperial-Cologne forces were defeated.88 Their Supreme Commander Lamboy was
imprisoned, together with many officers, and approximately 4000 ordinary soldiers.
The remainder of the army fled, and some joined the army of Imperial Field Marshal,
Hatzfeldt.89 Roaming soldiers posed a significant threat to stability, peace, and well-
being. The troop movements continued, and many people fled the Lower-Rhine Area
82During previous years, soldiers had been billeted in the Jülich-Berg principalities, but not on such
a large scale. See Walz (1982), p. 47.
83JL Akten 38, 21 December 1641 (printed): Kayserlich Schreiben an Gülische Landt-Standt
abgegangen Ferdinandt der Dritte von Gottes Gnaden, Erwohlter Römischer Kayser zu alten
Zeiten (p. 466 r-467 v); Engelbert (1959), p. 69; For an indication on the value of the currency
Wilson (2010), p. xxii.
84Engelbert (1960), p. 38.
85Engelbert (1959), p. 76.
86The town was already besieged by the end of December 1641, according to imperial writing: JL
Akten 38, 21 December 1641 (printed): Kayserlich Schreiben an Gülische Landt-Standt
abgegangen Ferdinandt der Dritte von Gottes Gnaden, Erwohlter Römischer Kayser zu alten
Zeiten (p. 466 r–467 v).
87von Schaumburg (1882), p. 66; Kaiser (2002), p. 189.
This location was also known as: Kempe(ne)r Haide, Hülser Haide, St.Tönis Haide/ St. Antony’s
Haide or abbr. Tönis Haide or just as ‘the Haide’.
88Reichmann (2009), pp. 186–187.
89Wilson (2010), p. 633; von Schaumburg (1882); Engelbert (1959); Engelbert (1960), p. 59.
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to escape the horrors of war. They went into hiding in cities, forests, and across the
borders, especially in the Dutch Republic.90 In September 1642, Duke Wolfgang
Wilhelm informed the city of Jülich that it would be receiving 300 ‘guests’. These
soldiers would arrive through the Jülich or citadel gate under the command of
Imperial Field Marshal Hatzfeldt and General Von Blumenthal.91 The town’s
residents were much displeased.
When imperial commander Hatzfeldt left, the Lower-Rhine Area became,
militarily-speaking, less attractive to the emperor. Hatzfeldt was in pursuit of Jean
Baptiste Budes, Count of Guébriant (1602–1643), who fought under French com-
mand. Shortly after the departure, the nobility organised an assembly.92 They met on
Saturday 8 November in the Dominican convent of the city of Cologne.93 Here, they
intended to talk about their beloved fatherland’s hardships, and the Landstände
considered it their duty to do whatever they could to protect it.94 The nobles planned
to discuss the duke’s expenses, which he expected the commoners to pay. These
were a high burden, and the nobility believed that they oppressed the fatherland.
Those invited were urged to attend and reminded that a discussion of the problematic
90Engelbert (1960), p. 78.
91JL Akten 39, 23 September 1642.
92Engelbert (1960), p. 57.
93This seems to be the Predikercloister on Arnold Mercator - Kölner Stadtansicht (1571). This map
was drawn of the city of Cologne in 1571. The convent burned down 2 March 1659. See for more
information the website of the Archbishopric Cologne: Geschichte der Dominikaner in Köln.
94JL Akten 39, 29 October 1642 (one-page leaflet, printed): Demnach bey jetzigem zustant wegen
unterschiedlich eingefallenen Ursachen, auch auff gutbefinden der hochlöblichen generalitet der
Kayserlichen KriegsVolckern, die hohe notturfft erfordert, das beyder Fürstenthumb Gülich und
Berg herrn Landtstände förderlichst zusammen beschrieben werden, umb ober deβ lieben
Vatterlandts obligen zu deliberiren und die notthurfft vorzustellen: und dan mir so woll vermög
vor diesem gemachten Landtags conclusis als sonsten ex speciali commissione auffgeben worden,
das auch bey abgang deβ Gülischen Syndici auff erforderten nothfall die Herrn Landtstände
obgemelter beyder Fürstenthumben einbeschreiben solte, gestalt Sambstag der 8. negst
einstehenden Monats Nouemb[e]r hieselbst in Cölln in der Herrn Dominicaner Closter zu
erscheinen anbestimbt worden.
Alβ wollen Ew. G. sich gefallen lassen gegen jetzt gemelten tag an besagtem ort deβ vormittags
umb 9. uhren zu erscheinen, noch sich daran nicht behindern lassen, damit auch bey diesen ohne
das fast beschwerlichen leufften, nit die im gemelten termino erscheinende mit vieler zeit, und
vergeblicher kösten verlierung, auff die andere spätter einkommende sich verdrietzlich auffzuhalten
gemüssiget, und die nöhtige deliberationes dardurch verzogen werden. So wirdt ein jeder hiemit
fleisigst erinnert, das daran sein wolle, das in bemeltem termino sich einstelle und die notturfft mit
vorgehender reisslicher deliberation trewlich nach beschaffenen sachen einrahten helffe, und
sintemalen wegen jetzigen Kriegs unwesen gar schwerlich diese auβschreibens einem jeden
Ritterbürtigen können eingeliefert werden, so wollen die jenige so hiemit angelangt werden, dern
benachbarten welchen vieleicht dieses auβschreiben nit zukommen würde dieser conuention
erinnern, unnd gleich daran dem Vatterlandt bey diesen zerrütteten zeiten unnd Kriegs unwesen
ein mercklicher dienst erwiesen wirdt, also versehet man sich es werde auch ein jeder hiehin zu
erscheinen sich kein bedenckens machen. Sign. Cölln den 29. Octobr. [October] Anno 1642. Ex
Commissione DD.
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contributions to the Hessian army was scheduled.95 During this November meeting,
the nobles of Jülich appointed a syndic. Sigismund Mockel would represent them
and safeguard the nobility’s interests after that.96
In 1643, the city of Düren was damaged, and everyday life obstructed. The
nobility discussed these problems, and they agreed to reduce the burdens of
Düren.97 Debating the destitution and prosperity (Germ.: Wollfahrt) of ‘our beloved
Fatherland’98 was on the agenda for the next assembly in Cologne, on 2 May 1643.99
The subject of the debate was how prosperity could be improved.100 Following this
assembly, the nobility published a pamphlet containing its grievances regarding the
duke’s behaviour. The pamphlet mentioned that on 29 November 1642 and on
28 March 1643, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm had requisitioned taxes and duties.101
The nobility wrote that they were dismayed at not having been consulted on the
issue, despite their required consent. They were incensed by the duke’s cold-
heartedness when they described the desolate situation of their lands, which were
subjected to pillaging, theft of resources, plundering and looting of towns, castles,
and villages. The poor inhabitants were impoverished. Many people left hearth and
home, hoping to escape these perils of war and entrusting their lives to foreign
95JL Akten 39, 9 November 1642.
96JL Akten 39, 9 November 1642.
97Part from: JL Akten 39, 8 January 1643: ‘Demnach bey versamblung der Gülicher Landtstände in
Cölln zu erleichterung deβ gemeinen Mans bey diesem beschwerlichen Kriegswesen, die In- und
auβwendige Geistliche von deren Jährlichs einkommenden Renten Pfachten und gefällen, vom
hundert ad zehen anzuschlagen beschlossen und verabscheidt worden, dabey dan die Früchten ad
Dürener maβ zu reduciren, unnd daβ Malter schwarer Früchten ad zween und lichter Früchten ad
einen Reichstaler zurechnen. So wollen die herrn Beambten in dern anbefolenem Ambt daran sein
das selbige Geldere wie von altersherkommen umbgesetzt, erhaben, und dem verordneten
Einnemeren Johannen Hontheimb in Cölln vor S. Agathenkirchen inwendig dreyen wochen richtig
eingelieffert werden.’
98JL Akten 39, 18 April 1643 (printed): ‘Demnach einige Sachen bey diesem unseres lieben
Vatterlandts betrübten, und armseligen zustand vorgefallen, darumb die hohe unum[m]gengliche
notthurfft zu sein erachtet worden, daβ die Gülische herzen LandtStände, von Ritterschafft und
Stätten sonderlichst zu sa[m]men beschrieben würden, massen mir alβ dem Syndico auffgeben
worden dieselbe gegen Sambstag den zweyten einstehenden Monats Maij in der Statt Cölln zu
erscheinen, einzuladen.
So wollen Ew. G. sich belieben lassen, zu besagten tag unnd Wahlstatt, vormittags umb 9. uhren
in der Herren Dominicaner Kloster zu erscheinen, umb daheselbsten auff den beschehenen vortag,
unnd sonsten, sambt denn obrigen anwesenden herren LandtStände[n], die bevorstehende
notthurfft beratschlagen, und darüber schliessen zu helffen, wie unseres lieben Vatterlands
wollfahrt es erfordern wirdt. Signatum Cölln den 18. Aprilis 1643. Ex Commissione &c. Sigismund
Mockel.’
99JL Akten 39, 18 April 1643 (printed).
100JL Akten 39, 18 April 1643 (printed).
101JL Akten 39, 6 May 1643, p. 1 (printed). ‘Abermalige Protestirliche Contradition, und
Erinnrung der Gülich- und Bergischer Land-Stände, u[sw]. Wider Ihro Fürstliche Durchleucht
Pfalz-Newburg sub Dato den. 29. Nouembris [Novembris] [1]642 so dan[n] den 28. Martij [1]643
Jahrs uneingewilligte und den Priuilegijs zuwider außgeschriebene Stewr- und Licent-Geldere.
Getruckt im Jahr Christi, 1643.’
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princes.102 The nobility’s outcry is a means of critiquing princely policy—in the
light of Althusius’ ephors who wanted to redirect policy rather than overthrowing the
prince.
When the nobles wrote their critique, they bore the most recent illegal taxations of
March in mind. These yielded at least 1000 Reichsthaler in both duchies. Their main
arguments, presented in their letter of 6 May 1643, were based on previously
obtained legal verdicts. The case of Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm overstepping bound-
aries had been thoroughly investigated.103 It led to a verdict in the form of a
Mandatum poenale cassatorium, meaning it was a mandate with a penalty clause,
with protection from prosecution for the claimants. Both rulings on behalf of
the emperor Ferdinand II had restrained Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm when it came to
the requisitioning of taxes, a reminder which he duke did need. The situation, on the
whole, was remarkable, since the nobility had not approved of any taxation at all
since 1632. The duke did not receive permission to levy tax until 1649. The duke’s
requests during this period, despite the lack of approval of the nobles, indicated his
despair.104
Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm had seriously violated the notions of freedom, noble
privileges, law, and justice, according to a pamphlet issued in 1643.105 Through this
pamphlet, the nobility not only objected to these violations but also made them
publicly known. Since the requisition of taxations was perceived as illegal, the
nobility argued that nobody should collect them, nor need anyone pay.106 In the
summer of 1643, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm expressed his commitment to the prin-
cipality and its inhabitants, not only because of his lineage but also by written
102Part from: JL Akten 39, 6 May 1643, pp. 2–3: ‘Demnach Wir Gülich- und Bergische
Landstände, von Ritterschafft und Stätten, mit höchstem unserm Leydwesen und Wehemuth
vernehmen müssen, daβ der Durchleuchtigste Fürst und Herr, Herr Wolfgang Wilhelm, Pfaltzgraff
bey Rhein, in Bayern, zu Gülich, Cleve und Berg Herzog, u[sw.] Unser gnädigster Herr, u[sw.] bey
diesen ohn das empörlichen und höchst verderblichen Kriegsleufften und Zeiten, da die arme
eingesessene Underthanen zu grund und boden durch die vorgangene, sowol von Freund als
Feinden erlittene und auβgestandene Raub, Nahm, Plünderung, Ranzionierung, Brandschatz-
und Einäscherung vieler Stätt, Flecken, Schlöss- und Dörfferen, und dergleichen unzählig verübte
Kriegs Dressuren und Drangseln, wie dan auch beharzlichen von Jahr zu Jahren continuirende
Einlägerungen, Stewrn und Contributionen dermassen zugerichtet und ruinirt, daβ schier
meistentheils derselben von Hauβ und Hoff verlauffen, und im Elend sich kümmerlich in frembder
Herren Landen auffzuhalten bemüsigt werden: Andere auch gutentheils auβ lauterer Betrübnuβ
und Armseligkeit jämmerlich verstorben: Die dritte, so noch obrig blieben, das liebe drucke Brod,
umb deren Weib und Kinder beym Leben zu erhalten, nit haben können, u[sw]. Dessen alles aber
unangesehen, under Dato Düsseldorff den 29. Novembris [1]642. Jahrs etlich viel tausent
Reichsthaler in beyde Fürstenthumb Gülich und Berg, unser geliebtes Vatterland, vermeintlich
ohn vorgangene Einwilligung unser der Landstände auβgeschrieben, u[sw]. Item, sub Dato
Düsseldorff [d]en 9. Martij scheinenden [1]643 Jahrs.’
103Lat.: cum plenissima causae cognitione.
104Walz (1982), p. 90.
105JL Akten 39, 6 May 1643, p. 6.
106JL Akten 39, 6 May. 1643, p. 7.
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traditions.107 His obligation was to take care of his lands with ‘fatherly’ precau-
tions.108 How this pledge was received is unfortunately unknown, though the years
following the duke’s renewed commitment show that there was little change in his
behaviour.
The nobility used a ruling in the case of the Landstände of the principality of Berg
against Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm. This text issued by the emperor in 1644 in Speyer
was called ‘Copia Mandati Poenalis sine Clavsvla. In Sachen Bergischer
Ritterschaft Contra Pfalz Neuburgs 1644’. This text contained Emperor Ferdinand
III’s ruling on taxation matters of the Duchy of Berg:109 restoring the rights of the
dear and loyal Landstände and reprimanding Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm for his illicit
activities in Berg. It even made a reference to a—for the time being—restricted
succession to both Jülich and Berg.110 Even though the imperial verdict applied
solely to the Duchy of Berg, the nobility of the Duchy of Jülich felt encouraged as
well, as they expected the same rules to apply to Jülich. After all, they shared the
same unlawful taxations. However, 4 days later, the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian
Circle and the Imperial Council met and quickly sent out a signed letter concerning
specific taxes in Jülich. Contrary to what the nobility of Jülich had expected, the
taxes requested by the duke over the past 4 months had to be paid with only a few
days’ notice, since the officers of the garrisons depended on them.111 The fact that
the requests for taxes had to be complied within several days increased the burden
experienced.
The nobility received aid from those who had sworn to uphold the Provisional
Treaty of Xanten, and who were soon sending letters to Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm.
On 19 June 1644, a letter from France arrived, 10 days later another one from the
Dutch Estates General, with the acknowledgement of the Prince of Orange.112 Both
letters addressed to the duke, drawing attention to his malpractices and the need to
improve his behaviour towards his subjects.
Later that year, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm requested another 1,000 Reichsthaler
from the inhabitants of Jülich—despite all he should have learned about the
nobility’s zeal to uphold their privileges.113 The nobility turned to Emperor
Ferdinand III, who applauded them for turning to him for advice, as well as for
filing another formal objection concerning the duke’s abuse of their rights. By his
ruling—the penal mandate concerning Berg—the emperor’s decision on Jülich read
107JL Akten 39, 2 August 1643 printed in Cologne (printed, 2-side leaflet).
108JL Akten 39, 2 August 1643 printed in Cologne (printed, 2-side leaflet).
109JL Akten 40, 16 January 1644.
110JL Akten 40, 16 January 1644, p. 6.
111JL Akten 40, 20 January 1644.
112JL Akten 40, 19 July 1644, Letter in French to the duke (French signature is unreadable); JL
Akten 40, 29 June 1644: Letter in Dutch of the Estates General to Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm of
Pfalz-Neuburg.
113JL Akten 40, 11 July 1644: one-page leaflet (print).
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that the tax collectors should not execute the task the duke had given them, and that
those who had already paid must be reimbursed.
The nobility met and debated issues arising from the war, on 9 August. The
dominant issue this time was not the illegal taxation levied by the duke, but how to
decrease the burden of billeting of Düren. It was considered necessary to have
sufficient revenues, but also to relieve the inhabitants of that city. Therefore, an
alternative was suggested: should the clergy be made to pay tax, and perhaps the
nobility as well?114 Many people had already fled the principality of Jülich due to the
violence incurred. The link between violence and the mass emigration was pointed
out in a document published on 12 September 1644.115 After losing everything,
some people enlisted—supposedly because they had nothing left to lose. The
depopulation and abandonment of farmland troubled the nobility of Jülich tremen-
dously. Although they commended taking up service in defence of the Holy Roman
Empire, the nobility felt that people had to be deterred from making this choice. An
envoy was sent to the Imperial War Council to explain the situation, assuming that
the council would understand that damaging daily life by extracting necessary
workforce would be detrimental to the empire as well. On 13 August 1644, the
nobility presented an account of what the disgruntled and distressed inhabitants.
They were burdened with problematic taxations: unconsented and thus illegal, high,
and forcefully requisitioned.116 On this same date, they made a reference to
soldateska rather than soldiers.117 The term soldateska had a violent and negative
connotation and referred explicitly to lawless soldiers.118 Commanding officers were
asked to step in and prevent soldiers from harassing the treasurer and exert control
over their soldiers.
A field marshal of the Imperial Forces stated in early January 1645 that he had
received some complaints regarding his soldiers, referring back to the accusations in
the previous August.119 With this choice of words, the marshal implied that his
forces consisted of disciplined, not disorderly men.120 All of the complaints, he
noted, were caused by actions which occurred during the collection of monthly
contributions of about 3145 Reichsthaler121 rising to 5000 Reichsthaler later that
year, during which time several soldiers had allegedly extorted money and goods
from local inhabitants. The malefactors had allegedly received a punishment, and the
114JL Akten 40, 9 August 1644.
115JL Akten 40, 12 Augustus 1644: one-page leaflet (print) of the Imperial Chancellery inviting
people to defend the Holy Roman Empire.
116JL Akten 40, 13 Augustus 1644, one-page leaflet (print) reaction of the Landstände of Jülich
concerning the Imperial request—written and signed in Cologne.
117JL Akten 40, 13 Augustus 1644.
118Wilson (2010), p. 623.
119JL Akten 40, 4 January 1645.
120Wilson (2010), p. 623.
121JL Akten 40, no date: ‘Extract Assignationem de Anno 1644’ stated that each month 3145
Reichsthaler had to be collected, amounting to a total of 18349 Reichsthaler that year, including
January 1645.
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other soldiers were ordered to leave the people, their lands, and their goods in peace.
Of course, the collection of the monthly fees would still proceed.
At an unknown date in early 1645, a Manifest122 against the policy of Duke
Wolfgang Wilhelm was written on behalf of the Landstände of Jülich and Berg.123
Appraisal of the duke’s policy led to the conclusion that he ignored previous
Imperial Rulings and that, seemingly as a consequence, the principalities were
now struggling to overcome the presence of the soldateska. The requisitioned
money led to the accusation that he was pursuing an ‘absolute [sic] Dominatus’.124
As a consequence, the loyal Landständemet out of loyalty and patriotic affection for
the beloved fatherland and its inhabitants. The fatherland’s prosperity was said to be
severely damaged by the presence of soldateska and the—obligatory—payment of
monthly fees.125 Unfortunately, the duke had ignored the complaints of the
Landstände so far.126
On 3 March 1645, a pamphlet was printed in the city of Cologne.127 Before
treating the content of the pamphlet, it should be noticed that the nobility organised
the printing of the pamphlet. Among the cases studied in this work, this is a unique
situation, as it made the complaint publicly known; something the nobility of Hesse-
Cassel would usually avoid. Content-wise it seems to be an elaboration on the
previously discussed Manifest; but it is not an exact copy. The hand-written version
of the pamphlet happens to be available in the Akten Jülicher Landständen as
well.128 It was a collective endeavour of the Landstände of Jülich and Berg, and
the text referred explicitly to the tense relationship between the duke and the
Landstände. This specific pamphlet dealt with two issues in particular: the matter
of taxation without the consent of the nobility, and the assumed motives of their
duke. In February of 1645, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm had once again requisitioning
taxes without consent. As in the past, the nobility addressed the duke’s perceived
illegal behaviour, quoting the imperial rulings that made specific references to their
122This is the name given to the document by the author, this assumption is based upon the
observation that the ‘Manifest’ is written in the same hand as the rest of the text.
123JL Akten 40, no date (30 pages, handwritten). First words: ‘Ob woll beijder Furstenthumb Gülich
und Berg [. . .]’.
124JL Akten 40, no date (30 pages, handwritten). First words: ‘Ob woll beijder Furstenthumb Gülich
und Berg [. . .]’., p. 5.
125JL Akten 40, no date (30 pages, handwritten). First words: ‘Ob woll beijder Furstenthumb Gülich
und Berg, p. 7. This complaint is repeated on page 26 and 28.
126JL Akten 40, no date (30 pages, handwritten). First words: ‘Ob woll beijder Furstenthumb Gülich
und Berg, pp. 28–29.
127JL Akten 40, (pamphlet) Wiederholte Getreue Warnung Der Gülich: und Bergischer
Landtstände Wieder Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. Pfalz Newburg sub dato Düsseldorff 4. Februarij
oneingewilligte einfettig auβgeschriebene anmaβliche Steuer Geldere. Im Jahr 1645 (Cologne,
3 March 1645).
128JL Akten 40, (handwritten) Wiederholte Getreue Warnung Der Gülich: und Bergischer
Landtstände Wieder Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. Pfalz Newburg sub dato Düsseldorff 4. Februarij
oneingewilligte einfettig auβgeschriebene anmaβliche Steuer Geldere. Im Jahr 1645 (Cologne,
3 March 1645).
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privileges. The nobility expressed irritation at the continuous violations of their
privileges, and therefore wrote in the pamphlet that the duke had used false pretexts
to enable the levying of taxes to which they had not agreed in advance.129 In addition
to the unlawful nature of the taxes, and the coercion to pay them, Duke Wolfgang
Wilhelm was accused of repeatedly contravening imperial decisions and severely
harming the interest of the principality and its inhabitants. Evidently, the
requisitioning went beyond what the Landstände could condone. The claimants
stated that the duke used the soldiers in order to exact payment from his subjects.130
129Section from: JL Akten 40, 3 March 1645, pp. 3–4: ‘Bevorab den punctum collectandi oder
Steuer, Accisen, Licenten, Zöll, und dergleichen auβschreib- und erhebung betreffend, endtlichen
abgeortheitet, auch dieβfahls zu wiederholtem mahl durch Poenalia mandata, Inhibitoria &
restitutioria allergnedigst befohlen, Nemblich daβ höchtgemelte Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. Pfaltz New-
burg unter keinerley Schein oder praetext bemächtigt seyn sollen, einige Steuergeldern, Accisen,
Licenten, Zöll, oder dergleichen Aufflagen, wie die auch Nahmen haben mögen, welche dero
Gülich- unnd Bergische Landständte auff einem gemeinen auβgeschriebenen Landttag nicht per
maiora zuvoren eingewilliget, auβzuschreiben, umbzulagen, viel weniger aber von den armen
Underthanen zu erzwingen un[d] abzunötigen, sondern viel mehr gehalten seyn, was der gestalt
gegen der Rom. Kayserl. Mayest. allergnedigsten definitiff Urtheilen, Decisiones, Rescripta, und
Mandata durch die Beambten abgepresset, solches widerumb zu restituieren, alles mehreren
inhalts jetzt angeregten oben angezogenen Kaiserlichen Eudturtheilen [sic: Endurteilen],
Decreten, Rescripten, Resolutionen und Mandaten.’
130Section from: JL Akten 40, 3 March 1645, pp. 7–9: ‘Ob nun wol Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. in dero
einseititigem [sic] Auβschreibens diese Schein Ursache vorwenden, daβ all solche Geldere zu
Unterhaltung dero Soldatesca müssen hinverwendet wirden: So kan doch selbiges mit bestendtgem
grundt nicht bewehrt, noch bewiesen werden, zu mahlen die Gülich- und Bergische Landständte
den jüngster abhandlung wegen Monatlicher Unterhaltung der Kayserlichen Kriegs Völckeren in
beyden Fürstenthumben Gülich und Berg, mit dero Röm. Kaiserl. Mayest. in Cöllen letzt
anwesenden hochansehenlichen herren Gesandten den hoch wolgebornen Herren Herren Ernsten
Herr von Traun u[sw]. so dann der hochloblichen Kaiserl. KriegsGeneralitet (unter anderen
auβtrucklich mit einbedingt und vorbehalten worden) daβ auβ all solchen Monatlichen Gelderen
den Pfaltz Newburgischen Volckeren auff die von Ihrer Kaiserl. Mayest. vorlängst reducirte Anzahl
deren 800. Mann zu Fuβ und 100. zu Roβ gleichfals dero Monadtlicher Underhalt solte mit
angewiesen werden, massen darauff auch erfolgt, daβ nicht allein durch beyder Landtschafften
Syndicos auβ Befelch der Landtstände, in macht der Käyserlichen allergnedigsten Verordnungen,
die veraccordirte Geldere in beyde Fursthenthumb repartirt und auβgeschrieben, sonderen auch
durch Ihrer Käyserl. Mayest. ReichshoftRaht und deβ löblichen Westphalischen Creytz General
KriegsCommissarium den Wol Edelgebornen unnd Gestrengen Herren Joachim Friederichen von
Blumenthall auff gemeldte Newburgische Völckere vergleichener massen assignirte und
angewiesen worden, die weniger aber nicht ober obgemeltte Anzahl denen vorlengst Ihrer Furstl.
Durchl. von deβ Herren General Veldmarschallen Graffen von Hatzfeldt Excell. oberlassener
Soldatesca auch anderwerts dero Monatlicher Underhalt gleichfals angewiesen, und damitten
von Augusto nechstlitten biβhero in den Februarium inclusiuè continuiret worden, gestalt Ihre
Fürstliche Durchl. keine befugte Ursach haben, unterm Schein und Praetext dero Soldatesca die
verarmbte Eingesessene und Unterthanen ferners zu grauiren, und mit unerzwinglichen
Contributionen unnd Exactionen (wie leyder seyter etliche Jahren gar zu offt geschehen) onmild
eiglich und dubbelt zu beschweren.
Daβ sonsten dem auβgeben nach, die Landständte auff beschriebene Auβschreibung zu den
LandtTagen nicht erschienen, oder doch ohne Ihrer Durchl. In deren Postulatis zu mitfahren von
den LandTagen zuverreysen genöiget Orth vor diesen Remonstrirt, auch die gepflogene
Handlungen in den Prothocollis mit mehrerem nach fahren.
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These harmful actions troubled the nobility. Hence, out of patriotic feelings and
affection for the fatherland, they asserted the need to speak out against the duke’s
politics—which seemed to be in line with Althusius’ ephors.131 As a result of these
Weilen dann auβ oben angezogenenen erheblichen Gründen unnd Ursachen verhoffentlich zu
gnüge erhellet, daβ Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. Pfaltz Neuburg keines wegs befugt beyder Fürstenthumben
Gülich unnd Berg Eingesessene und Beerbte der gestalt einseitig und eigenthatlich bey diesen ohne
deme höchst verderblichen Kriegszeiten mit Steuren zu belegen, viel weniger dieselbe durch deren
Beambten von deren verarmbten und meistentheils zu Bettelstab getriebenen Underthanen
unmildtiglich zu pressen, Und die ohne daβ zu hoch beschwerte beträngte arme Underthanen mit
noch weiteren Drangsalen zu beschweren und zu beleydigen. So wirdt ein jedweder deren so wol in
den Natürlichen als gemeinen beschriebenen Geist- unnd Weltlichen Rechten erlaubten und
angelassenen Mitteln gegen vergleichen unbillige und widerrechtliche zunötigungen sich
zugebrauchen, und deren sich zu entwehren wissen, auch von den jenigen Beambten, Steuerhebern
und Executoren, oder welche darzu quouis modo cooperiren unnd durch ZwangsMittelen etwas
abgepresset, oder hinfüro abpressen werden, durch ArrestBeschläge, und andere zulässige wege
auff deren Person und Gütere, wo dieselbe anzutreffen, zu betretten, und gelegen, die wieder
erstattung oder Restitution zu suchen wol befugt seyn, unnd derselben Mittel sich wol bedienen
können unnd mögen Darnach sich ein jeder zurichten, und selbsten vor schaden und gefährlicher
Consequentz zu hüten wissen wirdt, deβhalben diese Abtruck zu Jedermans Nachrichtung zu
publiciren für eine unombgängliche Notturfft zu seyn befunden worden. Gegen Cöllen den 3 Martij,
1645.
Gülich- und Bergische LandeStande.’
131Section from: JL Akten 40, 3 March 1645, pp. 4–7: ‘Dennoch weiln die Gülich: un[d] Bergische
Landständte mit dero hochstem leydtwesen ober alle zuversicht und verhoffen vernehmen müssen,
daβ höchstgedachte Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. Pfaltz Newburg mit höchst verkleiner: und straffbarlicher
hindansetzung allerhöchst gemelter Ihrer Kaiserl. Mayest. als dieser Fürstenthumben und Landen
Ober- und Lehenherren Verordnungen und Befelchen unterm praetext oder schein der
Underhaltung deren geworbenen Soldatesca, in beyde Fürstenthumb Gülich und Berg eine grosse
GeltSumma gegen deβ Vatterlandts wol herbrachte kundbare Priuilega, Freyheiten, alt herkommen
Recht und gerechtigkeiten, unter dato Düsseldorfs den vierdten nechst abgangenen Monats
Februarij ausgeschrieben, und allsolche einseitig angelegte Contributiones von denen ohne daβ
auss Marck und Beyn, auβgesogenen, verarmten, und noch wenig obrigen Unterthanen ohn einige
mildte oder reflexion auff dieser Landen elendigen zustandt, nebenst den vorhin gleicher gestalt
auβgeschriebenen und uneingewilligten unerzwinglichen Geltsteueren, noch weiters zu erzwingen
und abzupressen dero Beambten ernstlich anbefohlen. Und dass diese höchstgemelt. Ihrer Furstl.
Durchl. Proceduren und Verfahrungen von dero hochgeehrte[n] Vorfahren Herzogen zu Gülich
und Berg Christseligsten andenckens, niemals gesehen, gehört, oder in Historijs dieser
Fürstenthumbe[n] (unangesehen derselbe[n] Ständt und underthanen seyther Ihrer Fürstl. Durchl.
anwesenheit in dieser Lande[n] derselbe[n] mehr, als bey allen vorige[n] ungezweiffelten
Landsfürsten geschehen, nach und nach unter die Arm gegriffen) gelesen worden gestalt es kein
ander ansehen oder nachdencken verursach, als d[iese] Höchstg[e]d[achte] Ihre Fürstl. Durchl.
durch diese, und deren vorhin nun etliche Jahren hero zugefügte Pressuren und Exactionen,
Angarias & super-angarias nur allein dahin zielen, als wie sie der Gülich und Bergische
Landtständte, so dann Geist- unnd Weltliche Eingesessene zuforderst enerviren, deren noch
wenig obrigen Lebensmitteln entblösen, folgendts dieselbe untertrucken, gleichsamb zur
Schlaverney und Knechtschafft bringen, und also den lang vorgehabten zweck eines absoluti
Dominatus in diesen landen einführen, und stabiliren mogen.
Sohaben wolg[efa]l[ene] Landtständte eine notturfft zu seyn ermessen, zu bezeigung Ihrer biβ
dahero getragener, und noch biβ in die Grube zu beharzlicher und continuirender trewer auff
richtiger redlicher und patriotischer zuneigung un[d] affection gegen dero geliebtes Vatterland,
und dessen Eingesessene und Beerbte Geist- und Weltliche, Adliche und Unadliche, auch jeder,
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feelings, the nobility felt the need to protect their beloved fatherland, and to mention
that the duke had inherited the duchies (Posterität).132 However, it seems that by
repeating this phrase, they only recognised him to be their de facto ruler as he lacked
the imperial recognition, which would make him the de jure ruler.133 Since the
nobility regarded the duke as a possessor who violated traditions, procedures, and
agreements which had been made by his ancestors, they eventually attacked Duke
Wolfgang Wilhelm on a far more personal level and questioned his motives. They
went so far as to articulate the belief that the duke’s actions constituted an attempt to
establish an absolutus Dominatus.134 They claimed that the duke held the ambition
of becoming an arbitrary ruler over the principalities. To be able to reach that
ambition, he was using officeholders to harm his subjects. The situation as experi-
enced with Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm who risked becoming a tyrant justified the
defence of the patria.135 The nobility of Hesse-Cassel—we will see—experienced a
similar situation.
By the end of 1646, the Landstände deemed it necessary to assemble. According
to the summons for this particular meeting, they needed to discuss the presence of
enemy troops and the heavy burdens that accompanied them.136 These burdens had
been enumerated earlier that year.137 This earlier pamphlet, published by the
Emperor’s War Council on 26 November in Siegburg, clarified what the origin of
the tension was, explaining that soldiers and other military men should be content to
sleep in houses; they were not to requisition more.138 The commoners of Jülich paid
monthly amounts of Reichsthalers—which could vary per month—to support the
officers of the imperial troops. All these aggravating circumstances, combined with
the presence of the army, constituted a burden too heavy to bear. For this reason, it
was the most important topic on the agenda during the nobility’s deliberations on
8 January 1647.139
männiglich fürstlich etwa den ungrundt deren in bemeldtem Furstl. Auβschreiben begriffenen
narraten zu entdecken, der gebühr (vorbehaltlich doch in alle wege Ihrer Fürstl. Durchl.
geziemenden hohen Fürstl. Respects) zu hindertreiben, unnd zu remonstriren. Warumb vielgemelte
Eingesessene und Beerbte all solche von Ihrer Fürstl. Durchl. auβgeschriebene, von den
Landtständten aber nicht eingewilligte Steuergeldere abzurichten oder zu zahlen nit schuldig
oder verpflichtet, sondern viel mehr solcher unbefugter und unrechtmässiger abnötigung sich
bester gestalt zu entwehren und zu wiedersetzen gute fueg und macht haben, auch in ihrem
Gewissen der wertheu Posterität und gefährlicher consequentz halber, obligirt und verbunden
seyen.’
132JL Akten 40, 3 March 1645, p. 7.
133JL Akten 40, 3 March 1645, p. 5.
134JL Akten 40, 3 March 1645, p. 6.
135Schmidt (2007), p. 67.
136JL Akten 41, 23 December 1646.
137JL Akten 41, 26 November 1646.
138JL Akten 41, 26 November 1646.
139JL Akten 41, 23 December 1646.
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On 16 January 1647, a 14-page text appeared, issued in the principality of
Cleves.140 In it, Georg Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg expressed his
understanding of the trouble, and the substantial contributions paid. Moreover, he
addressed the Landstände as loving patriots.141 The exact meaning of this text
remains unclear, though the letter seemed to undermine the policy of his cousin.
On 18 February 1647, the nobility of Jülich and Berg met in Cologne to prepare
before meeting the duke in a joint assembly.142
A mere 10 days after the issuance of the invitation, another pamphlet, referring to
the unification of the Duchies of Jülich, Cleves, Berg, Mark, and the county of
Ravensberg, was printed.143 Curiously enough, it was written in Dutch, and not in
the German dialect of the area. The pamphlet referred to the year 1496 when the
Lower-Rhine Area was united, a move accepted by Emperor Maximilian I. The
pamphlet used this context to explain that the current duke acted in violation of the
nobility’s privileges. It mentioned that in the past, all parties involved respected
these privileges and their responsibilities. These ancient rights were considered to be
beneficial and indispensable. The text referred to the unification of the Landstände of
the various principalities, who had pledged themselves to cooperate. The text
stresses that this union was renewed on 15 February 1647: the date of the pamphlet.
It seems reasonable to assume that there must also have been a German version of the
text, though this has not yet been traced. The text seems to have been written to
portray the Dutch as the nobility’s sworn ally and to encourage them to uphold the
Treaty of Xanten (1614). Based on other pamphlets from Spain, France, and Naples,
which, as historians have concluded, were used as a desperate attempt to involve
allies in internal politics, we may argue that this pamphlet probably functioned
similarly.144 In these non-German cases, no appeal was possible at the Aulic or
Imperial Chamber Court, which did alter the dynamics. In Jülich, however, a
seemingly deliberate choice was made not to go to court, but to press the matter
by publishing pamphlets.
On 20 April 1647 a pamphlet voicing discontent with the duke’s politics was
printed in the Dutch Republic.145 This pamphlet focussed on two arguments. The
140JL Akten 42, 16 January 1647 (handwritten).
141JL Akten 42, 16 January 1647: p. 3 v.
142JL Akten 42, 5 February 1647.
143JL Akten 42, 15 February 1647; Erf-Vereenige der Landtstenden uyt Ridderschap ende Steeden
der Hartogdommen Gulick, Cleve, Berge, ende der Graefschappen, Marck ende Ravensperg
(Knuttel 4211, n.p. 1647).
144Villari (1994), pt. Afterword Two: Political and Conceptual Points of Contact Between the
Seventeenth-Century Revolutions: Naples and Europe.
145JL Akten 42, 20 April 1647; Aenmaning schrijvens van de Hooghmogende Heeren Staten
Generael der vereenigde Nederlanden. Aen den deurluchtigen heer hartog van Nyborgh, &c
(Knuttel 4302, ‘s-Gravenhage 1647); also in German JL Akten 42, 20 April 1647: Abdruck deβ
Intercessional- und Warnung- Schreibens, So die hochmögende herren Staten General der
Vereinigten Niederlanden, an Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. PfalzNewburg, u. Auff gebührliches Ansuchen
der Erbvereinigten LandtStänden der Herzogtumben Gülich- Cleve und Berg, wie auch beyder
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first argument was that the duke had violated existing agreements, and noted that the
Imperial Chamber Court had highlighted this fact as well. A supporting argument
could be found in the claim that the Duke of ‘Nieuborgh’ (Neuburg) had not called
an assembly with the Landstände of his principalities. The absence of consultation
was a violation of existing treaties. The text referred to the years 1609 and 1627. In
1609, the Dutch Republic had helped the two Protestant princes conclude the Treaty
of Xanten. In 1627, a quote from theMandatum poenale (a penal mandate) was used
to illustrate that the duke had violated his prior agreements. The Dutch pamphlet
scrutinised the mandatum and pointed to instances of the duke violating existing
agreements. The second argument was that the Remonstrants did not enjoy religious
freedom. Religion was becoming an issue once more, caused by the succession of
the Protestant Friedrich Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg (1620–1688) in the
principalities of Cleves and Mark in 1640. This young Protestant ruler had fixed
ideas about the obligation to protect his fellow-believers and actively courted the
Dutch Republic for aid.146 For all the reasons discussed above, and primarily
because of promises made to uphold the Treaty of Xanten, the Dutch Republic
readied its garrisons in the cities of Wesel, Emmerich, Rees, Rheinberg, and
Orsoy.147 Half a year later, the Dutch States-General were still not convinced that
the duke was living up to the agreements made.148 In addition to the first troops
deployed earlier that same year, the Dutch now placed their troops in Gennip,
Ravenstein, Schenkenschans, Nijmegen, Bredevoort and Grol (Groenlo) in the
highest state of alert.
Early in 1647, the nobility issued a text articulating the four main points they
wished to pursue.149 Although the original text does not seem to have survived, these
censorious points were quoted in another text on 27 May, to which the duke
Graffschafften Marck und Ravenβberg, u[nd] Die uneingewilligten GeldtStewren in jetztgemeldten
beyden Fürstenthumben Gülich und Berg betreffend, haben abgehen lassen. Mit angehengter
Erinnerung wolgedachter herren LandtStanden an alle Beambten, Vögte, Dingere, Schultheissen
und Einnehmere, u. Gedruckt im Jahr nach der Geburt Christi, 1647 (n.p. 20 April 1647).
146Richter (2010). Note: with the death of Stadtholder William II (1626–1650), and the commence-
ment of the “True Freedom”, these plans to help Brandenburg were put on hold until the year 1655.
147JL Akten 42, 20 April 1647; Knuttel 4302, Aenmaning schrijvens van de Hooghmogende Heeren
Staten Generael der vereenigde Nederlanden. Aen den deurluchtigen heer Hartog van Nyborgh, &c
(‘s-Gravenhage 1647), p. 6; also a handwritten version available in JL Akten 42, 20 April 1647; and
as a German pamphlet: JL Akten 42, 20 April 1647: Abdruck deβ Intercessional- und Warnung-
Schreibens, So die hochmögende herren Staten General der Vereinigten Niederlanden, an Ihre
Fürstl. Durchl. PfalzNewburg, u. Auff gebührliches Ansuchen der Erbvereinigten LandtStänden
der Herzogtumben Gülich- Cleve und Berg, wie auch beyder Graffschafften Marck und
Ravenβberg, u. Die uneingewilligten GeldtStewren in jetztgemeldten beyden Fürstenthumben
Gülich und Berg betreffend, haben abgehen lassen. Mit angehengter Erinnerung wolgedachter
herren LandtStanden an alle Beambten, Vögte, Dingere, Schultheissen und Einnehmere,
u. Gedruckt im Jahr nach der Geburt Christi, 1647 (n.p., 1647).
148JL Akten 43, 28 September 1647; Dutch National Archief 1.01.02 file 3253, p. 543; Dutch
National Archive 1.01.02 file 98.
149JL Akten 43, 27 May 1647.
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responded. The first of the nobility’s demands was to have their old privileges
honoured. Secondly, they demanded that office-holders should be born in either
Jülich or Berg. Thirdly, financial resources could not be requisitioned without the
necessary consent of the Landstände.150 The nobility requested that the various
foreign armies to leave the territory, and lastly, they requested that minutes of
meetings would be made available upon request.
A copy of a letter from Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm is found among the
Landständische Akten, concerning the assembly of the Landstände in Cologne. It
was written on 20 June 1647.151 It commented on the debates about the prosperity of
the fatherland and conservation.152 The duke was displeased that assemblies were
taking place outside his jurisdiction while such vital issues were discussed and made
preparations for a Landtag with the Landstände. The duke felt the situation needed
to change, as the nobility published a pamphlet concerning a ducal invitation a
Landtag in July 1647.153 Though the original invitation seems lost,154 a verbatim
rendition was added to the pamphlet. The nobility, first of all, expressed their joy that
the Landstände of both Jülich and Berg were invited. The text of the pamphlet
emphasises that the assemblies in Cologne were organised to express concern about
the beloved Fatherland. It stresses that the extended invitation invites all with
honourable, patriotic intentions.155 The Landstände were most willing to come to
an official assembly, mainly to obtain a more detailed answer to their four
requests.156 The Landstände tried to meet the duke’s wishes with these remarks.
150JL Akten 43, 27 May 1647.
151JL Akten 43, 20 June 1647.
152JL Akten 43, 20 June 1647.
153JL Akten 43, 17 July 1647 (pamphlet) Nachrichticher Abtruck Der Gulich: und Bergischer
Landtstanden underthanigsten Antwort Schreibens in Ihre Furstl. Durchl.Pfalz Newburg, u
[nd] sub dato den 17. Julij nechstlitten abgangen. Betreffend Ihrer Furstl. Durchl. Erklarung
auff die 4.HauptBeschwarden, und das erscheinen zum Neweraugeschriebenen Landtag
(n.p. 1647).
154The text differs greatly from the text previously mentioned, written on the 20 June 1647 by the
Duke; which leads to the conclusion that it must be a different text.
155Section from: JL Akten 43, 17 July 1647 (pamphlet), 4–5: ‘Als ist für eine unumbgängliche
Notturfft befunden, unnd bey ernendter Gülich- unnd Bergischer LandtStändt letzt gehaltener
Versamblung hieselbsten binnen der Stadt Cöllen beschlossen worden, zu jedermans, sonderlich
aber zu der Gülich und Bergischer Underthanen, Eingesessenen und Beerbten Nachrichtung,
durch diesen offenen Truck kundt unnd wissend zu machen, auβ was beweg- und erheblichen
Ursachen mehrgemelte Gülich- und Bergischer LandtStändte vor dieβmahl zum Landtag zu
erscheinen, und mit höchstgedachter Ihrer Fürstl. Durchl. Erklärung auff die 4. Hauptpuncte zu
acquiesciren in ihrem Wissen und Gewissen sich beschwertet befinden, inmassen auβ
nachfolgendem an Ihr Fürstl. Dürchl. von offtbesagten, Gülich und Bergischen LandtStändten
dessentwegen Underthenigst abgangenem Schreiben mit mehreren zu vernehmen ist- warauβ dann
ein jeder unpassionirter leichtsamb der Gülich- und Bergischer Landständt sorgfalt, und
deroselben zu dem lieben Vatterlandt, wie auch zu der werther Posterität tragende auffrichtiger
Patriotische Intention, wirdt vernehmen und aburtheilen können, jedoch mit Vorbehalt Ihrer Fürstl.
Durchl. Hohen und Fürstlichen Respects.’
156See above, and in: JL Akten 43, 27 May 1647.
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The duke’s invitation also referred to the contacts with the Dutch Estates-General
and the assemblies in Cologne. It stated that he, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm, could not
have defended his principality without money and that he had in fact attempted to
honour the fatherland’s privileges.157 In order to act swiftly, he had needed to rely on
his power and authority and had not intended to harm the beloved fatherland’s
liberties.158
The Dutch sent a neatly written note on the 23 May 1647, again pledging their
help as and when requested; however, they stressed that peace was the most
desirable situation to pursue.159 The Dutch Republic closely monitored the situation.
Several texts stressed the Dutch alliance with the nobility of Jülich, emphasising that
Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm needed to put an end to the financial harassment of his
subjects.160 On 1 June 1647, a letter was sent on behalf of the Dutch Estates-General
157Section from: JL Akten 43, 17 July 1647 (pamphlet), 8-9: ‘So können Wir nicht absehen, was für
hoffnung seye, daβ Ewer Fürstl. Durchl. so wol in dem puncto Collectandi, als anderen vielfältigen
Grauaminibus die geringste satisfaction zu geben gesinnet seyn sollen, umb so viel mehr, daβ in
dem Schreiben, so Ewer Fürstliche Durchl. unter Dato den 24. Maij nechstlitten, an die Herren
General Staten der Vereinigten Niederlanden haben abgehenlassen, vermeldet, daβ Sie Uns zum
offtermahlen zu dem LandTägen einbeschrieben, umb auff, Wege und Mittel zudencken, wie von
Ewer Fürstl. Durchl. praetendirte un[d] geforderte Gelder umbzusetzen, und von den Underthanen
zu erheben seyen, da doch vermittelst deβ Vatterlandts Privilegien, und vermög alten Herkommens,
vor das Erste, Ob? Zum zweyten, wieviel?
158Section from: JL Akten 43, 17 July 1647 (pamphlet), p. 9-10: ‘Drittens: Welcher gestalt die
Underthanen mit Stewren zu belegen seyen? Muβ und solle erwogen und beschlossen worden.
Weilen aber Ewer Fürstl. Durchl. dardurch nicht dunckel zu verstehen geben, daβ die zwey ersten
Fragstücke gleichsamb Uns abzunehmen, und für sich allein auß eigener Macht unnd Authoritet zu
decidiren, und sich vermeintlich vorzubehalten gesinnet: Solches aber Wir keines wegs deroselben
zu Praejuditz und Nachtheil Unsers lieben Vatterlands Freyheiten nachgeben können. So wird Uns
desto schlechter hoffnung zu der vertrösteten Satisfaction gegeben, bevorab Ewer Furstl. Durchl. in
dero Befehl Schreiben, so Ste unter Dato 24. Junii, und also zwey Tag nach dem Landtags
Auβschreiben, an dero Beambten haben abgehen lassen, auβtrucklich mit einrücken,
nachfolgendem Inhalt: In allen wegen die Underthanen ernstlich zu erinneren, daβ Sie zu
verhütung fernerer Ungelegenheit oder Executionen, ihr Contingent der von Ewer Fürstlichen
Durchl. unvermeidtlich auβgeschriebener Stewren so, baldt der Arnd so weit fortgesetzt seyn
würde, daβ sie es darauβ zu erheben, unweigerlich bezahlen, unnd sich daran nichts behinderen
lassen sollen, u[sw.].’
159JL Akten 43, 23 May 1647 (Dutch letter, signature unreadable).
160JL Akten 42, Pamphlet 1647: Abdruck deß Intercessional und Warnung: Schreibens, So die
hochmögende herren Staten General der Vereinigten Niederlanden, u. an Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. Pfalz
Newburg, u. Auff gebührliches ansuchen der Erbvereinig-ten LandtStänden der Herzogthumben
Gülich: Cleve und Berg, wie auch beyder Graffschafften Marck und Ravenßberg, u. Die
uneingewilligte GeldtSteweren in jetztgemeldten beyden Fürstenthumben Gülich und Berg
betreffend, haben abgehen lassen. Mit angeengter Erinnerung wolgedachter Herren Land-Ständen
an alle Beambter, Vögte, Dingere, Schultheissen und Einnehmere, u[sw.] (Proverbiorum: N Fructus
Hominis Ivsti Lignum Vitae, n.p. 1647).
The first part is signed by Sigismund Mockel, dated 2 June 1647, with a printed reference to the
text of 20 April 1647; and JL Akten 42 Klaer bewys dat de Ho: Mo: Staten Generael gherechtight
ende verbonden zijn tot de garantie ende maitenüe vande privilegien, vry ende gerechtigheden der
Landt-stenden inde landen Gulick, Cleve, Berge, Marck ende Ravensbergh (Knuttel 4215,
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to the Landstände of Jülich expressing abhorrence that the duke was pursuing his
incorrect and illegal procedures.161 In October and December, the nobles assembled
in Cologne.162 The nobles themselves had attended in order to discuss the presence
of the marauding Hessian army. The invitation called ‘patriots’ to attend, as the well-
being of the fatherland was at stake. Here, explicit use of the word fatherland seems
to signify the importance of both the meeting itself and the presence of the nobility
therein. It is striking that the nobility stressed the well-being of the fatherland and the
threat posed by foreign troops. At the same time, they did not discount the possibility
of assistance from the Dutch Republic, which would have entailed the presence of
even more troops. Although the nobility did not request its support, it did not
actively reject its interference either. In order to fulfil their office of a patriot, they
would accept whatever help was required. The contributions to be paid to the
Hessian—and imperial—armies, were a frequently discussed concern that recurred
throughout the year.163
On 18 May 1648,164 another invitation of the nobility to join in an assembly on
8 June extended to all loyal patriots.165 The purpose of this meeting was to confer
about the imperial commission, which had assembled to inspect the area. A brief
pamphlet in October then informed the participants that the commission would send
representatives to their upcoming meeting on November 4.166 On 21 November, a
notice stating that the Landstände were relieved was issued, as a peace treaty had
finally been reached in Munster, ending the Thirty Years’ War: the Treaty of
Westphalia.167 This Treaty brought peace and tranquillity in many parts of the
empire, and also prevented other wars to regain lost lands form breaking out. Rulers
were thus forced to focus on their fiefs, (re)establish balance, and create a newmodus
Vivendi that would respect the balance between the different groups.168 The various
princes of the Holy Roman Empire acknowledged and restored the old privileges of
the Landstände.169 The nobility of Jülich understood that the Swedish and Hesse-
n.p. 1647). Another Dutch letter, again, points out the need to obey the agreements: JL Akten
43, 8 Juni 1647 (Dutch letter), it warns that if they Landstände decide to act offensively, the Dutch
forces will help.
161JL Akten 43, 1 June 1647.
162JL Akten 43, 1 October 1647; JL Akten 43, 7 December 1647.
163See for example: JL Akten 43, August 1647; JL Akten 43, September 1647, both have
calculations on how to reach 10,600 Reichsthaler; JL Akten 43, 16 December 1647: discussing
the contributions of 1648; JL Akten 43, December 1647, reaching 10,600 Reichstalers.
164Walz (1982), p. 114.
165JL Akten 44, 18 May 1648: ‘Alβ werden zu allerunderthänigsten ehren aller hochst ged[achten]
Käys. Mayest. Ew. G. sich darnach zu bequemen, und alhie in angestelten termino obeng[eme]l
[ten] der gebuehr nach einzustellen wissen, und sich daran, alβ ein Getrewer Patriot, auβerhalb
ehrenhaffter Ursachen nicht behinderen lassen.’
166JL Akten 44, 14 October 1648.
167JL Akten 44, 21 November 1648.
168W Isaacson (1933), p. 9.
169Ibid., p. 11.
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Cassel army needed payment. Nonetheless, they were content with the peace treaty,
as it was generally beneficial to their fatherland.170 At their next assembly, they
would discuss the consequences of the Peace of Westphalia.
The taxes that have been mentioned above and below make it possible to
calculate how hard the crisis of the Thirty Years’ War hit Jülich.
Table 3.1 certainly present an incomplete image of all the financial burdens Jülich
had to cope. Nevertheless, it shows an increase of the burden the people had to pay,
in the course of only a relatively short space of time. The increase was likely
perceived as enormous and threatening as people faced warfare and the presence
of a multitude of hostile foreign soldiers. In order to understand this financial burden,
‘food insecurity’, expressed in kilocalories, can be calculated, in order to determine
how the inhabitants of the troubled regions must have perceived their ability to
provide enough food for their families. This factor is set at 2100 kcal per person by
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO).171 Based on the grain prices found
Table 3.1 Tax and financial burden of Jülich (1639–1653)
Year Hessian demands Taxesa Total
In grams of silver
(Reichstaler: 25.98g/S)b gram Sil/inhc
1640 36,000 36,000 935,280 4.35
1641 36,000 36,000 935,280 4.35
1642 36,000 36,000 935,280 4.35
1643 36,000 1,000 37,000 961,260 4.47
1644 36,000 1,000 37,000 961,260 4.47
1645 36,000 37,740 73,740 1,915,765 8.91
1646 36,000 60,000 96,000 2,494,080 11.60
1647 36,000 36,000 935,280 4.35
1648 36,000 36,000 935,280 4.35
1649 60,000 60,000 1,558,800 7.25
1650 60,000 60,000 1,558,800 7.25
1651 60,000 60,000 1,558,800 7.25
1652 60,000 60,000 1,558,800 7.25
1653 60,000 60,000 1,558,800 7.25
This table has been published earlier in German in C.A. Romein, ‘Jülicher Patrioten am Ende des
Dreiβigjährigen Krieges (1642-1652). Die Verwendung der Vaterland-Terminologie im 17.
Jahrhundert.’ Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter, vol. 85 (2021). Published with permission
aThere may be many more taxes requested and/or levied, that have not been mentioned here. This
can be explained by the hundreds of pages of source material at the NRW-archive that are still
awaiting a researcher’s attention. The author does not claim to be complete here, and merely sets out
to offer an overview of the taxes she did find
bChristmann (2002), p. 213
cNumber of inhabitants has been fixed at 215,000 inhabitants. Based on: Tornow (1974), p. 22
170JL Akten 44, 21 November 1648.
171http://www.fao.org/docrep/pdf/011/i0515e/i0515e23.pdf. Accessed 12-12-2014.
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by Thomas Rahlf, it is possible to calculate the purchasable amount of grain with
silver.172
The price of wheat could differ per year and with it the hectolitres of grain that
could be bought with the silver (second and third column of Table 3.2). One
kilogram of (organic) wheat has been set at 1680 kcal, although the amount may
have varied, depending on the soil’s fertility. Food insecurity is measured by the
amounts of kcal in the total amount of organic wheat and dividing that by the food
insecurity measure developed by the FAO of 2100 kcal per person/per day. By
dividing the outcome by the number of inhabitants, it is possible to calculate the days
of food insecurity expressed in kcal. For Jülich the number of 215,000 inhabitants
has been applied.173 In 1642 the tax-burden equalled nearly four and a half days of
food insecurity or hunger, rising to nearly 31 days of hunger in 1646.











Nr. of days of
food insecurityb
1640 47.06 19,874.20 1,987,420.31 3,338,866,128 1,589,936 7.40
1641 45.82 20,414.27 2,041,427.48 3,429,598,167 1,633,142 7.60
1642 78.68 11,886.84 1,188,683.56 1,996,988,384 950,947 4.42
1643 70.18 13,696.67 1,369,667.44 2,301,041,293 1,095,734 5.10
1644 63.44 15,153.46 1,515,346.42 2,545,781,982 1,212,277 5.64
1645 47.53 40,310.68 4,031,067.86 6,772,194,003 3,224,854 15.00
1646 30.10 82,873.57 8,287,356.70 13,922,759,262 6,629,885 30.84
1647 24.35 38,417.74 3,841,774.49 6,454,181,146 3,073,420 14.29
1648 35.68 26,215.21 2,621,520.87 4,404,155,058 2,097,217 9.75
1649 76.30 20,431.22 2,043,122.09 3,432,445,114 1,634,498 7.60
1650 74.28 20,985.74 2,098,574.29 3,525,604,814 1,678,859 7.81
1651 83.46 18,676.32 1,867,631.55 3,137,621,010 1,494,105 6.95
1652 74.90 20,812.30 2,081,230.47 3,496,467,195 1,664,984 7.74
1653 46.55 33,486.57 3,348,657.36 5,625,744,361 2,678,926 12.46
This table has been published earlier in German in C.A. Romein, ‘Jülicher Patrioten am Ende des
Dreiβigjährigen Krieges (1642–1652). Die Verwendung der Vaterland-Terminologie im 17.
Jahrhundert.’ Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter, vol. 85 (2021). Published with permission
aIbid
bNumber of inhabitants has been set at 215,000 based upon Tornow (1974), p. 22
172Rahlf (1996).
173Ibid., p. 22.
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3.3 Hostile Occupation: Hessian Troops
Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm was pleased with the outcome of the negotiations of
Westphalia and wrote in early December that ‘the war was officially over’.174 The
end of the war meant that the internal tensions would soon be over, since the foreign
armies were about to leave. However, the peace treaty stipulated that Jülich and Berg
had to pay at least six times 100,000 Reichsthaler between them before the Hessian
and Swedish troops would leave. A treasurer was commissioned to provide these
funds. The duke seemed to realise that, despite the peace treaty, his subjects would
be disappointed about having to pay for the troops to leave and would not be keen to
contribute. Taxation had caused tensions and fuelled heated dissent throughout the
war, and taxation to end the war seemed paradoxical. Furthermore, the war had taken
its toll, and the population had shrunk by roughly one-fifth (21.8%) from 275,000
inhabitants in 1618 to 215,000 inhabitants in 1648, leaving far fewer people to bear
the financial burden.175
On the one hand, the duke understood the delicate nature of demands for taxes;
but on the other hand, he needed to pay off the foreign troops. In January 1649, Duke
Wolfgang Wilhelm expressed his sincere regrets that his god-fearing loyal subjects
would have to suffer a bit longer.176 Timely payments were essential, or the Hessian
army would extend their stay.177 The Swedes would leave as soon as payments
started to arrive, according to two pamphlets written in April and May 1649.178
Since hostilities had ended, the Landstände expressed their hopes that the inhabitants
would not suffer too much from these new taxes. These sufferings may have caused
the duke to attempt reconciliation with the nobility. Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm
acknowledged that the Landstände had focussed on the well-being and prosperity
of Jülich, and wanted to discuss these matters.179 In the case of Hesse-Cassel, such a
genuflection would not occur. The duke humbly requested them to attend an
174JL Akten 44, 4 December 1648.
175Tornow (1974), p. 22.
176Part from JL Akten 45, 24 Januari 1649: ‘Und weil also vorgemelte unnd andere viel wichtigere
Puncte, daran unser auch Ewer und aller unser getrewer und gehorsamer lieber LandtStende unnd
Underthanen zeitliches heil und wohlfahrt bestehet, und wie eins und anders am besten anzustellen
reisslich zu deliberiren und abzuhandlen nötig: So haben wir eine unumbgengliche noturfft
erachtet, Euch unnd andere unsere gehorsame und getrewe liebe LandtStende von Ritterschafft
und Stätten anhero zum Landtag zubeschreiben, euch hiemit gnedigst befehlend, daβ ihr Euch
gegen Dienstag den 16 des künfftigen Monats Februarij anhero unfehlbarlich verfüget, unsere
gnedigste proposition und waβ wir Euch zu des Vatterlants wolfahrt und besten werden vorbringen
laβen, vernehmet, darüber die noturfft deliberiret, und mit unβ entschlieβet, auch umb obgemelten
gemeinnutzigen Intents willen Euch hiran auβer Gottes gewaldt nicht hinderen laβet: Versehen unβ
also unnd seint Euch mit gnaden gewogen. Geben zu Düβeldorffs [d]en 24. Januari Anno 1649.
[Wolfgang Wilhelm].’
177Kaiser (2002).
178JL Akten 49, 26 April 1649; JL Akten 49, 31 May 1649 (printed).
179JL Akten 45, 24 January 1649.
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assembly of February, in order to advise him on what to do to improve the
fatherland’s prosperity.180 The duke’s altered attitude is a significant development
because he seemed to acknowledge the sincerity of the motives and actions of the
Landstände, and their choice of words to pursue their aims.
In the meantime, the presence of foreign forces and monthly contributions still
burdened the inhabitants of Jülich. A pamphlet was distributed, emphasising that if
the inhabitants neglected the payments, it would result in severe penalties.181
Imperial Marshall Lamboy received letters expressing grievances about the
misbehaviour of soldiers. Lamboy promised to resolve this problem in return for
the regular contributions.182 Three days later, a letter informed the inhabitants of the
Lower-Rhine principalities that Lamboy had attempted to oust the Swedish army, or
had at least tried to remove some of the Swedish forces in order to decrease the
burdens.183 The inhabitants of the Dutch Republic noticed financial trouble in Jülich.
Here, a very considerate trader, who was supposed to collect a debt of 300 Gold
guilders, noted in a letter that he had become aware of the enormous war-related
destruction which made him decide not to demand payment at this particular time.184
It was not until 4 August 1649 that the first Landtag of Jülich in over a decade
convened, in the presence of their duke, and there the nobility presented their
substantial grievances.185 In order to prevent disruption and delays, complaints
had to be prepared and submitted in advance of the next Landtag (scheduled for
1651). The nobility complied and sent their grievances in writing. These accounts
stated that some office-holders had appropriated extra money while collecting taxes.
It was agreed that if soldiers had plundered subjects, this would be taken into
consideration.
Furthermore, nobles were asked to share in the present financial burden, but
strictly on a voluntary basis. With that, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm seemed to have
become more considerate concerning people’s hardships and the privileges of the
nobles. The Landstände of both Jülich and Berg were invited to an assembly in the
open fields on August 30.186 The Landstände met 4 days in advance in Cologne to
discuss their affairs. The contributions troubled them, as is shown in the
Prothokollen on the assembly of 30 August 1649.187 Specifically, the assembly
noted that the armed forces present in the principality extracted resources on their
account, burdening the inhabitants, and leading to the desolation of the lands.188 The
180JL Akten 45, 24 January 1649.
181JL Akten 49, 26 April 1649.
182JL Akten 45, 5 May 1649.
183JL Akten 45, 8 May 1649.
184JL Akten 46, 16 November 1649.
185JL Akten 49, 6 January 1651 (printed).
186JL Akten 46, 16 August 1649: p. 49 r and JL Akten 47, 16 August 1649: p. 248 r. This printed
leaflet, consisting of one page is available in both JL Akten: it seems identical.
187JL Akten 46, 30 August 1649: p. 40 r–42 v.
188JL Akten 46, 30 August 1649: p. 40 r; JL Akten 46, 30 August 1649: p. 40 v.
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Landstände, especially the nobility, sorely regretted this situation as it harmed their
beloved fatherland.189 Nevertheless, on 30 August 1649, a pamphlet printed on both
sides was published on behalf of the duke.190 It requested the cooperation of the
inhabitants of Jülich regarding the imperial contributions due to payment in
8 days.191
Texts of the experiences and observations of the nobility—frequently referred to
as the Collegio Nobilium—are available fromMarch 1650 onwards.192 These mainly
concern troop movements and the payment of contributions, though another subject
was the that the duke ignored the nobility’s ancestry and their position in society.
The latter went against their special privileges of the patria.193 Another complaint,
voiced on 21 April 1650, was that protocol demanded the consultation of the nobility
but observed that no approval had been sought concerning the status patri. Hence,
the Landstände could not protect the prosperity of the fatherland and its inhabitants,
though they were willing to show their minutes.194 These two complaints led to the
voicing of grievances.195 However, the duke did not listen to the patriots who had the
best interest of the fatherland at heart.196 The transcripts of 22 April 1650 mentioned
that the patriots wanted to meet and discuss the issues concerning the fatherland and
its prosperity amongst themselves.197 Here it is crucial to note that within the
nobility’s reports, fatherland terminology was applied. However, these texts seem
not to have been intended for widespread distribution. The terminology was not only
used in the Landstände’s external communication, or communication that could be
read by others – as would be the case with the printed invitations—but was
something they ardently believed in and consistently applied.
189JL Akten 46, 30 August 1649: p. 40 r.
190This to distinguish it from the “Einzelblatt”, a ‘pamphlet printed on one side’. The German term
‘Flugblatt’ (leaflet or flyer) has earned itself a far more negative connotation than the pamphlets
numbering more pages; moreover, the ‘Flugblatt’ could hold a big image to illustrate matters in
combination with text. See: Harms (1985), pp. VII–VIII.
191JL Akten 46, 30 August 1649: p. 573 r. Unfortunately, the amount has not been filled out.
192For example JL Akten 48, Prothocollum de Anno 1650, p. 52 v.
193JL Akten 48, 30 March 1650, Prothocollum de Anno 1650, p. 4 r.
194JL Akten 48, 21 April 1650, Prothocollum de Anno 1650, 22 v-23r ‘Sondern weilen daßelbe
herkommen und die Prothocolle es also mit sich bringen thäten, daß die Räth von nihi vocati beij
der Ritterschafft erschienen sonders wahren dieselbe beij welchst verblieben und hatten der selber
mit ihren und ihnen Gütsachern assistirt, und beij gestanden alß welchen status Patria ohne besten
bekundt und die wohlfahrt des Vatterlandts alß Patrioten sich mehrens also undern würdest zu
hertzen gehen laßen, zu geschwungen daß der Landen privilegia eß auch also nach führtens daß zu
den Landtags handlungen kann andern alß Landstanden von Landtsfürsten gebraucht werden
solten.’
195JL Akten 48, 21 April 1650, Prothocollum de Anno 1650, p. 23v.
196JL Akten 48, 21 April 1650, Prothocollum de Anno 1650, p. 24r.
197JL Akten 48, 22 April 1650, Prothocollu de Anno 1650, p. 26r.
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On 27 June 1650, a one-page pamphlet was published announcing that a Landtag,
essential for the fatherland, would take place in Steinen on 4 July.198 Both the
Landständen of Jülich and Berg were invited to attend. This pamphlet also invited
members to join a preparatory meeting in the Franciscan Convent on 3 July.199 It is
unclear whether the Landstände went to the Duke’s Landtag, as their documents
make no mention of it.200 The Akten of the Landständen do contain an invitation for
an assembly on the 24 January 1651 and make it entirely clear that everyone
concerned about the Fatherland—the beloved, worthy ‘Posterität’ (heirloom)—
should come. It explicitly says that no loyal patriot should be restrained or stopped,
and that they should arrive at the set term.
At last, the Landstände report about ongoing debates regarding the withdrawal of
foreign troops that were going on in Nuremberg.201 The troops would leave on
condition that the contributions were paid. Eager to be relieved of the burden of
foreign troops roaming their lands, subjects of the principality were requested in
order to deal with the expenditure swiftly, and to pay tax at short notice. The
thesaurus of Jülich was asked to oversee the procedure.202
On 3 April 1651, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm agitatedly remarked that the Dutch
Republic and some reformed people had threatened and abducted Catholic clergy-
men.203 The duke was not pleased with these actions and feared for the well-being of
his Catholic subjects—especially the clergy. He considered the non-Catholics of
Jülich agitators because they were associated with reformed soldiers who had
disturbed local masses. That religious troubles sprouted again, became evident on
13 June as a pamphlet was published claiming to be a translation into Dutch from a
German original. Its title was a reference to the question of why the Friedrich
Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg had invaded Jülich and Berg, and occupied
several towns. The invasion itself took place a few days later. The document was a
response to two earlier texts issued by Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm and explained the
198JL Akten 48, 27 June 1650: ‘Demnach der Durchleuchtigste Fürst und Herr, Herr Wolfgang
Wilhelm Pfaltzgrave bey Rhein, in Bayeren, zu Gülich, Cleve und Berg. Herzog u[sw], Unser
gnädigster Herr, die Gülich und Bergische Landständ gegen den 4. Julii in dero Dorff Steinen zum
Landtag gnädigste beschrieben; Und aber die zu der von Ihrer Fürstl. Durchl. höchstgemelt.
zwischen dero gemelten Landtständen gnädigst vorgeschlagener gütlicher Conferentz specialiter
benente Deputirte ober das jenige, was zu Düsseldorff bey solcher Conferentz newlich
vorgelauffen, dem corpori gebührend zu referieren, und sonsten anderer erheblicher ursachen
halber, daran dem lieben Vatterland mercklich gelegen, sich allhie zu forderst zu unterreden, vor
nötig erachtet.
Als wollen Ew. G. gegen den dritten künfftigen Monats Julii allhie einkommen, und folgenden
Morgen zu acht Uhren in der Minnebrüder Closter bey der Versamblung sich einstellen, auch
daran ausser Gottes Gewalt sich nichts behinderen lassen, Signatum Cölln den 27. Junii 1650. Ex
Commissione. [von Mulheim].’
199JL Akten 48, 27 June 1650.
200JL Akten 48, 4 July 1650: Prothocollum de Anno 1650.
201JL Akten 49, 20 August 1650 (printed).
202JL Akten 49, 20 August 1650.
203JL Akten 49, 3 April 1651.’
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motives for the invasion.204 Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm had agreed to respect the
Protestant religion when he signed the Treaty of Xanten but had not upheld this
promise.205 Instead, he had imprisoned pastors, taken money away from churches
and violated treaties regarding religion.206 Such accusations were published in
several texts, translated, and consequently distributed in the Dutch Republic.207 It
turned into a pamphlet polemic, in which texts written on behalf of Duke Wolfgang
Wilhelm defended his case.208 The emperor also joined in as he wanted to prevent
another full-blown war.209 Von Looz-Coozwarem has characterised this as a revival
of the War of Succession, as the provisional treaties had not resolved the original
dispute. The emperor had also left the Privilegium Unionis intact, and failed to
propose an alternative solution.210
On 14 June 1651, under the pretext of protecting ‘his’ fellow-believers, Friedrich
Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg (1620–1688), ruler over Cleves and Mark,
invaded the principalities of Jülich and Berg.211 The Prince-Elector’s disappoint-
ment with the Treaty of Westphalia prompted his actions: Catholics had gained
ground since 1609 and 1612.212 He had questioned the right of succession of his
204Kort Bericht, waerom Sijn Cheurfursteleijke Doorluchticheyt van Brandenburgh is bewogen
ende veroorsaeckt worden, eenighe Plaetsen inde Vorstendommen Gulick ende Bergh in te nemen
(Knuttel 6968, n.l. 1651).
205Kort Bericht, waerom Sijn Cheurfursteleijke Doorluchticheyt van Brandenburgh, 3.
206Kort Bericht, waerom Sijn Cheurfursteleijke Doorluchticheyt van Brandenburgh, 4-5.
207Kort Vertoogh In plaets van een Manifest. Waerom Sijn Cheurvorst: Doorluch: tot
Brandenburgh, eenige plaetsen in de Vorstendommen Gulick en Bergh in te nemen, bewogen en
veroosaeckt geweest is. (Knuttel 6969, Dordrecht 13 June 1651); Dero Chur: Brandenburgisch.
Fürstlich. Durchl. De dato den 13. Iunij abgelassene kurze Anzeig anstatt Manifests unnd darauff
Ihrer Fürstlich. Durchl. PfalzNewburg außgefertite Bestendige Widerlegung, zu mehrer Instruc-
tion, also beyeinander in Druck gegeben (VD17 23:308525B/ HAB: M: Gm 3621 (2), n.p. 1651).
208Vorstelijck Palts Niewbvrgse Fundamentele Wederlegginge, Tegen’t ongesondeerde Kort
Bericht, Waeromme Sijn Cheur-Vorstel. Doorl. van Brandenburgh, is bewogen eenige Plaetsen
inde Vorstendommen van Gulick ende Bergh in te nemen, zijnde alleen die daerinne so specieuse
voorgestelde Relgie, een deck-mantel van de voorghenomene gheweldadige invasie door de
Troupes van gemelte Cheurv. Doorl. begaen. Ghetranslateert uyt het Hooghduyts (Knuttel 6970,
n.p. 1651); Placcaet Van Wegen Sijne Vorstelijcke Doorlucht. Den Heere Hertog van Nieubvrg,
Teghen ’t gene dat den Heere Cheur-Vorst van Brandenborgh heeft laten affigeren den 13. Iunij
1651. tot verschooninge ende verbloeminghe vande onghefondeerde ende gewendadige invasie
inde Landen van Gulick ende Bergh (Knuttel 6971, Leiden 1651).
209Mandement van sijne Roomsch Keyserl. Majesteyt, tot Cassatie ende Annullatie van ’t Cheur-
Brandenburghsche voor desen Affigeerde Placaet, aen de respective Standen der Vorstendommen
Gulick, ende Bergh (Knuttel 6972, n.p. 1651); Missive van Sijne Roomsch Keyserl. Majesteyt aen
de Heere Cheur-vorst van Brandenburg, Improberende die inde Vorstendommen van Gulick ende
Bergh ghedaene Invasie, vermanende ende bevelende den selvede Wapenen neder te leggen
(Knuttel 6973, n.p. 1651).
210von Looz-Corswarem (2014).
211Jaitner (1973), pp. 88–101; Isaacson (1933), p. 25.
212Jaitner (1973), p. 91.
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distant relative ever since his acceptance of the fief in 1640.213 Furthermore, the
Treaty of Westphalia gave the Catholic Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm occasion to
question whether Protestants could inhabit his principalities.
Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm had shown his good intentions in some respect. On
29 May 1651, he issued a one-page invitation to assemble on 16 June 1651. The
agenda read a discussion of the needs of the fatherland.214 Whether this Landtag
ever took place is unclear. In their ‘Prothocollen’, the sole topic the Landstände
mentioned was an invasion that took place on June 17.215 The competition between
the two princes was not appreciated as the safety of the patria was at stake once
again.216 The nobility wrote a pamphlet on behalf of the joint Landstände of Jülich,
Berg, Cleves, and Mark. They indicated their displeasure and stressed the need to
preserve their privileges and complained about the war.217 The second version of
this pamphlet was twice as long.218 In addition to the 4-pamphlet, the Dutch
8-pamphlet emphasised the promises made during the Treaty of Xanten (1614).
The extended pamphlet was signed and reprinted—probably as a reminder. Inter-
estingly, the German version (probably the original) is a one-page print containing
only the text that had been printed in the Dutch 4-pamphlet.219
The Jülich-war did not last long, ending in October. DukeWolfgangWilhelm had
pawned the cities of Millen and Born to ensure the help of 4000 Lorraine soldiers;220
his son Johann Wilhelm visited the Estates-General in The Hague, successfully
requesting the Dutch Republic to refrain from interference.221 The Landstände did
not appreciate the military presence of the Lorraine troops, and feared for more
threats to the fatherland, stating that their presence would ruin the lands.222 By
27 July the Landstände deliberated and mentioned that the patria depended upon the
return of peace.223 It was now clear that religion could still be a cause for war, a
casus belli—or could at least give rise to a pamphlet polemic—despite the end of the
Thirty Years’ War. Friedrich Wilhelm, Prince-Elector von Brandenburg issued
several documents and pamphlets claiming he was protecting the Protestants. He
213The text is in response to 7 March 1651 and 3 April 1651. Richter (2010).
214JL Akten 49, 29 May 1651 (printed).
215JL Akten 50, 17 June 1651: Prothocollum de Anno 1651, p.5 r and 7 v.
216JL Akten 50, 17 June 1651: Prothocollum de Anno 1650, p.8 r.
217Placcaet Gepubliciceert By ende van wegen d’Erf-vereenigde Lantstanden. Uyt de Ridderschap
ende Steden der Lantschappen Cleve, Gulick, Berge, ende Marck tot Conservatie van haer
Privilegien (HAB: 258.20.15 Quod 4, n.p. 1651).
218Placcaet Gepubliciceert By ende van wegen d’Erf-vereenigde Lantstanden. Uyt de Ridderschap
ende Steden der Lantschappen Cleve, Gulick, Berge, ende Marck tot Conservatie van haer
Privilegien (HAB: A: 32.38 Pol. 17, 8, n.p. 1651).
219Wir Landtstenden auß Ritterschafft und Statten der Erbvereinigten Landtschafften und
Herzogtumen, Gülich, Cleve, Berg, und Graffschafft marck u. (HAB Gm 3621 (8), n.p. 1651).
220JL Akten 50, 17 June 1651: Prothocollum de Anno 1651, p. 15 r.
221von Looz-Corswarem (2014).
222JL Akten 50, 17 June 1651: Prothocollum de Anno 1651, p. 15 r (2 July 1651).
223JL Akten 50, 27 July 1651: Prothocollum de Anno 1651.
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based his right to interfere upon the Treaty of Xanten (1614). Both princes –
Friedrich Wilhelm, Prince-Elector von Brandenburg and Duke Wolfgang
Wilhelm—were official administrators of the principalities. Hence, the Treaty of
Xanten meant that the ‘cujus regio, ejus religio’-rule protected both Calvinists and
Catholics, leaving the Lutherans without rights.224 However, according to contem-
porary pamphlets, the inhabitants of Jülich were being threatened and murdered by
their Catholic duke. Such violence was the perfect excuse to wage war, and so
Friedrich Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg renewed the War of Succession
with the hope of expanding his principalities.
In Vienna, the emperor responded fiercely, and a pamphlet was circulated in
which an imperial critique of the deeds of Friedrich Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of
Brandenburg was made. In August, the emperor decided that Count Melcioren of
Hatzfeldt would help to restore peace in the Lower-Rhine Area and, if necessary,
would contact the Imperial Circle for help.225 However, as its coffers were empty,
the Circle debated whether or not they would help. Paderborn and Osnabruck, as
well as some other Catholic areas, were in favour of helping. Cologne, for its part,
felt intervening could only bring trouble. Before the Circle could reach a decision,
the Neuburg-Lorraine Coalition ended the renewed War of Succession. It was clear
that the conflict could easily divide the members of the Circle.226 According to the
letter, written in the city of Cleves on 11 October 1651, a commission to study the
situation was composed of impartial Prince-Electors, Princes, and Landstände of
both religions.227 Friedrich Wilhelm, Prince-Elector of Brandenburg, Duke
Wolfgang Wilhelm, and Emperor Ferdinand III all agreed on this composition of
the commission.
The so-called War of the Cows or Jülich War had been about opposing Duke
Wolfgang Wilhelm and defending the fatherland.228 However, Duke of Lorraine
helped Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm to regain control. Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm stated
in October that he had signed a treaty with Cleves-Mark. He requested his subjects to
come forward within 4 weeks if they had wrongfully benefitted from this conflict,
returning obtained horses and possessions.229 In March 1652, the duke sent an
invitation to the Landstände requesting them to attend a meeting on 15 April. The
agenda of the meeting read that the beloved fatherland’s unpleasant peril and welfare
demanded their attention.230 Strikingly, the duke used the word ‘the’ (deβ) instead of
224von Looz-Corswarem (2014).
225JL Akten 49: 11 October 1651.
226W Isaacson (1933), p. 26.
227JL Akten 49: 11 October 1651.
228JL Akten 49, 14 November, 1651.
229JL Akten 49: 11 October 1651.
230Part from: JL Akten 51, 29 March 1652: ‘Liebe Getrewe: Waβmaβen wir Euch, und andere
unsere getrewe liebe von Ritterschafft und Stätten, gegen den zwölfften nachlauffenden Monats,
anhero zum Landtag beschrieben, dessen wisset Ihr Euch zuerinneren: Nun hetten wir unβ gnedigst
versehen, Ihr würdet Euch darauff gehorsamblich eingestelt haben: Die weil aber solches nit
geschehen, gleichwohl die Sachen, darumb wir Euch beschrieben, und Immittelβ noch ferner
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your (Euch) fatherland. This choice of vocabulary could be interpreted as indicating
that he was now counting himself in, or at least did not exclude himself from, the
fatherland. In Hesse-Cassel, the landgravine’s lawyers used similar expressions.
Following the Landtag, a text was issued to stress that the duke considered the
Landtag a success.231 He did not want to dismiss the Landtag’s grievances as being
unimportant, but Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm stressed that they had dealt with the
disobedience of the Landstände, the fatherland’s peril, and its security.232 Here we
can see similarities to the argumentation that is found in Hesse-Cassel as well as in
Brittany.
Another text was printed on 6 May, in which the duke focussed on pressing
matters. He first assembled with the Bergische Landstände, but, the Landstände of
Jülich needed to vote on behalf of their loyal, beloved subjects, too. Therefore a
preparatory meeting was scheduled to find out who was to blame for the peril the
fatherland.233 The text explicitly identified the burdens in question. The duke
vorgefallen seint, also beschaffen, daβ nit allein unser, sondern auch, deβ lieben Vatterlandts
unumbgängliche notturfft und wolfahrt erfordert, daβ darüber schleunig (Will man nit alles über
und über gehen laβen) deliberirt, und maβ nötig, vorgestellt werde.’
231JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652.
232JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652, p. 3: ‘Alβ haben wir Euch auch allen unseren Landtstanden solches
hiemit gnädigst verstendigen wollen, mit dem abermahligen gnädigsten befehl, daβ Ihr zu
reassumir- und fortsetzung der angefangenen Landtags handtlung, off Mitwoch den 22. dieses
nacher Deuren [Düren] wider erscheinet, off unsere proposition, unnd darin begriffene nötige
puncten, neben anderen unsern Landtstenden, von Ritterschafft und Stätten, deliberieren, unnd mit
unβ die Notturfft erheischender helffet, deβen wir anβ also gänzlich versehen, inmaβen Ihr dan
sonst leicht zuermeβen, daβ wan Ihr und andere unsere Landtstende, wie Im Jahr 1649 verglichen,
Euch nit gehorsamblich einstellen, auch unser, und deβ Vatterlandts notturfft und sicherheit
bedencken, und darüber die notturfft schlieβen helffen werdet, wir alβdan das Jenige waβ sich
gestalten sachen und deβ Vatterlandts obligen nach, gebührt, für unβ selbsten werden resoluieren
und verordtnen müβen, und werdet Ihr unβ auch Immittelβ nit verdencken, sonderen der sachen
unumbgenglicher nothwendigkeit zuschreiben, daβ wir auch noch vorhero (weil die von der
Ritterschafft zu Deuren, so gahr urplötzlich verreiset, und nichts geschloβen, also auch die
Bergische unangesehen wir gleich folgenden Tags unβ zu Mülheim Persohnlich einzustellen
erklehrt, und Sie unsere ankunfft zuerwartten, durch unsere dahin verordtnete Rhäte haben
erinneren laβen, solche unsere Landtfürstliche ordtnung so weit niet respectiert, daβ Sie unser
erwartet hetten, sonderen gleichergestalt wie die Gülische, in falutato hospite, Alβ man Sie unsers
Ihres getrewen Landtsfürsten angesicht flichen theten, davon gezogen) für unsere Soldaten, daβ
unentbehrliche Brodt habe auβschreiben müβen, daβ wir auch wan Ihr Euch zur Landtagr [sic]
handlung nit einstellet, und solche fortsetzen helffen werdet, waβ die unumbgengliche
Notturffterforderen würde, noch darzu auβschreiben und beyspringen laβen werden, deβen
underlaβung wir auch, weder bey Gott, noch dem geliebten Vatterlandt, und der posteritet zu
verantwortten unβ getrawten, Wan wir händ unnd füeβ sincken, alles über ein hauffen fallen unnd
zu grundt gehen laβen, auch unβ unnd unsere geliebte angehörige Menniglichen zu Ihren willen
prostituiren: War nach Ihr Euch zurichten, und wir seint Euch auff den fall gehorsamer bezeugens
mit gnaden gewogen. Düβeldorff den 6. May 1652.’
233Section from: JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652. (A second letter on the same date.) ‘Obwohl wir zu Euch
und andern unsern Bergischen Landtstanden von Ritterschafft und Stätten gnedigst versehen
gehabt, Ihr würdet neben denselben bey Jüngster versamblung zu Mülheimb und dorthin von unβ
auβgeschriebenen Landtag, auff die in unseren nahmen von unseren Rhäten proponirte puncta,
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recognised that there was a need to cooperate with his nobility and acknowledged
that he should have behaved more like a father, and that he should have been more
aware of their loyalty.234 He referred to the year 1649 when the nobles had
proceeded to address the matter of the fatherland’s peril, which he should have
appreciated more.235 The duke switched back and forth between your (euer)
welche ein Jeder unpassionirten, auch un praeoccupirten gemüts, daβ Sie zu unser auch unser
Landt und getrewer Lieber Underthanen conservation und bestem, ehist [illigible] zu resoluiren,
unnd zu Werck zu stellen, nötig auch unumbgenglich seyen erkennen muβ, dem herkommen und der
schuldigkeit gemeeβ die notturfft mit deliberirt, und darauff mit unweigerlicher einwilligung Ewere
underthenigste devotion und bereitwilligkeit gegen unβ, auch Ewere schuldige lieb gegen Ewerem
Vatterlandt in der that erwiesen und resoluirt haben.’
234JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652, pp. 1–2. (A second letter on the same date.): ‘Nachdem aber unβ der
gantz unvermuthete Bericht zu Deuren [Düren] einglangt, daβ Ihr und andere unsere zu Mülheim
gewesene Bergische Landtstandt, von Ritterschafft und Stetten ungeachtet daβ wir unβ erbotten,
gleich folgenden Tags in der Persohn unβ zu Mülheim einzufinden, unnd über ein unnd anders
Persöhnlich mit Euch zu tractiren: Euch durch zween Deputirte von unser Gülischer Ritterschafft,
und deren Gülischen Syndicum durch Ihr, allem vermuthen nach, unerfindtliches angeben, auch
ehe Ihr die gewiβheit erlangt, ob dem also, unnd was wir dagegen einzuwenden, Euch habt
verleiten laβen, unerwartet unser Persöhnlicher gegenwahrt davon zu ziehen, da Ihr doch
vielmehr, wan Ihr die biβher nunmehr oder die 43. Jahr ungeachtet aller Leib und Lebens gefahr,
auch anwendung etlicher Millionen golts Euch in der that vielfeltig erwiesenen FürstVätterlicher
sorgfalt und trew, auch Gnaden unnd guetthaten betrachtet, und hinwider der danckbarkeit
gleicher Gestalt ein undertheniges guts herz zu unβ getragen, Euch für ein fremdt sollet geachtet,
vand von herzen verlangens getragen haben, unβ in unserem Gottlob mit ehren erlebten Alter noch
einmahl zu sehen, und unβ auff zuwarten.’
235JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652, p. 2. (A second letter on the same date.): ‘Alβ haben wir solches Euch
und andern unsern Bergischen Landtstenden hiemit verstendigen wollen: Und befehlen Euch
darauff hiemit gnädigst, daβ Ihr zu reassumirung und fortsezung der angefangenen Landtags
handtlung, auff Mittwcho [sic] den 22. dieses zu Mülheimb unfehlbahr wieder erscheinet und
neben anderen unseren gehorsahmen Landtstenden unsere proposition, und dabey begriffene
nötige puncta deliberieren, unnd die Notturfft entschlieβen helffet, deβen wir unβ also gänzlich
versehen: Inmaβen Ihr dan sonst leicht zu ermeβen, daβ wan Ihr und andere unsere Landtstande,
wie Im Jahr 1649. verglichen, Euch nit gehorsamblich einstellen, auch unser, und deβ
Vatterlandtsnotturfft und sicherheit bedencken und darüber die notturfft schlieβen helffen werdet,
wir alβdan das jenige maβ sich gestalten sachen und deβ Vatterlandts obligen nach, gebührt, für
unβ selbsten werden resoluieren und verordenen müβen, und werdet Ihr unβ auch Immittelβ nit
verdencken, sonderen der sachen unumbgenglicher nothwendigkeit zuschreiben, daβ wir auch
noch vorhero (weil die Gülische von der Ritterschafft zu Deuren, so gahr urplötzlich verreiset,
und nichts geschloβen, also auch Ihr und andere unsere Bergische Landtstende von Ritterschafft
und Stätten, unangesehen wir gleich folgenden Tags unβ zu Mülheim Persöhnlich einzustellen
erklehrt, auch Euch und Sie unsere ankunfft zuerwartten, durch unsere dahin verordtnete Rhäte
haben erinneren lassen, solche unsere Landtfürstliche ordnung soweit nit respectirt, daβ Sie unser
erwartet hetten, sondern daβ Ihr und sie gleichergestalt wie die Gülischer, insalutato hospite, Alβ
wan Sie unsers Ihres getrewen Landtsfürsten angesicht flichentheten, davon gezogen) für unsere
Soldaten, daβ unentbehrliche Brodt haben auβschreiben müβen, daβ wir auch wan Ihr Euch zur
Landtage handlung nit einstellet, und solche fortsetzen helffen werdet, waβ die unumbgengliche
Notturffe erforderen würde, noch darzu auβschreiben und beyspringen laβen werden, deβen
underlaβung wir auch, weder bey Gott, noch dem geliebten Vatterlandt, und der posterirter zu
verantwortten unβ getrawten, Wan wir händt unnd füeβ sincken, alles ober ein hauffen fallen und
zu grundt gehen laβen, Auch unβ und unsere geliebte angehörige Menniglichen zu Ihren willen
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fatherland to the (deβ) fatherland. With all these apologies and promises, he steered
towards acceptance as a true lord. The clergy also wished to be given a hearing in
Hambach at the next Landtag of Jülich, since they were opposed to specific plans
regarding the taxation of their lands and goods.236 In early September, the Syndici of
both Jülich and Berg informed the duke that the Landstände would assemble in
Cologne. They wanted to discuss matters with their supporters from both principal-
ities before any other meeting. This assembly was the key; there was little use in
calling a Landtag of loyal patriots without it, as there would be little support for the
duke’s plans—plans which applied to both principalities.237
On 26 September 1652, a letter was written in Cologne and sent to Philipp
Wilhelm of Neuburg (1615–1690), the new duke. The letter was meant to inform
him that his suggested date for the meeting with the Landstände was not convenient,
and it explained that the committee which had studied the perilous situation of the
principality would report back to the nobility, and would do so in Cologne.238
Discussions both about the danger to, and potential consequences for, the fatherland
were necessary.239 As a consequence, they rescheduled the meeting to a later date. It
was uncertain whether the new duke, the Catholic Philipp Wilhelm of Neuburg
could be accepted as de facto ruler of Jülich and Berg, as his legitimacy was just as
contested as his father’s had been.240 It took several treaties to resolve the remaining
issues resulting in an official addition of, the principalities of Jülich and Berg to
the Neuburg dynasty.241 In 1665, the Treaty of Dorsten was accepted, downplaying
the religious divisions of the period between 1612 and 1624. Moreover, the rights of
prostituiren wollen: Warnach Ihr Euch zurichten, und wir seint Euch auff den fall gehorsamen
bezengens mit gnaden gewogen.’
236JL Akten 51, 31 August 1652.
237JL Akten 51, 5 September 1652.
238JL Akten 51, 26 September 1652: ‘Nach de[m] Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. Unser Gnädigster Fürst und
Herr, Beyder Fürstenth[umben] Gülich unnd Berg[ische] Landtständt von Ritterschafft und
Stätten, in dero residentzstatt Dusseldorff, gegen den 7[.] deβ bevorstehenden Monatβ Octobris
zum Landthag zu erscheinen, von nemen Gnädigst beschrieben.
Alβ werden E. G. nach anlaβ deren, beyden Syndicis newlich auffgetragener Special Commis-
sion, gegen den 4[.] gemelten Monats Octobris anhero zu kommen, und folgenden morgens umb
8. uhren in der Minnenbrüder Closter sich einzufinden, krafft dieses Citirt, und eingeladen, gestalt
derjenigen (welche Hochstg. Ihre Fürstl. Durchl. die ursachen deroselben Ständt damahligen nicht
erscheinens zum Landthag underthänigst zu hinterpringen, von de[m] Corpore dieser thagen auff
Mulheimb deputirt gewesen) relation über ihre gehabte Verrichtung züforderβ anzuhören, unnd
diesfalβ, sowoll alβ auchsonsten anderwertiger, dem Vatterlandt hochstangelener incidentien
halber, mit und nebenβ denen obrigen erscheinenden mitgliedern, sich der notturfft nach zu
underreden, warzu jedermänniglich, so es mit dem Vatterlandt wollmeine thut, habender zuversicht
nach, sich unweigerlich accommodiren, und hindangesetzet aller verhinder nuβen Gottes gewaldt
allein auβgenommen praecise in termino dies orths unfehlbar einkommen wirt. Sig. Cölln den 26.
Sept. 1652. Ex Commissione Speciali DD. [von Mulheim].’
239JL Akten 51, 26 September 1652.
240Jaitner (1973), p. 36.
241Ibid., pp. 193–311.
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the Protestants were clarified, thus resolving the 1647 religious matters.242 Most
importantly, in 1666–1672, agreements were reached that dealt with the
succession.243
3.4 Conclusion
The nobility of Jülich perceived a severe threat to the welfare of the principality they
inhabited. Those who felt compelled to call themselves patriots met in Cologne to
discuss their perceived peril and despair. Surely their perception must have been
close to the reality as the depopulation of Jülich due to warfare, extortion and
taxations must have been visible. Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm failed to protect Jülich
as his policy was counterproductive: he attempted to pay off foreign troops, but
instead, this drew in even more payment-seeking soldiers. These money requests
may explain the significant fluctuations we find in the available information on
taxation. This data only concerns the exact amounts and not the damages caused
by warfare to crops, plundering, billeting and other atrocities. These perceived
threats to welfare likely caused the decline in population, for example, by causing
people to flee the principality. The per capita taxation demanded by the Hessian
troops may not have been high when calculated in grams of silver or kilocalories.
However, because these resources had to be delivered on short notice, this would
have increased the—perceived—burden.
The invitations, pamphlets, and letters of the nobility show their proclaimed
compassion towards the impoverished inhabitants, and expose their fear that the
area might become uninhabitable. With that, it touches upon their interest as their
tenants suffered. The nobility met in Cologne outside the jurisdiction of the duke to
discuss the ordeal. Such meetings, in themselves, were a very well thought through
course of action. Their arguments, however, were not sophisticated. Their basic
attitude questioned the legitimacy of any decision made by the de facto duke. All
actions were placed under the microscope, especially when he failed to call the
nobility to assemble. However, when he did call for them to meet, they frequently
failed to show up, and consequently, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm could not obtain the
necessary consent to levy taxes. The question arose whether he was given a fair
chance to explain his need, as the Landstände were not keen to favour any ducal
appeals. Seeking means to influence Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm’s policy and protect
the fatherland, those calling themselves loyal patriots opted to send out political
pamphlets to their Dutch allies. Opting for persuasive texts was on the one hand
motivated by their geographical position on the outskirts of the Holy Roman Empire
and the proximity of their ally. However, on the other, it was likely caused by their
severe disappointment with the imperial court’s ruling in 1627.
242Ibid., pp. 179–180.
243von Looz-Corswarem (2014); Bergerhausen (2011), p. 55.
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The behaviour of the nobility’s in Jülich can be summarised in five main points.
Firstly, the nobility met outside the jurisdiction of the principality, in the Free City of
Cologne.244 There are two explications of this. On the one hand, the nobility avoided
having to invite the duke. On the other, they avoided a ban on their meetings, which
would have been likely if there had been so much as a hint that they undermined the
government. Secondly, the invitations to the assembly stated that patriots were
invited to discuss the welfare of the fatherland. The invitees were aware that war
threatened their fatherland and that their presence was therefore needed: explicit
references were made to ‘our fatherland’.245 The duke, later on, adopted this
fatherland terminology in his 1651 invitation to assemble, gradually shifting from
a discussion of ‘your fatherland’ to ‘the fatherland’.246 He eventually even acknowl-
edged that he should have valued the loyalty of the nobility more than he had.
Thirdly, the invitations and reports always referred to the loyalty of the invitees. This
strong emphasis on the word ‘loyalty’ helped the nobles to avoid association with
rebellious actions.247 Although not explicitly mentioned, an influence of Althusius
seems perceivable in this approach. Fourthly, the nobility used printed texts to
spread invitations and express their concerns following an assembly. The use of
printed texts seems unique, at least in comparison to the other two studied cases here,
as it seems to constitute a balancing act between finding allies and open rebellion.
Fiftly, although a legal case had been won in 1627, claiming that taxation without
consent was illegal, the nobility of Jülich did not continue to challenge violations of
their privileges in court. This may seem surprising, given the fact that they had
already obtained a favourable ruling. However, ongoing peace negotiations meant
that they might have deemed a legal suit inappropriate and potentially too time-
consuming. Also, the de facto ruler of Jülich—Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm—could be
replaced by any ruler who may have had far worse intentions with the principality.
By not pursuing their case in court, the nobility seems to have left the possibility of
communication open. Alternatively, perhaps they had simply lost faith in the
Imperial Chamber Court and appealed to other principalities for aid.248 The
nobility’s appeal to others was also strengthened by previous agreements—for
example, those between the French and the Dutch Republic—to uphold the provi-
sional treaty of Xanten (1614).
Ad hoc reactions to perceived threats, searching for the appropriate vocabulary
and motivating allies to act, show the nobility’s learning curve in dealing with the
duke’s failure to protect the fatherland. Each of these steps took a little bit more time
than the previous and seemed to have been motivated by a mixture of despair, fear,
and a spark of hope. The published texts were not written by lawyers or academics,
as no references are found. Hence, it is interesting to see how paid servants that
244JL Akten 39, 29 October 1642.
245JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652. (A second letter on the same date.).
246JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652, p 1-2. (A second letter on the same date.).
247JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652. (A second letter on the same date.).
248Villari (1994), chap. Afterword Two: Political and Conceptual Points.
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wielded a pen for money dealt with similar matters. The Hessian nobility may have
been the ones in conflict with their landgrav(in)e; it was their paid advocates that
wrote down the argumentation. The use of the terms fatherland and patriot seemed to
have functioned as a key to mobilise those who felt that change was necessary.
Furthermore, they signalled that only those who experienced the trouble first hand
should attend. In Jülich, it was a terminology initially used by the nobility, though
shortly after the end of the Thirty Years’War, these terms appeared to be accepted by
the duke as well.
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Hesse-Cassel: Alledged Sedition and Law-
Suits (1640s–1650s)
In 1647–1655, the displeased nobility in Hesse-Cassel used similar termsto the
nobility of Jülich to express criticism regarding their government. Landgravine
Amelie Elisabeth von Hanau-Münzenberg (1602–1651) ruled the Lower Principality
of Hesse-Cassel from 1637 to 1650, as regent for her son Wilhelm VI (1629–1663).1
Although the nobles had supported her in her role as a regent, Amelie Elisabeth
proved unwilling to acknowledge their privileges, especially their required consent
in tax matters. The nobility fiercely opposed Amelie Elisabeth’s taxation because the
prosperity of the principality, and the livelihood of its inhabitants had already
suffered much from the Thirty Years’War. Nevertheless, she requisitioned payment
from the commoners to pay her armies without obtaining the necessary consent. The
nobility thus argued that she had neither listened to their pleas, nor honoured prior
agreements, and thus she risked establishing an absolutus Dominatus.2 Here they
applied precisely the same term as the nobility in Jülich to indicate that they
considered her actions illegal. Correspondence between the nobility and the
landgravine shows that the nobility would take the matter to the Imperial court if
Amelie Elisabeth were to proceed with such abuses. The nobles of Hesse-Cassel
reflected upon themselves as being patriots acting for the common good of their
fatherland.3
This above case illustrates how the Hessian nobility responded to what they
perceived as threats to the welfare of the Lower Hessian principality of Hesse-
Cassel. These covered three aspects: the requisitioned payment from the com-
moners; the denial of the vital role the Hessian nobility had played throughout
1Though there are no general spelling-rules during the seventeenth century, nor were people very
consistent over time, the spelling of the landgravine’s name has been adopted in accordance with
her own autograph in JL 40, 9 May 1645; 11 May 1645 and 31 May 1645.
2Replicae der niederhessischen Ritterschafft contra dem Hern Landgraff Wilhelmen zu Hessen, etc.
1652, in HStAM 73, documents from the year 1652.
3von Friedeburg (2010), p. 170; von Friedeburg (2005); von Friedeburg (2003).
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history; and above all, the continuous damage to the lands that affected all means of
existence of the inhabitants. The German Landgraviate of Hesse-Cassel was small,
with an estimated population of 375,000, and again, with only a few nobles.4 Most
people in Hesse-Cassel were Lutherans since the sixteenth century, which they
practised in silence when their landgrave converted to Calvinism.
In 1646 Landgravine Amalie Elisabeth requisitioned taxes to free Hesse-Cassel
from its enemy occupation. When the nobility met to discuss this, the landgravine
interpreted their assembly as undermining her government. Hence, she had its two
chairmen humiliatingly arrested. The Hessian nobility then brought their case before
the Imperial Chamber Court to seek reparations and restore their privileges; the case
continued until 1655.
All debates focussed primarily on two issues: the welfare and prosperity of the
landgraviate, and taxation and the cost of war. The landgrave claimed to use taxation
to cover the cost of warfare, aiming to restore the welfare and prosperity of the
principality. Conversely, the nobility claimed that the cost of war—and the resulting
taxes—damaged Hesse-Cassel even further. Therefore the landgrave and the nobility
had different perspectives on cause and effect. This does not imply that the landgrave
and the nobility held opposing positions—they did judge the weight of taxes and
warfare differently. Arguably, the landgravine—in contrast to the nobility—consid-
ered the hardships caused by warfare and taxation to be acceptable in comparison
with the effects of ignoring the threat of war. The nobility and the landgravine barely
engaged in a discussion about the governing principles that informed their argu-
ments, only because they were generally in agreement. They agreed, for instance, on
the premise that the welfare and prosperity of the land and its inhabitants ought to be
protected. In addition, when the nobility referred to the risks posed by either a
tyrannical rule or the establishment of an absolutus Dominatus, the landgravine or
landgrave did not dispute that such risks were indeed detrimental and must be
avoided. They merely claimed that, in this particular case, these actions were not
tyrannical, because this was a case of extreme necessity. Likewise, the nobility did
not attack this statement by claiming that the category of necessity was invalid, but
instead stated that the landgrave’s claim of necessitas was not applicable in the case
at hand. In order to discuss these differences in interpretation, the nobles had
assembled without Landgravine Amalie Elisabeth or—later on—Landgrave
Wilhelm VI, respectively. Their exclusion from these meetings prompted the
landgrav(in)e to use the argument that the assemblies were illegal, and to accuse
the nobles of illegal protests and of committing lèse-majesté. Following earlier
debates, the nobility accepted the landgrav(in)e’s general argument, and countered
by stating that while the argument’s premise was correct in theory, it did not apply in
this case.
The words fatherland and patriot played a crucial role in discussing the welfare
and prosperity of the land and its inhabitants. Despite their sporadic usage, they
indicate the need to set the discussants apart, attempting to avoid the accusation of
4Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 64–65.
82 4 Hesse-Cassel: Alledged Sedition and Law-Suits (1640s–1650s)
rebellion. In other words, they seemed to have followed Althusius’ ideas about
ephors. Not until the counterargument regarding lèse-majesté was developed did
fatherland terminology enter the conversation in any significant way. When
discussing taxation or assemblies, the nobility often referred to their immunities
and privileges. They offered their loyalty as a counterargument against the accusa-
tion of lèse-majesté and illegal assemblies. In nearly all cases that such an argument
was deployed, fatherland terminology was used as well, implying a commitment to
the landgraviate.
Both the landgrave and the nobility accepted that being a patriot entailed loyalty
to the fatherland. However, they differed with regards to how the duty to defend the
fatherland should be carried out. From the nobility’s reactions, it can be distilled that
in their interpretation of the presupposed office of patriot and their asserted duty to
protect the fatherland, they were empowered and in their rights to critique the
landgrave’s harmful policy. The landgravine, on the other hand, had lawyers consult
historical examples. The examples they employed explained that being a patriot
meant being loyal to the fatherland and the landgrave. In the past, nobles had set
aside their privileges and immunities when the landgrave needed to defend the
principality. The nobility countered this by stressing that they were both: liegemen
and patriots.5 They underlined their loyalty to the landgrave as liegemen and their
loyalty towards the landgraviate as patriots.
The word patriot is not found exclusively in texts written by the nobility: the
landgravine and her lawyers employ it as well. For example, when they used
historical evidence, the landgrave’s documents stress that the ancestors of the
nobility had acted as patriots precisely because they had accepted necessitas. This
chapter shows that the argumentation in question was used from the start of the legal
debate until the nobility and landgrave reached an agreement (Vergleich) in 1655.
This lawsuit sets Hesse-Cassel apart from Jülich and Brittany, where no such formal
situation occurred. Table 4.1 shows the number of times fatherland terminology was
applied in six of the primary texts that will be discussed in this chapter. This amount
may seem insignificant. However, it is necessary to take into account that it is the
specific application of terminology in legal texts and debates that make it notewor-
thy. The surviving texts of the conflict between the Landstände (mainly the nobility)
and the landgrav(in)e are the Imperial Chamber Court’s (Reichskammergericht)
lawsuit and its drafts. The fact that these interrelated texts show a recurrence in
vocabulary signifies that the terminology was generally accepted. The most obvious
proof of this can be found in the Vergleich (2 October 1655), an official text in which
the word fatherland was used.
These legal texts showed that the use of words such as Patria, patriot, and
fatherland had entered the judicial sphere (see Table 4.1). The words were not
exclusive to the Landstände but were used by the landgrave as well.6 Although
the landgrave and his lawyers mainly used this vocabulary when responding to the
5Replicae, p. 4.
6von Friedeburg (2003), p. 268; von Friedeburg (1999).
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nobility’s arguments, it is nevertheless noteworthy that their terminology mirrored
that of the nobility.
The use of fatherland terminology, and the issues these terms were applied to
show that a new mode of political-legal argumentation had dawned. During the
Middle Ages, it was considered a virtue of protecting the feudal benefice and its
inhabitants. Failure to do so constituted a weak government. During the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, the practice and protection of the true religion could
become part of this interpretation. During the seventeenth century, virtue and the
asserted duty to protect the fief were interpreted as one and the same duty. This duty
entailed not only the protection of the fief and its inhabitants, but it also meant
protecting its prosperity. In the Low Countries, this argument was taken to extremes,
and led to the identification of Philip II (1527–1598) of Spain as a tyrant. It was a
unique situation whereby the nobility identified a tyrant, then engaged in a Revolt,
and ultimately gained independence via the Act of Abjuration (1581).7
In the formal and informal (draft) texts discussed in this chapter, the nobility
argued that they were patriots whose love for the fatherland forced them to step in to
protect their endangered fatherland. The most frequently used example of their duty
to do so involved taxes levied without their consent. Such taxes endangered the
prosperity of the principality, and so the nobility had to act. The danger was difficult
to quantify; however, stubbornly the nobility persisted in their claim that taxes and
the presence of soldiers had seriously threatened the prosperity of Hesse-Cassel.
They concluded that the violation of their right of assembly in order to discuss this
Table 4.1 Fatherland terminology in the sources of Hesse-Cassel
Replicaa Duplicab Über das Duplicc Triplicad Memorialiene Vergleichf
Natio 0 0 2 0 0 0
Patriot 1 1 0 1 1 0
Patria 8 9 1 2 1 0
Fatherland 8 6 0 3 7 1
Total 17 16 3 6 9 1
This table is an adaptation of an earlier published table in: C.A. Romein (2014) Fatherland Rhetoric
and the “threat of absolutism”: Hesse-Cassel and the Reichskammergericht (1646–1655), The
Seventeenth Century, 29:3, 277-292. Adapted by the author/ reprinted by permission of Taylor &
Francis Ltd, http://www.tandfonline.com on behalf of 2014 The Seventeenth Century
aReplicae: Patriot, 4, Patria, 3 (twice), 21, 41, 70 and 91 (three times); Fatherland, 26, 42, 74, 79,
81, 84, 85 and 91
bDuplicae: Patriot, 33, Patria, 11, 24 (twice), 37, 41, 42, 47, 52 and 55; Fatherland, 33, 41, 78, 83
and 94 (also as an adjective, used on page 32)
cÜber das Duplic schrift: Natio, 2 (twice) and 12, Patria, 32
dTriplicae: Patriot, 36, Patria, 3 and 7; Fatherland, 36 (also as an adjective, used on 5 and 7)
eMemorialien: Patriot, 83, Patria, 56; Fatherland, 37, 57, 60, 64 (twice), 80 and 107. There is also a
reference to the ‘Teutscher Nation’ on 14
fVergleich: Fatherland, § 4
7See for example: van Gelderen (1993).
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situation could lead to tyrannical rule.8 This example indicates two essential duties
of the landgravine. Firstly, that she should respect noble privileges. Secondly, she
needed to respect the welfare and the well-being of the principality’s inhabitants.
Taken as a whole, these texts, therefore, outline the characteristics of good
government.
The fraught relationship between the landgrave and the Landstände of Hesse-
Cassel had commenced in 1605–1606 when Landgrave Maurice converted to
Calvinism and joined the Protestant Union.9 The nobility objected to the landgrave’s
military plans, and eventually felt compelled to negotiate with the imperial army for
support. When the landgravine Amalie Elisabeth requisitioned grain and banned
their assemblies 40 years later, the nobility believed their rights were curtailed once
again. From 1646 onwards they wrote explicitly about the well-being of the father-
land which—they felt—had deteriorated noticeably due to the landgravine’s poli-
tics—and the underlying problem related apparently to religious changes and
warfare. The nobility avoided mention of their problems in any official correspon-
dence, and nor did they publish pamphlets, contrary to the published pamphlets
present in Jülich-Berg.
It has long been assumed that conflicts like the one in Hesse-Cassel were
gradually resolved in favour of princes.10 However, the scenario in Hesse-Cassel
suggests that the alleged struggle of the landgrave to increase his power was not
straightforward and certainly did not go unnoticed. The nobility did not agree with
what they perceived as the landgrave’s attempts to gain more power and circumvent
the need to consult them. Eventually, they filed a complaint with the Imperial
Chamber Court in 1647. Here, I provide a complete overview of the complaint,
and as no scholar has provided an overview of them so far, the archival sources in
this chapter are a unique exposé of the debate at the time.11 The supplementary texts
(unofficial drafts) that have never been analysed to the officially filed ones (see:
Table 4.2) are included in this chapter.12
In this chapter, I examine the whole conflict and the lawsuit. These legal texts
provide a context to the tense situation between the Landstände and the landgravine.
I look into the entire lawsuit brought before the Imperial Chamber Court, which is
unique because earlier Armand Maruhn and Robert von Friedeburg have only
looked at parts of the case, while Tim Neu has looked at the lawsuit, but did not
focus on the terminology of the conflict. He saw it as the starting point of the new
relationship that commenced between the nobility and the landgrave. In order to
understand historical references, I am first going to describe the dynastic lineage and
8Replicae, 12–13.
9Maruhn (2004a), pp. 24–32.
10Press (1991) and Maruhn (2004b).
11See for instance: Neu, Die Erschaffung der landständischen Verfassung refers to the sources but
did not use all of the additional, unofficial sources (drafts).
12Maruhn (2004a, b), Eβer (2001), von Friedeburg (2003) and von Friedeburg (2005).
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history of the principality from the sixteenth century until the end of the conflict.
This overview is essential to understanding the undercurrents in the debate and
references in the suit before the Imperial Chamber Court fully.
Table 4.2 Text concerning the conflict in Hesse-Cassel (1647–1655)
Document Name
Written on
Behalf of Date Informal AARKa





























Replica The nobility 30 March 1652 √
PP The nobility 1652–1653 √
Duplica The landgrave 22 April 1653 √
Über die Duplic Schrifft The nobility Between 1653 and 1655 √ √
Triplica The nobility 25 June 1655 √
Ohn Vorgreiffliche
Memorialien
The nobility 1653–1655(?) √ √
Quadruplica The landgrave 1655d
Vertrag/ Vergleich The landgrave
and nobility
2 October 1655
Texts in italics have been filed at or issued by the Imperial Chamber Court. C.A. Romein (2014)
Fatherland Rhetoric and the “threat of absolutism”: Hesse-Cassel and the Reichskammergericht
(1646–1655), The Seventeenth Century, 29:3, 277-292. Adapted by the author/ reprinted by
permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandfonline.com on behalf of 2014 The Seven-
teenth Century
aStift Kaufungen / Archiv der Althessischen Ritterschaft Kaufungen (AARK)
bvon Friedeburg, ‘Widerstandsrecht Und Landespatriotismus’, 304; Maruhn, Necessitäres Regi-
ment, 206 footnote 182; Neu, Die Erschaffung der landständischen Verfassung, 413; HStAM
73, 1816: ‘gutachten’ with modern handwriting 1648 has been added, on one of the two versions,
though there is no indication to be found
cDate according to HStAM 5, Bestand 14660: sub- et obreptiones (fol. 25), as indicated with pencil
(modern) on HStAM 5, 1816: sub- et obreptiones
dThe Quadruplik is an unfinished document, as the conflict was resolved shortly after the Triplica:
Neu (2013a), p. 413; Maruhn (2004a), p. 17
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4.1 The Lineage of the Landgravial Family: 1500–1600
Hesse-Cassel (Map 4.1) experienced considerable turmoil in the seventeenth cen-
tury, but the sixteenth century had not been devoid of troubles either. Philipp of
Hesse (1504–1567) lost his father at the age of five,13 which did not lead to any
significant governmental changes because his mother Anne of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin (1485–1525) had already been made regent after syphilis drove her
husband insane.14 The nobility did not care for this state of affairs, as Anne no
longer allowed them to assemble at will.15 The curtailment of their privileges led to
Map 4.1 Landgraviate of Hesse (seventeenth century). Map by Joan Blaeu, “Hassia
Landgraviatus.” 1645. Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center. https://collections.
leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:cj82ks23k. Accessed November 23, 2020. Map reproduc-
tion courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal Map and Education Center at the Boston Public Library
13Press (1986), pp. 269–270.
14Demandt (1972), p. 222.
15Puppel (2004), pp. 158–189.
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their request to Philipp to begin his reign at the age of 13½. The emperor eventually
sanctioned this request.16
Philipp I of Hesse—later commonly referred to as the Magnanimous or ‘the
Elder’17—attended the Imperial Diet of Worms (1521), where he met Luther
(1483–1546).18 It was not until 3 years later when Phillipp I met with Philipp
Melanchthon (1497–1560) and converted to Lutheranism. In 1526 Lutheranism
became the official religion of the landgraviate.19 Fifty convents20 throughout the
area were closed over the following years, and Philipp I founded a Protestant
university in Marburg (1527).21 The Imperial Diet responded by condemning
Lutheranism, after which several Lutheran members of the Diet united to form the
Schmalkaldic League (1531). Landgrave Philipp I of Hesse and John Frederick I,
Elector of Saxony (1503–1554) headed this league.22 After their defeat at the Battle
of Mühlberg (1547), the emperor forced both princes to plea for mercy. Philipp I of
Hesse was then forced into captivity for 5 years.23 The Augsburg Settlement (1555)
finally ensured that Catholics and Protestants could coexist in the Holy Roman
Empire, following the principle of ‘cujus regio, ejus religio’.24
Philipp I wrote in his will that upon the event of his death—which befell him in
1567—his possessions were to be divided among the four sons born of his first
marriage to Christine of Saxony (1505–1549) (see Fig. 4.1).25 His second marriage
had been a morganatic marriage to Margaret van der Saale (1522–1566),
disqualifying heirs of that union from inheriting his lands. They were awarded the
titles ‘Born in the House of Hesse, Counts of Dietz and Lords of Lißberg’ and
controlled several towns and castles. In 1577, when this lineage died out, their
possessions were redistributed among Philipp’s four legitimate sons.26 Philipp had
decided to divide Hesse into four principalities because he feared that his sons might
not be able to cooperate. The welfare of the country, but more importantly, that of the
16Heinemeyer (1986), pp. 259–260; Demandt (1972).
17J. Feurborn, Nothwendige außführliche Special-Widerlegung deren in Hessen-Casselischen
publicirten also gen. Wechsel-Schrifften gerühmbten,gleichwohl aber gantz unbegrundeten,
Rettung eines, von Weiland herrn Landgraf Wilhelmen zu Hessen u., hochlöblichen Undenckens,
sub data Cassel den 19. Aprilis Anno 1630 an herrn Georgen, herrn Philipfen und Herrn
Friderichen, beede hochlöblicher gedächtniss alle Landgrafen zu Hessen u. abgegangenen
Schreibens. (Giessen, 1647) p. 3.
18Heinemeyer (1986), p. 235.
19J. Feurborn, Nothwendige außführliche Special-Widerlegung, 3; Neu (2013a), p. 137.
20Two convents were handed to the Hessian nobility for their unmarried daughters. These were the
convents of Wetter and Kaufungen. See: Demandt (1972), p. 226.
21Ibid., p. 226; Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 52–60.
22Demandt (1972), pp. 228–229.
23Press (1986).
24Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 60–63.
25Feurborn, Nothwendige außführliche Special-Widerlegung, 28-29; Ibid., pp. 63–64; Puppel
(2004), p. 46; Wilson (2004), p. 45.
26Demandt (1972), p. 236.
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dynasty, was of paramount importance. Specific central institutions were upheld: for
example the Marburg court of appeal, the university, hospitals, and church institu-
tions.27 The division resulted in four principalities. William IV (1532–1592)
received Hesse-Cassel (Niederhessen). Louis IV (1537–1604)28 ruled Hesse-Mar-
burg (Oberhessen). Phillip II (1541–1583) became landgrave over Hesse-Rheinfels
and the lower County of Katzenelnbogen. The youngest brother Georg I
(1547–1596) obtained Hesse-Darmstadt and the upper County of Katzenelnbogen.29
Hesse-Cassel was by far the largest principality with 6100 km2 and 175,000 inhab-
itants. The Nassau family at the Dillenburg, who was conveniently close by,
influenced the development of Calvinism in the region and offered marriage partners
for local Protestant Houses. Hesse-Cassel also became an important centre for arts
and science.30
In various electorates of the Holy Roman Empire, only the eldest son could
inherit the principality. In other principalities it was considered wise, on account
of the need for appendages, to allow younger sons to own a small part of the fief.31
This line of reasoning shows that the fate of the dynasty as a whole was more
important than holding the dynastic agglomerate together. The practice can perhaps
best be illustrated by turning to the example of the death of Georg I of Hesse-
Darmstadt, and the events that followed in its wake: his younger surviving sons each
received a minor feudal benefice in 1596. The eldest son Louis V—received the most
substantial part: Hesse-Darmstadt, due to his primogeniture.32 The younger sons
gained, based on secundogeniture: Hesse-Butzbach (Philipp III)33 and Hesse-Hom-
burg (Friedrich I).34
4.2 Maurice the Learned: Confessional Breakdown
of Relations (1592–1627)
Maurice the Learned, who took an interest in arts and science, inherited the main
parts of Hesse-Cassel upon the death of his father William IV in 1592.35 When
Maurice’s two remaining uncles passed away, the close relationship between the
27Heinemeyer (1986), p. 260; Maruhn (2004a), pp. 100–101.
28The succession crisis concerning Marburg broke out in 1604; the House of Hesse-Cassel claimed
the principality, but had converted to Calvinism and could therefore not inherit, according to the
House of Hesse-Darmstadt: Neu (2013a), pp. 203–221.
29Heinemeyer (1986), p. 238; Press (1986), pp. 269–270; Neu (2013a), pp. 159–164; Maruhn
(2004a), pp. 100–104.
30Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 64–65.
31Press (1986).
32Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), p. 70; Press (1986).
33It was not until 1609 that he became landgrave.
34He became the principality’s landgrave in 1622.
35Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 70–72; Menk (2000a), p. 47; Neu (2013a), p. 278.
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various successors of Philipp I became strained. The heir of Hesse-Darmstadt had
inherited by far the smallest fief and proved to be devoted to Lutheranism, while
Maurice had converted to Calvinism. Both landgraves were entitled to inherit a part
of Hesse-Marburg, as their uncle had died without an heir. However, Lutheranism
had to remain the official religion of this principality.36 These religious differences
proved detrimental to family relations and caused the Marburg Succession Crisis.37
Maurice’s conversion to Calvinism (1605) and joining the Protestant Union
(1609) triggered the ultimate breakdown of relations.38 Maurice was fascinated by
theological developments and the Synod of Dordrecht (1618), in Holland. He
became increasingly interested in defending the Calvinist case, and because he
used military force to do so, his debts mounted massively.39 Debts and taxes placed
a heavy burden on Hesse-Cassel: the principality fell into decline, and the nobles
were infuriated. In order to prevent any further destruction, the nobility sought
mediation from the emperor. Maurice argued that he fought for his faith and the
autonomy of his lands. Because Maurice was unwilling to negotiate, the emperor had
General Tilly invade Hesse-Cassel.
In 1623, the Aulic Court in Vienna ruled against Landgrave Maurice in the
Marburg Succession.40 Maurice found it impossible to accept this verdict, and
absented himself for 2 years in search for military alliances in the north, leaving
his eldest son in charge.41 Meanwhile, the nobility turned against their landgrave,
encouraging a condemnation of his behaviour by the emperor. The Landstände
themselves received imperial protection, and Maurice’s actions were marked as
treasonous.42 In 1624 Wolfgang Günther, advisor to the landgrave, remarked that
the nobility had betrayed the land through their negotiations with the emperor.43
Albrecht von Wallenstein’s (1583–1634) imperial armies entered Hesse-Cassel in
1625, forcing the principality to defend itself. Hesse-Cassel had neither the money
nor the troops for a proper military defence, and its allies also proved too weak to
assist. With the defeat of the Danish king Christian IV (1577–1648) in the battle of
Lutter (1626),44 Tilly was able to force Maurice to surrender and demilitarise.45
Numbed by defeat and humiliation, Maurice convened a family meeting. He
signed a dynastic treaty on 12 February 1627,46 dividing his lands into Hesse-Cassel
36Demandt (1972), pp. 244–245.
37Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 73–75.
38Maruhn (2004a), pp. 24–32; Eβer (2000).
39Demandt (1972), p. 251.
40Ibid., p. 252; Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), p. 74; Weiand (2009).
41Neu (2013a), p. 265.
42Demandt (1972), p. 252.
43von Friedeburg (2007), p. 181; Menk (2000a), p. 69.
44Parker (1997), p. 139; von Friedeburg (2002), pp. 142–143.
45Menk (2000a), p. 69; Neu (2013a), pp. 300, 308–312, 318.
46Raingard Eβer remarks that some more research should be done with regard to this topic, as little
research has been done into this document. See: Eβer (2000), pp. 199–201.
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and Hesse-Rotenburg.47 The former went to the son Maurice had had with Agnes
von Solms-Laubach: Wilhelm V.48 The latter went to his second wife Juliana of
Nassau-Dillenburg and their surviving sons.49 As he had three sons with Juliana of
Nassau, the secundogeniture was divided into three parts: Hesse-Rotenburg went to
Hermann; Hesse-Eschwege was given to Friedrich; the youngest son Ernst received
Hesse-Rheinfels-Rotenburg.50 On 17 March 1627, Maurice resigned from the office,
leaving his lands with debts totalling close to two million Reichsthaler.51
4.3 Wilhelm V: The Enemy of the Emperor and Exile
(1627–1636/7)
When Wilhelm V took over in Hesse-Cassel, he was already an experienced ruler
after his father’s absence in search of allies. He remained loyal to their Lutheran
Swedish ally, despite the uncertainties this alliance brought.52 In November 1630,
the Swedes offered to help Wilhelm V drive out the imperial forces, and in 1631 it
came to an alliance.53 On 28 June 1633, the armies of Hesse-Kassel won the siege of
Oldendorf, creating an advantageous position in Westphalia.54 Despite his military
successes, Wilhelm V did not call a single meeting to confer with the Landstände
until 1634.55
In February 1634, France and Hesse-Cassel formed an alliance. In that year a
French general, entrusted with the command of the Hessian army appeared on the
Hessian payroll.56 The next year France became actively engaged in the war,
Sweden—which offered only military assistance—offered cooperation with France,
and the possibility of receiving substantial financial contributions.57 On 30 May
1635, the Peace of Prague was signed, whereby the Calvinists—and thus the
Landgraviate of Hesse-Cassel—were left out. Calvinists did not receive any reas-
surances about their positions or possessions, and hence, Landgrave Wilhelm V
found himself in the blind.58 As a result of this situation, the Lutheran Landgrave of
47Press (1986), pp. 302–307; Menk (2000a), pp. 26, 35; Lemberg (2000), p. 173.
48Lemberg (2000), p. 174.
49Ibid., p. 174; Menk (2000b), p. 108.
50Nothwendiger Bericht, darauß zu sehen, Daß nicht allein die, von Hessen-Cassel erlangte
(S.I. 1646) 34–35; Press (1986), pp. 303–305; Helbach (1977).
51Neu (2013a), p. 318; Demandt (1972), p. 253; Weiand (2009), pp. 33–34; Philippi (2007), p. 3.
52Press (1986), p. 307.
53Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 75–79; Menk (2000a), p. 16.
54Press (1986), p. 308.
55Ibid., p. 307.
56Buckreus (2008), p. 65.
57Ibid., p. 65; Medick and Marschke (2013), p. 13.
58Buckreus (2008), p. 27.
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Hesse-Darmstadt demanded the principality Hesse-Cassel from his Reformed cousin
Landgrave Wilhelm V, but he met with silence.59 Landgrave Wilhelm V felt
compelled to continue the war to safeguard his assets, and freed Hanau from the
imperial occupation in the process. The success was short-lived, as imperial forces
soon conquered numerous cities in Westphalia. The landgrave needed strong mili-
tary support, which he found when the French Cardinal de Richelieu, offered
Wilhelm V a provisional treaty. This treaty was signed in Minden in early June.
The final treaty,60 signed in Wesel on 21 October 1636, entailed two important
clauses, one being the instalment of an army comprising 10,000 soldiers, in support
of Hesse-Cassel and paid for by France to the amount of 200,000 Reichsthaler; the
other that no peace would be signed without France’s consent.61
Wilhelm V overtly opposed the emperor through his military alliances with
Sweden (22 August 1631)62 and France (1636),63 and so the emperor banished
him.64 Landgrave Wilhelm V had become an ‘enemy of the emperor’.65 In the
meantime, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt was appointed to deal with all admin-
istrative matters of Hesse-Cassel. Wilhelm V left for Eastern-Frisia with his family
and the remainder of his troops. This banishment was short-lived, as Wilhelm V died
on 21 September 1637.66 His wife and two sons,67 along with their entourage,
remained in exile until 25 March 1640.68
4.4 Politics in Exile (1637–1640)
The successor to the fief of Hesse-Cassel was the 8 year-old Wilhelm VI. As stated
explicitly in his father’s will, which was drawn up in 1633, Amelie Elisabeth became
William’s guardian.69 Her role was first among equals of the regents.70 Since enemy
59Demandt (1972), pp. 256–257.
60Buckreus (2008), p. 73.
61Ibid., p. 74; Demandt (1972), p. 257.
62Weiand (2009), pp. 38, 42 a provisional treaty had already been signed on 11 November 1630;
Helfferich (2013), p. 135.
63Buckreus (2008), p. 65.
64Ibid., p. 28; Asch (2005), p. 131.
65Weiand (2009), pp. 39, 74; Helfferich (2013), p. 87.
66Puppel (2007), p. 104.
67The youngest son Philipp died in exile: Helfferich (2013), p. 140.
68Buckreus (2008), pp. 26, 107–108; Three daughters—Emilie, Charlotte and Elisabeth—had
remained in Cassel for the duration of the exile, another passed away—Louise; Helfferich
(2013), p. 140.
69Buckreus (2008), pp. 27, 35 Wilhelm V had married Amelie Elisabeth of Hanau-Münzenberg in
1619. They had fourteen children together, but only four survived. ; Puppel (2004),
pp. 51, 193–194; Amalie Elisabeth (1994), pp. XII–XXI.
70Buckreus (2008), p. 22.
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forces occupied the entire principality, Landgravine Amelie Elisabeth was in charge
of the army.71 The nobility had opposed the emperor’s decision to drive out the
landgrave. Wilhelm V may have been absent while governing his north-western
lands, but his family had not been rejected. The nobility had been conciliatory upon
Wilhelm V’s death, despite two issues. Firstly, it was unclear who would be in
charge of the defence of the occupied landgraviate.72 Secondly, two alternative
claimants to Hesse-Cassel presented themselves. These were, (1) Landgravine Juli-
ana of Hesse-Rotenburg, the second wife of the late Landgrave Maurice; and
(2) Landgrave Georg II von Hesse-Darmstadt, who had already taken over the
administrative matters in the interim period, and who intended to reunite Hesse.73
Landgrave Georg wrote to the emperor to request help and ordered his armies to
advance in order to pressure the subjects of Hesse-Cassel to accept him as their new
ruler. He had a strong case since the emperor had previously forced Wilhelm V to
turn the government of his fief over to him.74 Negotiations in November and
December of 1637 were designed to persuade the emperor to award the enfeoffment
of Hesse-Cassel to the House of Hesse-Darmstadt. As the Landgravine Amelie
Elisabeth had little contact with the principality, she was in no position to object.
Eventually, she requested that Anselm Casimir Wambold von Umstadt, Archbishop-
Elector of Mainz negotiate on her behalf.75 When the Landstände were called to a
Landtag on 1 November 1637, they proclaimed their loyalty to the 8 year-old
Wilhelm VI.76
This portrayal of nobility’s loyalty to Wilhelm VI can be explained by the events
which unfolded shortly after Wilhelm V’s death. As per the late landgrave’s
wishes—wishes that were honoured by the Landstände—an inauguration for
young Wilhelm VI had been arranged. In the presence of the army, Wilhelm VI
had taken his oath on 27 September, and the nobility swore its allegiance in the city
of Kassel.77 As illustrated above, this had not been in vain. Both the nobility and the
Landschaft remained loyal to the Hesse-Cassel dynasty, led by the minor Wilhelm
VI and his mother, Amelie Elisabeth. This loyalty the nobility would stress in their
texts later on. The Landstände were neither impressed by the attempts by the House
of Hesse-Darmstadt to undermine their new landgrave’s position by declaring his
claims illegitimate, nor by the emperor’s command to accept Landgrave Georg II as
their new ruler.78 On 29 October 1637, Georg II, Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt
71Puppel (2007), p. 104; Bechert (1946).
72Bechert (1946), p. 5.
73Ibid., p. 5; Puppel (2004), p. 192; Helfferich (2013), p. 111.
74Bechert (1946), p. 5.
75Helfferich (2013), pp. 106–107.
76Puppel (2004), p. 195 The estates did not meet regularly, and only when there were financial
measures to be taken. The Landtag consisted of the Ritterschaft and Prälaten combined, and the
Landschaft, which consisted of representatives of certain privileged cities. ; Neu (2010), pp. 11–12.
77Puppel (2004), p. 194.
78Helfferich (2013), p. 104; Puppel (2007), p. 107.
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issued a pamphlet in an attempt to convince the nobility to side with him, as he had
the interests of the fatherland at heart, and felt that enough blood had been shed.79
The regency had thus been established and accepted through the inauguration.
Furthermore, thanks to her military successes and alliances, landgravine Amelie
Elisabeth could negotiate a truce with the emperor. The emperor guaranteed that the
Calvinist faith could be professed in the principality of Hesse-Cassel.80 Shortly
afterwards, Wilhelm V’s testament was accepted, and the House of Hesse-Darmstadt
had to withdraw its claims. Unfortunately, young Landgrave Wilhelm VI was not
able to return to Hesse-Cassel until March 1640.81 Nevertheless, soon after the
official acceptance of his rule, he wrote a letter to the Landstände to express his
appreciation. Until he came of age, Amelie Elisabeth was to govern together with a
council (Landrät) on Wilhelm VI’s behalf. Any treaties had to be co-signed by the
landgravine and a counsellor, of which there should be four. When one of the regents
died, he had to be replaced within months. The council should also be called to
assemble to discuss significant issues, something which Amelie Elisabeth did not
always bother to do.82 Wilhelm V’s testament stipulated who was to guide the
widow-landgravine in the process of governing: one of the four Obervorstehers,
the Stadtholder of Kassel, Hermann von der Malsburg (1570–1636), Johann
Bernhard von Dalwigk ({ 1638) and three citizens.83 In critical matters, the regents
had to consult other individuals as well. In November 1640, Amelie Elisabeth
assembled her first Landtag, and the nobles requested another representative to be
added to the council.84 Philipp von Scholley was nominated to replace Hans Diede
zum Fürstenstein (1610–1665), as the latter had little knowledge of the Latin
language.85
4.5 Amelie Elisabeth: Regent, Commander, and Negotiator
(1637–1650)
Unfortunately, the landgravine’s government was not off to a smooth start. Firstly,
foreign forces occupied the principality. Secondly, other princes, e.g. the House of
Hesse-Darmstadt, contested her regency. Thirdly, she was short on resources to
supply her troops. Amelie Elisabeth’s primary goal was to leave her son with a well-
79HStAM, Bestand 255, H. 139: Auβschreiben unser Gedebes von Gottes Gnaden, Landgrafen zu
Hessen, u. An alle und jede Deβ Nider-Furstenthums Hessen und darzu gehöriger Graf: und
Herschafften, lande und Gebihte, getrew gehorsame Land-Stände, Sambt und Sonders. (s.i. 1637).
80Puppel (2007), p. 108; Buckreus (2008), p. 88.
81Buckreus (2008), pp. 67, 173; Philippi (2007), p. 1.
82Puppel (2004, 2007) and Bechert (1946).
83Puppel (2007), p. 109.
84Helfferich (2013), p. 154.
85Puppel (2007), p. 110.
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ordered principality. To achieve this objective, she needed to recapture the dynasty’s
possessions, which meant regaining the entire principality of Hesse-Cassel. Since
there were no directions in Wilhelm V’s will as to how to proceed in this regard, the
landgravine had no choice but to address this issue at her own discretion.86 She
needed to decide whether she would risk burdening her people with billeting and
extra war-related taxes, in the hope of regaining the dynastic possessions, or not.
In the spring of 1638, Amelie Elisabeth and Emperor Ferdinand III (1608–1657)
prolonged their cease-fire. Prince-Elector Johann Georg I. of Saxony also opened
negotiations, proposing a truce. However, it proved to be an armed truce, as the
12,000 troops on either side counter-balanced one another.87 Hesse-Cassel’s military
commander, Peter Melander (1589–1648), wished to include Duke Wolfgang
Wilhelm of Jülich, Count of Neuburg, and Ferdinand of Bavaria, Archbishop-
Elector of Cologne, and Georg II, Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt in any agreement.
Together they would be able to submit a request for a modification of the Peace of
Prague.88 Melander succeeded in forging a new alliance, known as the Welfen or
Guelph Allies, in early 1639. However, in months, the army suffered severe losses,
and France approached Hesse-Cassel to join in a new alliance.89 Amelie Elisabeth
found strong allies in both France and Sweden once again, and—secretly—secured
the deal. Secrecy was vital to the protection of her garrisons in Westphalia. The
Dutch Republic played a vital role as well, as it occupied fortresses near the city of
Meppen to prevent them from being conquered by imperial troops.
Two questions were raised during the early years of the landgravine’s regency.90
Should an independent peace be concluded between Hesse-Cassel and the emperor,
or should they await a peace treaty applicable to all? Moreover, would it be
preferable to wait and pursue negotiations, or engage in a military campaign? Amelie
Elisabeth feared being used by other major players in the alliance, which compli-
cated matters. Taking a neutral stand was risky, and an army had to be formed and
maintained. At the same time, the armies of Ottavio Piccolomini (1599–1656) and
the Count of Hatzfeldt were approaching from the west in the autumn of 1639. In
early 1640, the imperial troops gathered in Bohemia and Westphalia. Amelie
Elisabeth joined with Weimar, France, and Sweden, and within a few months,
their forces occupied Jülich and Berg.91 At this point, Emperor Ferdinand III had
hoped to win Amelie Elisabeth over, but he ultimately failed in this matter.92 The
landgravine exerted some pressure on Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm, who agreed to pay
monthly revenues to the Hessian troops totalling 60,000 Reichsthaler each year.93
86Buckreus (2008), p. 174.
87Wilson (2010), p. 613.
88Ibid., p. 613; Bechert (1946), p. 14.
89Wilson (2010), pp. 616–618.
90Bechert (1946).
91Parker (1997), p. 147.
92Bechert (1946), pp. 11, 14; Wilson (2010), pp. 618–621.
93Engelbert (1959), p. 69.
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At the Landtag of 1643, the Landstände authorised Amelie Elisabeth to negotiate
a peace in the cities of Munster and Osnabruck.94 The Electors’ College accepted her
position in the Imperial Circle—effectively terminating the isolated position of the
landgraviate.95 Due to her recent military successes, the landgravine felt strong
enough to fight the imperial ruling of 1623. She, thus, claimed the Hesse-Marburg
principality, and her armies set forth to regain this principality in March 1645.
Amelie Elisabeth expected the Landstände to endorse taxes to pay for her military
expenses, but the nobility refused, hoping to force her into peace negotiations. Even
without the extra funds, Amelie Elisabeth still successfully besieged Marburg and
Butzbach and gained control over most parts of Oberhessen. Melander, who had
defected96 from Hesse-Cassel, withdrew from Marburg in 1648, and Hesse-Cassel
officially gained control over part of Hesse-Marburg, ending the Hessian War.97
4.6 The Nobility: Maintaining the Status Quo (1637–1646)
The Landstände had been very forthcoming in the case of Wilhelm VI’s succession,
even though they could have accepted Georg II of Hesse-Darmstadt as the emperor
demanded.98 YoungWilhelm VI was in Eastern-Frisia when he took the oath in front
of the army accepting his rule over Hesse-Cassel. The possibility to accept the
position of landgrave had entirely depended upon the loyalty of the nobility. It
was not until 1640 that Amelie Elisabeth and her son returned to the principality.
Between 1637 and 1644, the helpful nobility de facto supervised and ran affairs in
the landgraviate. This, all amid the damaging atrocities of warfare.99
Although the nobility had been loyal to Landgrave Wilhelm VI, they did object to
his mother’s military plans. They did so because they deemed these plans to be
harmful to the unity of the lands, and the relationship with the other parts of Greater
Hesse.100 Landgravine Amalie Elisabeth argued that she was merely upholding the
status quo until her son was old enough to reign. As such, the nobility had little to
say in foreign affairs, even though military events had a severe impact on the
domestic situation.
The nobility did not seem to have much influence at all during Amelie Elisabeth’s
regency. They were only called to meet in 1640, 1643, 1648, and 1650, which was
94Helfferich (2013), pp. 159–161.
95On behalf of Hesse-Cassel, five representatives were sent to Osnabruck. These were: Adolf
Wilhelm von Krosigk; Johann Vultejus; Reinhard Scheffer; Dr. Nikolaus Christoph Muldener;
Dr. Johann Antrecht. See: Langer (1994), p. 86; Buckreus (2008), p. 103.
96In July 1640 Melander no longer commanded the armies of Hesse-Cassel.
97Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 80–83; Helbach (1977).
98Puppel (2004), pp. 194–199.
99von Friedeburg (2005), pp. 905–906.
100Puppel (2007), p. 96.
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not nearly as often as they seem to have preferred.101 Not only did the limited
number of meetings give cause for dismay, so did the terms of Amelie Elisabeth’s
guardianship. The nobility preferred the 1514-model of regency, in which they
would actively advise the landgravine. However, Landgravine Amalie Elisabeth
opposed this. In 1643, she requested the Landstände to agree to four matters: (1) a
continuation of a tax on alcohol, (2) tightening the rules regarding Jews, (3) payment
of interest, and (4) the opportunity to negotiate in Westphalia.102 In 1648 the
Landstände were officially summoned to learn about the marriage of Landgrave
Wilhelm VI and Hedwig Sophie of Brandenburg (1623–1683). In 1650 they were
invited to approve and witness the young prince acceptance of government.
The opinions about Amelie Elisabeth among the Hessian population varied.103
Some considered her the saviour of Hesse-Cassel, and attributed her with impressive
political and military skills.104 Some lauded her for her strategic and negotiation
skills.105 She may have largely governed authoritatively but did request advice at
times. Others, including the nobility, saw her as a bringer of more warfare and
despair. Hence, she was also seen as untrustworthy as she seemed to have a
preference for war.106
4.7 Final Negotiations: Peace of Westphalia (1648)
On 24 October 1648, the final details of a peace treaty were recorded and were to be
signed by the Holy Roman Empire, Sweden, and France. Although people had
already started to celebrate, France complained that the details relating to payments
by Hesse-Cassel remained unclear. So, the French could, and indeed would not, sign
the treaty. The awkward timing at which these concerns were raised led to suspicions
that the French sabotaged the peace.107 Their very late demand for financial com-
pensation from Hesse-Cassel led to many misunderstandings, and the only negoti-
ators in favour of this settlement were the French. The House of Hesse-Cassel sought
compensation of the principality’s war damages and the costs incurred by its
army.108 Any peace should end the war between the emperor and the princes, and
resolve any remaining territorial and dynastic disputes. These disputes concerned
issues with the Reichsverfassung (Imperial Legislation) and dealt with issues from
101Puppel (2004), p. 210.
102Puppel (2007), p. 111.
103Ibid., p. 101.
104Buckreus (2008), p. 161.
105Puppel (2007), p. 99.
106Ibid., p. 101.
107Helfferich (2013), p. 232; Wolff (1999), p. 112.
108Wolff (1999), p. 113.
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which the war had originated.109 Landgravine Amelie Elisabeth genuinely believed
that making war and peace was the right of every individual German Prince. As her
armies held many fortresses and lands belonging to other rulers, she felt empowered
to press these claims.110
Religious conflict also needed to be addressed, as the Peace of Augsburg (1555)
no longer sufficed: Lutheranism, Calvinism and Roman-Catholicism needed to be
accepted.111 Religion formed an intrinsic part of the Hessian demands. The
emperor’s rights as head of the Holy Roman Empire had to be curtailed in order to
prevent legal decisions from being influenced by his power.112 This Hessian demand
had Sweden’s attention, as Sweden felt responsible for protecting the Protestant
nobility, in particular, the Lutherans.113 The house of Hesse-Cassel sought the
acceptance of Calvinism without alterations.114 Hesse-Cassel—as a military
power—was positioned to make the other negotiators acquiesce to this demand
and the ius reformandi and ius emigrandi were lifted.115
Negotiators for Hesse-Cassel pressed two demanded. Firstly, amnesty and resti-
tution to the Landstände by the 1618-situation, meaning the retrocession of Hesse-
Marburg. Secondly, compensations for damages—an unknown sum—caused by the
Catholic armies. The Hessian troops would remain in the principalities they had
occupied, for example in Jülich until they had received full payment.116 Hesse-
Cassel required 200,000 Reichsthaler to disband its army, on which an agreement
was reached in the end.117
4.8 Landgravine and Nobility: Problems Arising
(1646–1650)
Amelie Elisabeth showed a growing interest in regaining the lost Marburg heirloom.
Surprisingly the nobility objected to her warmongering. Their objection may have
come as a surprise because Landgrave Philipp’s declaration stated that the nobility
should not meddle in disputes between his heirs.118 The declaration referred to their
interest in fostering conflict hitherto. However, the policy of conquest focussed on a
small principality, which collided with the nobility’s interests. Most nobles had
109Ibid., p. 113.
110Helfferich (2013), pp. 161–196.
111Wolff (1999), pp. 114–115; Maruhn (2004a), p. 179.
112Maruhn (2004a), p. 178.
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possessions in more than one Hessian principality, and they were wary of endan-
gering their interest: stability.119 The nobility, therefore, preferred to foster an
identity of ‘the Hessian nobles,’ indicating allegiance to Greater Hesse.120 Refer-
ences to the wishes of Philipp I, the Magnanimous, guided the debate away from the
nobles’ interests and towards a nostalgic emphasis on a more favourable period in
history.121 The religious preferences of the Lutheran nobility were also important in
the debate, as the landgrave was a Calvinist.122
On 27 April 1646, Amelie Elisabeth called a meeting with the Landstände out of
dire necessity: she needed grain for the troops.123 She requested payment not only
from cities and towns, but also from the nobility, as they would benefit from feeding
the troops as well. The nobility opposed this and met in the convent (stift) of the town
of Kaufungen in December.124 Otto von der Malsburg, who had previously been a
favourite of the landgravine, now devoted himself to the nobility’s cause. The nobles
refused to allow the levy of 4000 Malter of grain but offered 1000 Malter in return
for the landgravine’s acceptance to respect their rights.125
The requested 4000Malter, being 656,000 kilos of grain, were the equivalents of
113,280 grams of silver.126 Per capita, this is such a low amount of silver that it does
not explain the reaction of the nobility. However, if expressed in kilocalories (Kcal),
it gives us a general idea of the amount of food that was taken away. The 656,000
kilos of grain comes to 1,102,080,000 kcal (1680 Kcal/kilo). Divided by the
2100 kcal that define food insecurity, it makes 524,800 insecure food days. With a
population of 375,000, this would have resulted in 0.30 g of silver or 1.5 days of
hunger per capita. These amounts do not seem to be extreme, but the promptness
with which they had to be delivered was problematic, certainly on top of the
relentless war damage.
Amelie Elisabeth was incensed and wanted the nobility to disband their assembly,
threatening those acting contrary to her commands. The nobles turned to Landgrave
Georg II of Hesse-Darmstadt, whose delegates had been invited to Kaufungen
previously but who had not shown up.127 The nobility cited their privileges, espe-
cially their right of assembly,128 whereas Amelie Elisabeth claimed that the current
state of necessitas entitled her to levy these taxes. The landgravine contested this
right of assembly without her consent and described the actions as secret meetings of
119Maruhn (2004a), pp. 104–105.
120Maruhn (2004b), pp. 71–94.
121Maruhn (2004a), pp. 112–113.
122Ibid., pp. 1–2, 127; Maruhn (2004b).
123Neu (2013a), p. 344; Maruhn (2004a), pp. 44–45.
124Eβer (2001), p. 184.
125Maruhn (2004a), pp. 40–52; Helfferich (2013), p. 207.
126Calculations based upon Rahlf (1996). The price-average for the year 1647, was 28.32 g/
hectoliter.
127Neu (2013a), pp. 346–347.
128Ibid., p. 348.
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private persons under suspicious circumstances.129 Despite these objections, the
nobility did assemble. Amelie Elisabeth was enraged and had Hans Diede and
Otto von der Malsburg incarcerated, expecting the rest of the nobility to back
down and cancel the meeting. Diede and Malsburg came up with means to deal
with this government upon their release from prison in April 1647: a government
that drew them in war; that disallowed the nobility to assemble; and withheld their
consent in the matters of taxes.130 Malsburg presented three options. Firstly, they
could use force. Secondly, they could consider going to court. Finally, they could
start petitioning and peaceful negotiations. The nobility opted for the latter two and
decided to pay only part of the requested sum of money in order to make their point
but also to keep negotiations open. Represented by Master in Laws and syndic of
Gottingen, Heinrich Diederich, they appealed to the Imperial Chamber Court.
On 14 September 1647, the Imperial Chamber Court issued a mandatum
inhibitorium et cassatorium sine clausula.131 It stated that the landgravine was
indeed violating the rights and privileges of the nobility by demanding such amounts
of food and taxes. Moreover, she was harming the welfare of her lands. A fine would
be imposed should she continue her harmful behaviour.132 Significantly, the nobility
did not present this mandatum to the landgravine, as they wished to continue
negotiations. However, the document was re-issued in January 1650, accompanied
by a more sharply worded formulation, when negotiations failed.133 This verdict was
eventually published after the Remonstratio134 had been submitted. The
Remonstratio was a document comprising a formal objection to the ban on the
nobility’s assembling.135 The nobility emphasised that they must assemble, because
they needed to discuss the troubles Hesse-Cassel was facing. It was their duty to
defend their rights and honours.136
129Ibid., p. 350; Puppel (2007), pp. 114–115.
130Maruhn (2004a), p. 47.
131HStAM Bestand 304 I, 504; Eβer (2001), p. 184; Maruhn (2004a), p. 51.
132Eβer (2001), p. 184; Maruhn (2004a), pp. 40–52, 191; Puppel (2007), pp. 99–125.
133von Friedeburg (2003), pp. 310–311.
134HStAM 5, 19147: Remonstratio; HStAM 73, 1816: Remonstratio.
135Section from: HStAM 73, 1816: Remonstratio: ‘Durchleuchtige hochgeborne Fürstin, genedige
Fraw, alß E.F.G. kurtz verwichener Zeit zweij unterschiedene Befehlschreiben ahn dero getrewe
Ritterschafft des Niederfurstenthumbs Heßen abgehen laßen, worinnen demselben ein undt andere
beschwerliche Ufflagen, zweifels ohne auß ungleichem Bericht, beygemeßen, dero jura und alles
Herkommen, insonderheit aber der bishero zuweilen angestelten Zusammenkunfften halber
disputirlich gemacht werden wollen undt nachmahls den 9[.] Junii dieses lauffenden Jahrs solche
hergebrachte wohlbefugte Zusammenkunffte gemeiner Ritterschafft ernstlich verbotten worden
[. . .]’ [quote continues in the next footnote].
136Section from: HStAM 73, 1816: Remonstratio: ‘[. . .] so hat der Ritterschafft Notturfft erfordert,
pro legitima et omnibus concessa defensione juris et honoris sui, vorbehaltlich alles unterthenigen
Respects und Gehorsambs, welchen sie E.F.G. zuerweisen schüldig, und durchaus nicht dero
Intention undt Meinung, sich demselben inn einige ungebürliche Wege zu widersetzen, wovon
hiermitt feijerlich bedingt wirdt, ihre Unschuldt undt Befugnis an den tag zu legen undt mit
wenigem zu remonstriren, daß nicht allein bißhero von der Ritterschafft nichts Unverantwortliches,
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The nobility used two different arguments. Firstly, they debated whether the
actions of Amelie Elisabeth were tyrannical. Secondly, they had acted in line with the
traditions and privileges of their principality.137 The nobility added that assemblies
had been banned in other principalities such as Jülich and Berg.138 In the principal-
ities above, the emperor had ruled in favour of the claimants, that is the nobility. The
Hessian Chronicle by Wilhelm Dillich was used to illustrate the history of Hesse,
and to provide examples proving that the nobles had the right of assembly.139 If the
well-being of the principality was at stake, the nobility had to debate strategy and
organise actions. They referred to the situation as ‘nottrufft’ (Eng: emergency).140
Moreover, the landgrave—and in this case, the regent—had sworn to uphold these
privileges.141
The nobility emphasised they had sworn allegiance to their young landgrave, who
in turn had to fulfil the duties of his office correctly. They focussed on the
principality’s customs and stated that the oath of the inauguration was a mutually
binding contract concerning upholding these traditions.142 Their privileges were
noch unbefugtes in Anstellung vorangedeuteter Zusammenkunfften begangen, sondern auch
dieselbe innkunfftig rechtswegen nicht behindert werden mögen, ihrer Angelegenheiten undt daß
gantze corpus oder collegium der Ritterschafft betreffender sachen halber zusammen zukommen
undt darüber nach notturfft zu vernehmen, dero underthenigen Zuversicht, F.Gn. werden solches
anderer Gestalt nicht, alß es gemeinet, in allen Gerraden aufnehmen undt vermercken.’
137von Friedeburg (2003), p. 304.
138Section from HStAM 73, 1816: Remonstratio. See page 80 for full quote from the source.
139Maruhn (2004a), pp. 105–111, 255. The full-text Hessische Chronica can be found at: http://
digitale.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/vd17/content/titleinfo/10083619. Accessed 20 May 2020.
140HStAM Bestand 73 Nr. 1816, Remonstratio 1647, page 4 r0.
141Section from: HStAM Bestand 73, Nr. 1816, Remonstratio 1647, page 5 r: ‘So ist bekandt, wie
heutigen Tages secundum morem et consuetudinem Germaniæ, ein Regent bey den Erb- undt
Landtshuldigungen seinen Underthanen zuegesagt, er wolle sie bey ihrer Religion schützen, bey
gleichmäβiger durchgehender Justitz, Friede, Ruhe, Wohlstand und Einigkeit, so wohl einen jeden
bey seinen erlangten, undt wohlhergebrachten Rechten, Gerechtigkeitten, Privilegien undt
Freyheiten erhalten, vertheidigen undt alles das jenige verrichten, befehlen undt anordnen, waβ
einem löblichen Regenten, der seine getrewen Underthanen von Hertzen lieb hatt Ambts, Standts
undt Gewisens halber zuethuen eignet ut gebueret, daruf sich auch eine getrewe Landtschafft gewis
verlassen soll, Neumeier etc. Wie dann auch bekandt, das bey der zue Naumburgk den 8t[en] Julii A
[nn]o 1567 aufgerichteten Erbverbruederung zwischen den chur- undt fürstl[ichen] Häusern
Sachsen undt Hessen austrücklich verabschiedet, ob ihre Mitt parthey ohne leibes lebens Erben
todtshalber abginge, also, das ihre Fürstenthümer undt Herrschafften ahn die andere Partheyen
die noch im Leben wehren, nach Lautt ihrer Bruederschafft Auf- undt Übergebung kehme, das sie
undt ihre Erben alsdann deβ abgangen Fürstenthumbs Graffen, Herrn, Ritter undt Knechte,
Burgmannen, Bürgern, Städten, Landt und Leuthe, geystlich undt weltlich, bey allen ihren Rechten,
Ehren, Würden, alter gutter Gewonheit undt Herkommen lasen undt getrewlich darbey erhalten
sollen undt wollen, innsonderheit aber ist der Ritterschaft in Niederhessen noch newlicner Zeit,
[. . .]’ (This quotation continues in the next footnote.).
142Section from: HStAM Bestand 73, Nr. 1816, Remonstratio 1647, page 5 r and v: ‘[. . .] in Anno
1624, als Landtgraff Georgens F[ürstliche] Gn[aden] die Pfandtämbter am Schwalmstrom
angewiesen, versprochen worden, sie bey hergebrachter Freyh- undt Gerechtigkeit zue
manuteniren undt zue schützen, ingleichem ebenmäsigk in A[nn]o 1627 von Landtgraff Wilhelms
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bound to the well-being of the principality of Hesse-Cassel. However, this well-
being seemed to collide with the attitude of the landgrave and his mother. This
perception and struggle shows resemblances with the case of Jülich.
Amelie Elisabeth’s advisors focussed on one argument in particular: in times of
turmoil and unrest, a prince might have to act unilaterally, laying claim to excep-
tional duties and taxes.143 The debate about who was responsible for the fatherland
soon turned to the differences between princes and subjects. The nobles denied that
they had acted rebelliously. They had acted from love for the fatherland,144 and as its
representatives, the nobility must be consulted. These claims addressed arguments
about necessitas as well as the dialogue about public matters. Resorting to history
and Althusius’ work, the nobility claimed to safeguard the welfare of the people and
the principality.145
During the conflict, the nobility did not want separate assemblies in the different
parts of Greater Hesse but preferred joint-Landstände assemblies. With that, the
nobles tried to turn back the clock when it came to the division of land. Chairman
(Germ.: Obervorsteher) Diede remarked, shortly after the signing of the Hessian
Treaty (Germ.: Hauptakkord) of 1648,146 that the House of Hesse had experienced
many difficulties due to internal differences. The Landstände should encourage both
landgraves to return to the situation before the troubles had commenced.147 For
instance, during the war, the Hessian troops had numbered 20,000 and were reduced
to 500 by 1649. The income of the seigniory paid them. These costs still displeased
the nobility, despite the modest lifestyle of Amelie Elisabeth and her son, and so they
sought a way to end them.148
On 24 October 1649, an assembly in Kirchhain was organised to discuss matters
concerning the requested troop payments.149 Again, Amelie Elisabeth considered
this meeting to challenge her rule. She fined Hereditary Marshal (Germ:
Erbmarschall) Curt Riedesel and imprisoned Otto von der Malsburg.150 After
F[ürstlichen] Gn[aden], hochseeligen andenckens, bey Einnehmung der Landtshuldigung, undt
nicht weniger in A[nn]o 1637, wie S[einer] F[ürstlichen] Gn[aden] H[err] Sohn unserm itzigen g
[nädigen]lieben Landtsfürsten undt H[errn] die Erbhuldigung von den Ständen gelaistet,
wiederhohlet worden.
Wie nun die Landtstände undt Underthanen verpflichtet seyn, dem jenigen, worzue sie sich in
dem Huldigungsaydt verbunden seyn, getrewlich nachzueleben, also ist ‚der Landesfürst nicht
weniger gehalten, dem Versprechen, so desen F[ürstliche] Gn[aden] den Ständen thut, fürstl[ich]
nachzuekommen. Mutuus enim hic contractus est [etc.] So hatt auch diese Zuesage die Krafft undt
Würckung eines geschwornen Aydts. Verba enim stipulationis etc.’
143von Friedeburg (2005), p. 911; Maruhn (2004a), pp. 262–264.
144von Friedeburg (2005), p. 912; Maruhn (2004a), pp. 264–266.
145von Friedeburg (2005), p. 914.
146Philippi (2007), p. 2; Weiand (2009), p. 166.
147Maruhn (2004b), p. 86.
148Philippi (2007), p. 6.
149Hollenberg and Jäger (1989a); Maruhn (2004a), p. 59.
150Maruhn (2004a), pp. 57–58; von Friedeburg (2003), pp. 298–299.
4.8 Landgravine and Nobility: Problems Arising (1646–1650) 103
more than 3 weeks, Malsburg was released on 22 January 1650. A rebellion was
punishable by death; however, Malsburg received a fine of 400 gold guldens.151 He
responded violently to this fine and addressed the landgravine sharply. He claimed
that she had ignored his noble ancestry, and that he had been imprisoned like a mere
commoner. To those in favour of the privileges of the Landstände, Malsburg became
a martyr. At this point, the nobles requested support from the emperor, and the
Imperial Chamber Court ruled in their favour in 1650. This verdict could force
Amelie Elisabeth into hearing the noble cause.152
During the Großer Landkommunikationstag, which lasted from 25 September
until 17 October 1650, Wilhelm VI took over the government of Hesse-Cassel.153
During this assembly, the nobility addressed the issue of their meetings as patriots:
they had done nothing to upset the landgrave, or so they claimed. Their gathering
was made solely out of their love for their land.154 The landgrave had come of age
and was now able to govern and make his own decisions.155 During his mother’s
regency, Landgrave Wilhelm VI had visited and established warm relations with the
151Maruhn (2004a), p. 59.
152Puppel (2007) and Maruhn (2004b).
153Hollenberg and Jäger (1989b). For more information on the frequency of meetings, see:
Neu (2012).
154HStAM 73, 213: Landtag zu Kassel Sept. 1650 nur: Gravamina der Landschaft. First mentioned
of the 29 grievances: ‘1. Das im künftig vorfallen den Sachen, so daβ Landes Wohlfarth und auch
Gefahr und beschwaren concerniren Die soll genannt Landtagen <und communicationes> ex in
allereits inzo von unsern F.G.fürsten undt herrn stracks im ersten Tage Ihren F. Gl. angetretenen
Regierung <Casselisch theils> ein löblicher Anfang- gemacht Worch, wiederumb an landt
genommen, undt darauf durch die sämptliche Landstände die nottrufft und remedia berahtschlagt,
ihre Anliegen undt Meinungen darbeij gehort, undt Fürstens durch die Praelaten undt Ritterschafft
so wohl, als durch die Städte zusammen dem gemeinen woβen gebüerede sampt hält geschehe
haben, hohen die Städte von Herzen gern, wünsche auch daβ sich darin ein jeder an seinem Orth
alβ ein Patriot in den Wercken, undt nicht in Worten allein, bezeige, auch ein des andern Höhe
Praesumption des befremdliche Intention nicht wuchs und zereijung [illigible] zu seiner
groβmarchung undt anderer standen und Unterthanen Unterdrückung suche, oder sonst einen
dem Regierenden landeβfürsten und anderen Landständen und Unterthanen nachtheiligen und
unverdächtigen Anfang nach, sondern demselben beginnen vielmehr abrathe, undt die gesechte alte
concorporation <der gesambte Platz Rittern- undt Lande-schaft> getrewe landes-liebe, und
einigkeit bestens Vermögens befordern solche, damit sich der Regierende Landesfürst sicherlich
auf ein solch gesamptes getreues corpus undt deβen notwendigen beijstandt zu verlaβen, undt
demselben hiergegen also landβvätterliche gnade undt liebe wiederumb zuerweiβen auch desselbe
ins gesampte beij seines Standt undt herkommen zu conserviren ersach haben, zu welchem ander
den von einer jeden in solchen corpore des landtstandes begriffener person, so eine noch nicht
geschehe die gebuerende homogial – und huldigungs aydt der, alβ die uhrälteste und beständigste
bündniβ gewischen einer Christlichen angeborenen regierung daβ landes rattern <oder> Fürsten
und dessen gesampten rathen landstständen, erfordert und wohlerinnert <er des könte, bevor ab
weil dardurch ein jeder samt wesen Er sich zudem andere zu der solche mehr ders: ehrt, und ders
rechts alte vertrauen ihr gantzes corporis unter sich selbes merklich stabilisiert wirde.’
155Philippi (2007), p. 3; Puppel (2007).
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Dutch Republic, France, as well as with other principalities of the Holy Roman
Empire. These contacts were maintained throughout his reign.156 However, it was
with some reluctance that Landgrave Wilhelm VI took over the government.
Landgravine Amelie Elisabeth’s influence was reduced to that of an unofficial
councillor in military affairs.157
The differences between the landgrave and the nobility seemed irreconcilable: the
grain was not returned. Moreover, there was no indication that the landgrave would
honour those privileges his mother had previously violated. The result of this
uncertainty was that the nobility withdrew early from the Landtag.158 On 17 January
1651, the nobility drafted a list of 84 points of view which they presented to the
landgrave.159 This list did not alleviate tensions, so the nobility had to alter their
strategy. Begging and pleading did not work; now, the nobles were forced to try a
more judicial path.
4.9 Preparing and Filing an Official Complaint (1647–1655)
In the case of the principality of Hesse-Cassel, I found six general themes illustrating
the debate’s developement. The sources found in the private Archiv der
Althessischen Ritterschaft Kaufungen show an on-going debate and not a linear
progression.160 These six themes are as follows. Firstly, the position of the dominus
terrae, holding the superioritas territorialis—in both private and public law. The
landgrave was the highest authority in the fief, a fact with which the nobility agreed.
Despite that agreement, the nobles argued that the laws still applied to the
superioritas territorialis (the highest authority within the territory). Secondly, the
nobility and the landgrav(in)e held opposing views as to the position of patriots. The
landgrave assumed that the patriots were loyal to both fatherland and landgrave,
whereas the nobility stressed their exclusive loyalty to the fatherland. Thirdly, the
issue of war. According to the landgravine, conducting war was necessary to defend
the fatherland. The nobility maintained that warfare was detrimental to the country.
Fourthly, taxation was a regular topic in the legal suit. The landgrave argued that it
was a basic necessity used to protect the prosperity of the fief, but the nobility
countered that it was a danger to the country. Fifthly, the issue whether or not the
landgrave had to consult the nobility and whether she had obtained their consent
156Philippi (2007), pp. 1–9.
157Puppel (2007).
158Eβer (2001), p. 185.
159AARK, P.P. (Repositur 6, Gefach 15, Seite 54, Nummer 5); von Friedeburg (2003), p. 299.
160Various versions of the Replica have been retrieved from two archives: Archiv der Althessischen
Ritterschaft Kaufungen (AARK) and the Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg (HStAM). The latter
holds multiple copies that seem to contain several individual persons’ handwriting: HStAM 255, H
139; HStAM 73, 1816. One of these bears a signature on the title page that indicates that this is the
version that was sent to the Imperial Chamber Court.
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before levying taxes. Landgrave Wilhelm VI argued that the war had created a
situation of necessitas and that there had been no time in which to request the
consent of the nobility. The nobility retorted that not consulting them was a sign of
tyranny. Sixthly, there was a question of whether or not the nobility were entitled to
assemble and debate amongst themselves. The landgrave believed that such meet-
ings undermined his government, whereas the nobility argued it was one of their
ancient privileges.
4.9.1 Remonstratio
In 1647 the nobility objected to Landgravine Amelie Elisabeth’s policy, and
informed her of their objections by writing a letter—called the Remonstratio—
containing their grievances. They stated that the fatherland was being damaged.161
As such, they had to voice their concerns by warning the landgravine about this
grave situation, hoping to repair the strained relationship.162 Shortly after the Peace
of Westphalia, the nobility re-presented their grievances. A prominent grievance
concerned the conflict over the inheritance of Hesse-Marburg, as the nobles feared
the landgravine’s renewed interest in it would spark another war. Both the
Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt received
these complaints in 1649.
4.9.2 Mandatum Inhibitorium et Cassatorium Sine Clausula:
1647 and 1650, 1651
On 14 September 1647 a mandatum inhibitorium et cassatorium sine clausula, was
sent to the nobility containing the verdict that they need not suffer the consequences
of the increased taxes unless the majority assented to said taxes.163 If the landgravine
were to continue her malpractice and keep ignoring her subjects’ rights to meet and
to vote on taxes, she would face a fine.164 Despite the positive outcome, the nobility
did not show their landgravine the document, as they interpreted her silence in the
matter of the Remonstratio (12 August) as tacit consent of their right of assembly.165
Therefore there was no need to bother her with the official verdict. The nobility could
use the verdict as a benchmark to test the validity of their protests, even when the
verdict was later on ignored by Landgravine Amelie Elisabeth and Landgrave
161Neu (2013a), p. 414.
162Maruhn (2004a), p. 52.
163Ibid., pp. 40–52.
164Ibid., p. 191; Neu (2013a), pp. 381, 412.
165Neu (2013a), p. 381.
106 4 Hesse-Cassel: Alledged Sedition and Law-Suits (1640s–1650s)
Wilhelm VI in 1650.166 The mandatum was renewed and re-issued on 23 September
1651 and was notably critical of the punishment of Riedesel and Von der
Malsburg.167
The verdict in the mandatum sine clausula had been reached relatively quickly,
given the fact that the Thirty Years’ War had severely delayed sentencing by the
court.168 However, only the complainant was heard in a sine clausula-case.169 Had it
been a con clausula-case, the landgrave would have been compelled to reply. The
accuser would then be obliged to present the verdict to the defendant.170 The
mandatum encompassed legal protection for the complainants and their goods
(inhibitorium) and guaranteed their right to be safeguarded from prosecution
(cassatorium).171 The Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt criticised the 1650 mandatum
in a letter to Landgravine Amelie Elisabeth, claiming that a mandatum sine clausula
seemed arbitrary. He recommended that Amelie should respond to the Imperial
Chamber Court forthwith.172
4.9.3 Disposition or Gutachten 1648–1650
Between 1648 and 1651173 a disposition (Gutachten) was written on behalf of the
nobility. The author was likely David Berger, a lawyer from Speyer.174 It contained
three questions:
[C]ould a prince make laws or any ordinance without prior consultation of the Landstände?
Could a prince ban assemblies on issues of the welfare of the fatherland (de salute patriae)?
Did the Landstände of Hesse-Cassel possess the right to meet for such purposes whenever
they saw fit?175
The first question implied the acceptance of Amelie’s power, but also that the
landgravine’s acts would be illegal when the privileges of the nobility were
166HStAM Bestand 255, H 139: mandatum sine clausula [5 January 1650], according to the date
and signature on the back it was presented to the landgravine on 12 March 1650; Maruhn,
Necessitäres Regiment, p. 192.
167Mandatum sine clausula, 61 and 201.
168Mandatum sine clausula, 192.
169Mandatum sine clausula, 193.
170Mandatum sine clausula, 193–194.
171Mandatum sine clausula, 194.
172Mandatum sine clausula, 195.
173HStAM 73, 1816; Von Friedeburg dates this document as written in the year 1648, Maruhn and
Neu indicate that it was written in 1651. Neu even suggests written prior to the exceptiones. See:
von Friedeburg (2003), p. 304; Maruhn (2004a), p. 206 footnote 182; Neu (2013a), p. 413.
I position the Gutachten between 1648-1650, as it could well have functioned as a trigger for the
Exceptionis.
174Gutachten: Bestand 73, 1816; Maruhn (2004a), p. 201 footnote 148.
175HStAM 73, 1816, r1; von Friedeburg (2005), p. 909.
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disrespected, (referring to the regimen politicum). The second issue raised, argued
for the nobility’s representation of the fatherland, and implied that their assembly
was necessary. Amelie seemed to agree with most points, though the point of the
necessity of meetings without consent remained a sensitive issue.176
4.9.4 Exceptiones sub- et obreptionis: 1651
With the landgrave’s permission, an exceptiones sub- et obreptionis—with 84 com-
plaints177—was sent to the Imperial Chamber Court on 17 January 1651.178 A first
draft of the text, drawn up by the landgrave’s lawyer Georg Goll, had been written
about 1 year before.179 The document was a response to the mandatum inhibitorium
et cassatorium sine clausula and challenged the jurisdiction and ruling of the
Imperial Chamber Court. The reason for this was that the nobility had allegedly
withheld vital information,180 namely that they had plotted against the government
and undermined it, thereby committing the offence of lèse-majesté. Strikingly, the
exceptiones referred to some subjects and not to the niederhessische Ritterschaft
(nobility).181 The landgrave had referred to all inhabitants of his principality as
subjects irrespective of birth. This change in terminology is an indication that their
positions changed during the seventeenth century.182 Privileges became less impor-
tant, and a uniform, objective norm was developed for everyone. The use of the word
subiectus or subject marked this development.183
4.9.5 Mandatum Poenale Sine Clausula: 1652
On 19 February 1652 Imperial Chamber Court issued yet another Mandate: a
mandatum poenale sine clausula, according to the text on the back.184 It seems to
be the second time the mandatum of 23 September 1651 was issued, although this
does not become clear from any references. The nobility stated in their notes that
176Ibid., pp. 910–911; Maruhn (2004a), p. 206.
177The version in HStAM Bestand 255 (Reichskammergerichtsachen), H 140: Exceptiones sub- et
obreptionis, counts a mere 64 points.
178HStAM 5, 14660 fol. 25: Exceptiones sub- et obreptionis.
179Maruhn (2004a), p. 203.
180Ibid., p. 202.
181Ibid., p. 202.
182AARK, Duplicae, Repositur 6, Gefach 15, Seite 54, Nummer 5, p. 75: ‘Unde in bene constitutis
rebus publicis principatibus ac Regnis ob subditorum malevolentiam mutationi facile obnoxijs
sedulo praecavere solent imperantes, ne subditi praesertim nobiliores ipsis inscijs conventus aut
congregationes agant, veluti in Regno Neopolitano et Siciliae.’; Stolleis (1988).
183Ibid., pp. 276–277.
184HStAM 255, H140: mandatum poenale sine clausula [19 February 1652].
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their lawyer Konrad Blaufelder was to copy the document for them.185 In this
mandatum, the emperor criticises the imprisonment of Otto von der Malsburg and
Curt Riedesel, as well as the penalties of 400 and 200 Goldgulden, respectively.186
He emphasised that they were speaking on behalf of the nobility, and that they
believed that much of the troubles would have been avoidable, had the nobles ever
received proper replies. Moreover, the landgrave was ordered to return the fine, as
well as the requisitioned resources.
4.9.6 Replica: 30 March 1652
The Imperial Chamber Court of Speyer received a lengthy complaint against
Landgrave Wilhelm VI of Hesse-Cassel and his late mother’s regency in 1652.
Lawyer Blaufelder filed The Replica. He was a lawyer who worked in Speyer.187
Before the publication of the Replica,188 the nobility had been accused of three
problematic acts. These were: (1) the crime of rebellion, (2) the crime of conspiring
against the prince and the fatherland and of (3) lèse-majesté.189 They, in turn,
185HStAM 255, H140: Ritterscha[fft] Samptliche Ritterschafft des Nider Fürstenthumbs Hessen-
Cassels [etc].
186HStAM 255, H140:mandatum poenale sine clausula [19 February 1652], in this respect it seems
the same as the mandatum of 23 September 1651.
187Eβer (2001), p. 186; Hollenberg and Jäger (1989c), p. 66 footnote 25.
188AARK, Replicae [. . .] Mandati Inhibitorii et cassatorii sine clausula (Repositur 6, Gefach
15, Seite 54, Nummer 5).
189Based upon Replicae, 3–4: ‘So will Anwaldt imperantium sowohl umb den Ungrundt und
Ohnerhebligkeit solcher Exceptionum destomehr an den tagh zu bringen, alß auch von den
schweren Imputationen inepte applicati criminis rebellionis machinationis contra principem et
patriam, itemq[ue] laesae majestatis, sie zu purgiren und ihre Unschuldt so viel clährer vor augen
zustellen, diese seine schriftliche replicas undt ableimung dargegen übergeben haben, undt thuet
neben gemeiner Wiedersprechung allem wiedrigen unerwießenen, unbegründten undt
unerfindtlichen Inhalts, auch dienstlicher Acceptirung alles desjenigen, waß einiges wegen seines
großg[ün]s[tigen] hern Pr[incipa]l[e]n in berürten exceptionibus nachgegeben undt eingestanden
oder auch zum besten verstanden werden kann, hiemit undt in Crafft dießes vor Gott vor der Kayser
[lichen] May[estät], vor E[wer] Chürf[ürstlicher] Gn[aden] undt vor der gantzen Weldt fyerlich
protestiren, daß das crimen Rebellionis machinationis contra pricipem et patriam, laesae
majestatis undt waß dergeleichen falschen imputationen mehr seinen Pr[incipa]l[e]n niemahln
in sein kommen, sondern Ihnen mit solcher Beschuldigung Gewalt undt Unrecht geschehe, dahero
Ihnen dan solche aufflagen undt atrocissimae, welche sie sich billig ad animum revociret undt
nochmahls revociren thunen, so viel tieffer ins Hertz schneiden, daß nach dem ihre weylandt
Vorfahren davon sie posteriren, deren Schildt undt Helm Sie führen, diejenigen gewesen, sowegen
Ihrer gegen dero Landtsfürsten undt waß von deren geblüth endtsproßen erwießen großen Trew
undt Tapferkeit, dardurch selbige zu dießem Fürstenthumb gebracht, auch in verschiedenen
gefährlichen Zuständen darbey erhalten, einen solchen Rühm erlangt, dergleichen vom anderen
adell beydes in geschriebenen undt sonst offenen Truck außgegangenen Chronicis nicht leicht zu
laßen, sie auch nach des herzens und gemüths sein, andermaßen dan auch sich jederzeit gegen Ihre
Landfürsten undt das Vatterlandt dergestalt erzeigt, wie getrewen redtlichen Adels persohnen,
4.9 Preparing and Filing an Official Complaint (1647–1655) 109
claimed to be harmed by this injustice and these grave falsehoods.190 The nobility
was convinced that their meetings had been legitimate.191 The Replica claimed that
the nobility felt obliged to honour the customs of both the Holy Roman Empire and
the fatherland. They needed to protest on behalf of their fatherland and to protect its
prosperity.192 The 1648 peace treaties had terminated the Thirty Years' War, so the
argument for necessity was no longer applicable.193 Despite the protest above, they
did recognise the landgrave as their superior.194
The landgrave and his mother had claimed necessity to levy resources, but no
situation had as yet been so pressing as to override the nobility’s ancient privi-
leges.195 The nobility felt strengthened by the mandatum sine clausula of
14 September 1647 issued by the Imperial Chamber Court, which overtly stated
that the 4000 Malter of grain were to be returned.196 However, the Replica shows
that little had changed, necessitating another complaint at court.197
The nobility again stressed that their liberties had been violated when the
landgrave forbade their meetings.198 They suspected that the meetings were banned
simply because Landgrave Wilhelm VI and his mother felt aggrieved because they
had not been invited.199 The emperor had ruled in favour of the nobility in similar
cases—such as that of Jülich-Berg and Eastern-Frisia. Here, the nobility was allowed
to gather despite their prince’s restrictions.200 The nobility made a comparison with
the Turks and the Muscovites, both of whom were ruled by an arbitrary ruler.201 In a
Vasallen undt patrioten zu thun gebühret undt wollahnstehet, dannoch gantz unverschulter weiße,








196Replicae, 7, 51, 53.
197Replicae, 55–61.
198Replicae, 8, 10–11, 68–72.
199Replicae, 76–8.
200Replicae, 79.
201CAR: Here the original references to sources have been removed from this quotation in order to
keep it readable; the places of the quotes are indicated with the [. . .]-sign.
Replicae, 12–13: ‘Gleichwohl wirdt Ihnen hirdurch kein dominatus absolutus, in quo Rex v[e]l
Princeps pro arbitrio agit, ac neminem consulere obligatus est, sondern nurt allein principatus in
spaecie, in quo graviora q[uaecum]q[ue] senatui communicantur [...] Et omnia communicanda
sunt [. . .] Indignum [e]n[im] est christiano principeabsolutâ poteslate operari velle. [. . .]
behaubtet werden können, derowegen dan beständig darher helt, daß diese forma in allen regnis
et principatibus Europae (das Türckische undt Moscovitische Reich außgenommen) also observirt
undt gehalten werde.’
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Greek polis, the nobility had to be part of the policy—and decision-making—
otherwise the landgrave risked becoming a tyrant.202 Those were the only two
forms of government mentioned: (1) monarchical rule with the consultation of the
Landstände, as would have occurred in the polis consultation, and (2) tyrannical
rule—or the rule by autocratic Greek monarchs—which was deemed illegal.203
Making the step to the meta-level of Aristotle’s theories could have helped to prevent
a critique that would focus on a possible lack of any law explicitly covering this issue
in Hesse-Cassel.
The corollary was that there were three requirements of a legal monarchical rule.
These were: remain within the boundaries of the law, follow the customs of the land,
and consult the Landstände.204 Arbitrary rule, which occurred when these require-
ments were not met, would endanger the welfare, wellbeing, and freedom of the
inhabitants and the fatherland.205 The nobility stressed the importance of custom
through references to the landgrave’s ancestors, especially Philipp I the Magnani-
mous and Maurice the Wise.206 These landgraves had developed laws and regula-
tions, which Landgrave Wilhelm VI had promised to uphold when he accepted
202Section from: Replicae, 16: ‘Neq[ue] [e]n[im] vera principis libertas consistit in hoc, ut faciet,
quod velit, sed quod iuste possit∏oλίτικως, namq[ue] non δεσпσδίγίκως imperat, totoq[ue] genere
Imperium â domino differt, plura pro hac sententia firmanda qui faciunt videndum est apud.’
203von Friedeburg (2005), p. 909; von Friedeburg (2003), pp. 270–271; von Friedeburg
(2010), p. 170.
204von Friedeburg (2005), p. 909.
205Section from: Replicae, 42–43: ‘Bey welchen dan auch dießes zufalen daß nicht in der
landtstände oder optimatum Wilkühr undt Gefallen stehe, der sämbtlichen Unterthanen Wohlfahrt,
Notturfft undt wie die Stände beij ihren Privilegien erhalten undt beschützet werden möchten, zu
gedencken, sondern daß die Eltisten undt Vornembsten im Lande dahin verpflichtet undt verbunden
sein, auff alles, darauß sowoll ihnen, als den anderen ein unwiederbringlicher Schade undt
Nachtheil zuwachßen möchte, ein wachendes Auge zuhaben undt nichts vornehmen zulaßen, so
des gantzen Landes Wollfahrt undt Heijl, wie auch deßelben Freyheiten zuwieder ist, undt wann sie
auff daß gemeine Weßen nicht acht haben, noch sich deß Vaterlandts Heijl undt Wohlfahrt
annehmen, so handlen sie wieder die gegebene Trew, undt seindt sowoll, als wan sie daß
Vatterlandt verkauffen oder verrathen hetten, zu bestraffen [etc], item de cap[ite] 6, Daß sie vor
Feinde undt Verderben der armen Unterthanen zu achten undt zuhalten, wan sie dem Regenten
einig undt allein zue gefallen, undt damit sie Gunst; Gnade erlangen, auff die stewer ohne noth
ridderlich undt schließen [etc], Optimates et officales singuli, inq[ui]t Althus[ius], sunt obligati ad
salutem populi, ipsisq[ue] non minus cura Reipub[licae] commissa, quam si neglexerint, ipsi
tenentur et meritò proditores Reipub[licae] esse dicantur etc d. loc. n. 54 et seqq[uentes]. Zu
erwegung deßen sie die Ritterschafft: so viel weniger mit Fuge verdacht werden können, daß sie so
woll vor der Unterthanen Noturfft undt Wollfahrth ins gemeine zu Zeiten reden müßen undt
denselben zur Beschwerung undt Nachtheil, nicht jedesmal ja sagen können [etc], alß ihre undt
der Ihrigen selbsten [etc]. So hat es auch wan schon obiges alles nicht wehre, mit den nobilibus
vasallis, wie droben zum Theil schon erwenet, wegen ihrer Lehngüter, die sie mit ihrem Leibe
zuverdienen pflichtig in, den Rechten dieße Bewandtnuß, daß sie selbige, so viel die Landtstewren
belanget, zu versteuren nicht schuldig, et ita indistinctè nisi consuetudine aliud receptum sit (wie in
gegenwertigern fall gahr nicht, sondern vielmehr die contrar observantz undt consuedo notirtii ist)
sentirt.’
206Replicae, 25–26, 34–36.
4.9 Preparing and Filing an Official Complaint (1647–1655) 111
government over his fief in 1637.207 The landgrave was expected to employ his
reliable princely power in upholding these regulations, and not to evade laws.208
Similarly, in the Holy Roman Empire, an emperor could not levy taxes without the
consent of the Diet.209 In order to rightfully and legally impose Imperial, Circle or
Land tax, the approval of the imperial assembly would have to be sought. Moreover,
the need for the taxation had to be unambiguous.210
The Landstände represented the inhabitants, and they needed to be able to speak
on their behalf. However, as they were neither allowed to assemble and hence could
not learn what went on, they could not talk about the fatherland’s peace, tranquillity,
well-being, nor about the preservation of privileges, immunities, and justice.211 The
nobility needed to be able to warn the landgrave, if necessary, of any threat to the
fatherland. With the right of nobles to convene forbidden, this possibility had been
taken away.212
Forbidding assemblies was one characteristic of an absolutus Dominatus, as a
dominus would harm immunities, privileges, freedom, and justice, and was therefore
considered undesirable. The nobility explained that the landgrave had been dishon-
est when he stated that the nobility had agreed with the situation of necessitas and the
consequent need to levy taxes. They had never agreed to call the situation one of
necessitas: it was inconceivable that the nobility would ever have agreed to this
because it would restrict their rights. They could have taken the argument one step
further stating that even if they had agreed about there being any necessitas, this
action would have been void because of its incongruity, mentioned above, with their
legally inextricable rights. Because stressing the incompatibility of ancient rights and
necessitas would be an attack on the principle of necessitas itself, they had
demurred, as this was never their goal, nor in their interest. Instead, the nobility
preferred to ridicule the mere suggestion that they had acknowledged necessitas.213
The nobility could not be asked to contribute taxes because they were tax-exempt,




211Replicae, 73–74: ‘Certi Juris esse ait, quod universitas suo Juris ad onera universitatis
sustinenda collectas, bellas, Schluß, stewer, unguldt, mankgeldt, indicre et colligere queat q[ua]
md[a]m exsat consilium Ferrarii Montani, quod et inter consil[iis] Marpurg[ensibus], vol[umen] l
consil[ium] l. Undt solche Municipal verfassungen, Gesetz undt Ordnungen undt sonst der Städte
undt Communen gemeinen Weßen undt Sachen ohne Zusammenkünfften undt gemeine
Berathschlagungen nicht verhandelt gemacht oder angestellet werden können, so wirdt statui
gradu superiori als der Ritterschafft, vielweniger den Landtständen, als dem gantzen corpori, in
fällen so des gantzen Vatterlandts Friedt, Ruhe, Wollfahrt undt Bestes endtweder zu erhalten, oder
wieder einzuführen undt zuwege zubringen, oder auch Conservirung ihrer Privilegien,
Immunitäten undt Gerechtigkeit betreffen, auch ohne zuvor darüber eingehohleten, Consens deß
superioris conventus anzustellen in Recht vergünnet sein, totum [e]n[im] quod totum habet idem
juris, quod pars, quo ad partem.’
212Replicae, 81–85.
213Replicae, 39–40.
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but they could offer advice or contribute voluntarily.214 Temporary, war-related
contributions could turn into permanent taxes—taxes which had not received the
requisite consent. This would significantly reduce the influence of both the nobility
and the general population.215
The nobility claimed that they only dealt with matters of welfare during their
assemblies, and had sought only to address the crisis. The nobles were irritated by
the suggestion that they had plotted against the fatherland and their prince.216 The
landgrave had argued that he alone could issue invitations to meetings, but the
nobility disagreed. If their opposition needed to be substantiated, the nobility
could send proof to the landgrave’s chancellor. Their liberties had been restricted
despite the legitimacy of their privileges.217 The nobility based their case on the ius
collectandi and the ius conventum, as well as other imperial laws, which they
claimed had been violated by the landgrave’s proceedings.218 Likewise, they used
new scholarly sources.
In short, the nobility denied that they had committed lèse-majesté and that the
necessitas argument used by the landgrave was invalid. Because the nobility was
excluded from policy—and decision-making, the landgrave risked becoming a
tyrant. When the nobility had claimed the right of assembly, their meetings were
forbidden. As loyal patriots, they should be entitled to assemble in order to discuss
the situation at hand. In doing so, they accepted an office of defending their
fatherland, that is the principality of Hesse-Cassel. With this duty came the right
to oppose the ruler. Like Althusius, they claimed this right came only when the ruler
had overstepped the limits, and did not fulfil his obligations.219
4.9.7 PP: 30 March 1652
The Archive of Marburg and the Archiv der Althessischen Ritterschaft Kaufungen
have a short document attached to the Replica.220 This document was probably
written by, or on behalf of, the nobility. It is called PP, and bears no other markings
or signatures. It has 84 numbered remarks. It seems to be a draft of some sort,
referring to the Sub- et Obreptiones. It is without much content, merely stating: this
is not to be believed, or this is a falsehood. These notes seemed to have been used






219Neu (2010), p. 16.
220AARK, PP (Repositur 6, Gefach 15, Seite 54, Nummer 5); HStAM 73, 1816: 1 folio –written on
all 4 sides
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4.9.8 Duplica: 22 April 1653
Written by lawyer Georg Goll, the Duplica was issued on 22 April 1653 on behalf of
Landgrave Wilhelm VI of Hesse-Cassel.221 The landgrave seemed agitated at having
to react to accusations while he was busy defending his fief.222 Nevertheless, he
acknowledged the value of the Imperial Chamber Court and stated his appreciation
for the emperor’s involvement in overseeing the trial.223
He stressed his position as dominus terrae by referring to his power as
superiorias territorialis, which entailed his duty to uphold Reichs Constitutionen
(imperial laws).224 The emperor was his feudal lord, a hierarchal reality that the
landgrave emphasised and accepted. The nobility had appealed to the wrong author-
ity, and should in fact have approached him225 as their immediate superior, rather
than ignoring him in favour of the highest authority of the Holy Roman Empire.
Nevertheless, Landgrave Wilhelm VI accepted the involvement of the emperor and
the Imperial Chamber Court because he trusted the emperor would agree with
him.226 A significant factor prompting the landgrave to acquiesce with the involve-
ment of the Imperial Chamber Court was the ability of that court to restore his
reputation.227 Since the emperor was superior to all princes, Landgrave Wilhelm VI
trusted him to be impartial.228 The salutem Patria pro suprema lege229 had been
upheld at all times, even when the landgrave was still a minor; his mother had upheld
the law and had prevented abuses like pillaging under her governance.230
In the Duplica Tacitus was quoted. The Roman consul and historian (ca. 56-117),
was staged for claiming that a sovereign has every right to ban meetings in which he
221Eβer (2001), p. 186; Hollenberg and Jäger (1989c).







229Duplicae, 37: ‘Was nun ferner undt in specie die Ritterschafft abgeforderte 4000 malter Maga[t]
zin frücht anlange wirdt von der Ritterschafft ein gewendet, es sie sich von das weg[en] zu deren
herschießung nicht lasten verstehen komen, noch wollen, weil sie zu deren bewilligung nicht
gefordert, kein landtag zu dem ende auß geschrieben, noch auch die nohtwendigkeit undt unsaghen
berahtschlaget undt bewilliget, dannen hero sie am Kaijß[er]l[ichen] Cammergericht darüber sich
zu beklag[en] undt das Mandatum des Cammergerichtes ordnung gemaß auß zuwürcken
verursacht worden, darbeij dan die Ritterschafft die höchlöbliche undt hochfahlige verstorbene
landesfürsten (welche beneben dehro geheimbten undt kriegesrähten obahngezogener maße, undt
wie reichs- undt weldtkundig ist, salutem patria pro suprema lege gehalte, nicht allein die
Conservation ihres damahls noch unmundigen Herr dieses anwalts herrn pricipalis, deren mit
feuer undt schwerdt verfolgten landt undt lantgrafs außenße sich Ahngelegen sein laße) mit hin dan
Setzung alles schuldigig respects ansteht Undertths schuldige danckbahrkeit, atrocissimè
ohnzugreiffen undt zu injurijren sich nicht geschneit.’
230Duplicae, 37, 63, 111–112.
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did not participate or represented.231 This reference from Tacitus’ Annals book
III.40: the Uprising of the Gauls232 may have signalled the Landgrave’s doubts
about the intentions of the Hessian nobility, and was perhaps an implicit comparison
with the beggars and thieves Tacitus described.233 The landgrave felt compelled to
inform the Imperial Chamber Court of the nobility’s apparent intentions to plot
against his government, even though it was his responsibility to prevent such a plot.
Tacitus neither lived in the Holy Roman Empire nor was he a jurist. The nobility
of Hesse-Cassel, who mainly used sources written in the empire, apparently
questioned the applicability of non-German authors to their situation.234 Yet, the
landgrave allegedly often relied on non-German sources.235 This difference was vital
in the on-going debate in Hesse-Cassel, where the nobility used the landgrave’s
approval of non-German sources to question his decisions. They added this denun-
ciation to accusations that the landgrave had neither proven the nobility’s malevolent
intent, nor the necessitas of the demands of 4000 Malter of grain.236 The nobility’s
remark about the use of non-German texts may have been a bit hypocritical. Unlike
Cleves,237 the nobility of Hesse-Cassel wrote no pamphlets with explicit inter-
textual comparisons with a Machiavellian Prince, but they did refer to Machiavelli’s
work.238
The landgrave referred to earlier times when the nobles had still trusted the
judgment of his predecessors. The nobility had then dealt with the situation as
faithful, loyal patriots, who fully understood the gravity of the situation, and who
thanked God for his excellent guidance in saving the fatherland.239 From fatherly
precautions, he did need resources and troops for the defence of the fatherland, and
his position allowed him to bypass the Landstände.240 The patriots and the
231The date was not the 22 of April 1652 as seems to be the date on the document in Kaufungen
which reads 1652. Since the Triplicae reflects back on the 1653 Duplicae, and this date is mentioned
in HStAM 255, H139, according to Eβer, ‘Landstände und Landesherrschaft’, it can be assumed
that 22 April 1653 is correct.
232The Duplicae wrongfully referred to book IV. The correct reference is book III, paragraph
40 which deals with the Uprising of the Gauls.
233Tacitus (2008), p. 116.
234Uberschicktes Bedencken Siner ebensoher Von Speijer. Uber die Duplic Schrifft, 1–2.
235Uber die Duplic Schrift, 1–2.
236Uberschicktes Bedencken Siner ebensoher Von Speijer. Uber die Duplic Schrifft, 24.
237Ontdeckinge van den valschen Cleefschen patriot, of Korte weder-legginghe van seker fameus
geschrift onlanghs tegen de Land-stenden uyt ridderschap ende steden van't hertoghdom Cleve, als
waerachtige patriotten, uyt-ghegheven (Knuttel 5542, ’s-Gravenhage 1647), 10. This is a reference
to a remark made in: Cleefsche patriot. Verthoonende de intentie van de missive, gesonden aen de
heeren Staten Generael van wegens de Cleefsche Landt-stenden, gepresenteert den 20 may deses
jaers 1647 (Knuttel 5540, Wesel 20 May 1647).
238AARK, Replicae (Repositur 6, Gefach 15, Seite 54, Nummer 5), 16.
239Duplicae, 32–34.
240Duplicae, 32–33: ‘Am 1sten Aug: Anno 1622 sub N undt S ahngezogen die Lehn undt
Ritterdienste mit Ihrem Pferde williglich virrustet [illigible], undt wie solches auß ab angezogenen
Hessischen Landtags Abschieds Clarlich zu zeigen, so ist es ahn dem wann ein Regirender Fürst zu
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Landstände would have to accept this situation. Proof that the dynasty had accepted
their responsibility could be traced back to the Hessian Chroniek.241
The primary duty of Landgrave Wilhelm VI of Hesse-Cassel was the defence of
‘our Fatherland’ and its subjects.242 However, to do so, he needed weapons—and an
army.243 In order to justify his policy and taxes to pay for the army, he quoted Cicero
and Tacitus.244 The landgrave stressed that the safety of his people and the common
good had been considered of vital importance ever since 1532.245 During the violent
Thirty Years’War, the landgrave acted swiftly, based on the ius Divino (divine law),
the exceptional sub- et obreptiones, and statutes found in Saxony law.246 With these
legal limitations, he could use this extra latitude to arrange tributes, collections, and
revenues.247 The landgrave also used his power to prevent assemblies, which would
Hessen in Krieges Zeitte auß trew eisterigen landes vatterlicher vorsorge vor seint von Goodt ahn
befehlet landt undt lantge zu deren defension einen heilste mitt gelt undt volck benöthiget ist, das er
in Crasst habender Landesfürste hoheit undt regalien, macht undt gewalt hatt, seine Landtstände,
Praelaten, Riter, undt Landtschafft, der sachen Zeiten undt gefahr, erheischden notturfft nach zu
beschreiben, undt zur Abwendung der bevorstehenden gefahr, nicht allein eine nahmhafte undt Aln
Jahrliche Summa geldes von Ihnen zufordern sondern auch nach des landes gelegenheit, eine
ahnzahll weleks zubeijshren [illigible], worin dan nach auß weiß der hiebe vor gehaltenen Lantäg,
undt sonderlich das zum 22ten Julij A[nn]o 1619, sub lit O afgeruhteten Landttags Abschiedts,
Ritter undt Landtschafft Fl Landtgraff Moritzen Underthänig Hag fleißige damit sage, das I. F.
Gl. da die sachen dero Zeit in undt außer halb Reichs in einen gefährlichen Zustandt gerahten, das
sie sich der gemeinen noth, dermaßen sorgfältig, fürst undt vatterlich ahngenommen, das dargegen
die Landtstände ahn ihren ort nichts, was zur defension undt rechnung des Vatterlandes, undt zu
wieder bringung friede, ruh undt einigkeit nöthig undt gefarig, an sich erweise zu laße, gefliße
geweßen mitt underthänigen tag erbirthen, das sie ihres theils gegen Ihr f. gl. sich hin wiederumb
alß getrewe ständen undt patriotten eignet undt gebühret vermittelst Göttlichen undt leihnung
erweiß undt gehorsamb ahngelage sein laßen wollten, undt ob wohl damahls gegenwertige undt
sich noch ferner onregends nach undt gefahr also groß undt wichtig gewaße, das Praelaten, Ritter
undt Landtschafft, die mit ihren Vermögen, nicht genügsamb abzunemen undt zu verhüthen
getrawert, damit aber doch Ifg. Mit undt neben andere Churfürsten undt ständen, die defension
gleichwohl desto füglicher aber sich nehmen, undt also die stände beij Ihr F. Gl. undt damahlig
gemeinen maße, auch das Ihrige getrewlich thun undt leisten möchten, so haben sie auß
underthannig trewer lieb undt leist affection jegen Ihr F. Gl. undt das vatterlandt, mit einer stewer
von dreijmahl hundert thaußent fl[orijn], zu stadten zu kommen, undt dieselbe nach den Treülichen
in a[nn]o 1576 aust gewinsten landtags abschriedt, zu sammen zu tragen sich erbotten.’
241Duplicae, 96–98.
242Duplicae, 5 and 11.
243Duplicae, 5-6.
244Duplicae, 9: ‘Atq[ue] hinc 14 obligalia pacis ormenta et belli subsique Cicero pro lege Manilia,
vocabat et Tacitus neq[ue] quietem gentium neq[ue] arma sine stipendijs, neq[ue] stipendia sine
tributis habere posse scribit, Prudentissime etiam Romanus Senatus Neroni Cuncta vectigala omitti
jubenti demostravit, dissolutionem Imperij fare, si fruct[us] quibus res publica sustineret
diminuerentur Tacitus hist lib 4 et Annalium lib 14.’
245Duplicae, 66.
246Duplicae, 10, 14–15, 48, 52, 55.
247To collect taxes and crops: Duplicae, 10.
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undermine his government during the temporary situation of necessitas.248 Disre-
spect and disobedience to this decision amounted to high treason.249 It was the
nobility who acted suspiciously by assembling at a convent. Throughout the empire,
regulations (e.g. ius collectandi) justified a necessitas policy for a limited time. Swift
proceedings were considered to be the only workable option in some scenarios, and
so there was no need to invite the nobles, nor was the landgrave under an obligation
to ask their consent.250 To substantiate the claim of the acceptance of necessitas, he
referred to the papal power and the Bible, for example, 1 Kings 2, and the Gospel of
St. Matthew, on the acceptance of government.251 Arguably, the situation in Hesse-
Cassel in 1647 was one of extrema necessitas, as both Swedish and Imperial troops
had swept through the principality.252
Funds were required at short notice in order to defend the Lower Principality of
Hesse-Cassel against these foreign troops.253 Those with meagre resources had
suffered significant damages; however, this had been inevitable in order to defend
the fatherland.254 The landgrave had expected few objections as the property of the
nobility needed to be defended as well. The situation was compared with the
imperial request for imperial taxes and land taxes, as well as the tax to avert the
Turkish threat.
As a consequence, based on the principality’s history, the landgrave argued that
he held the highest regalia to be able to avert dangers from the fatherland. He was
authorised to defend his land with all means, resources and forces.255 The nobles
were allowed to contribute and share in the costs of war voluntairily; or, contribute to
the defence of the principality.256 Ideas about the welfare and defence of the
principality were thus bound to collide. The nobility used exceptionally straightfor-
ward language regarding their immunities, privileges, and exceptions which the
landgrave deemed counterproductive.257
The nobility wanted to be allowed to assemble where and when they considered
this necessary, even without the landgrave. However, the landgrave claimed that
even during the reign of Landgrave Philipp I, meetings had always been convened
by the landgrave. In the years 1536, 1542, 1557, 1566, and 1576 necessity had been
accepted as a valid argument by the landgrave and his successors.258






254Duplicae, 18–24, 52–53, 87–88.
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The nobility portrayed the landgrave as wilfully seeking to diminish their immu-
nities. He was alleged to do this in order to abolish the Landstände under the pretext
of necessitas.259 Landgrave Wilhelm VI did not take kindly to this kind of defama-
tion, remarking that such statements were unworthy of the nobility. Awaiting the
nobility’s consent would have cost valuable time, and caused even more destruc-
tion.260 In contrast, the landgrave and the nobility shared one common goal: the
preservation of the Lower Principality of Hesse-Cassel.261
4.9.9 Reaction to the Duplica (1653–1655?)
After the issuance of the landgrave’s Duplica, a contemplation on it emerged. It
bears no significant name or known date, which is understandable as it does not
constitute an official reply. It was called Duplica: ‘Uberschicktes Bedencken Siner
ebensoher Von Speijer. Uber die Duplic Schrift’. This text is only available in the
Archiv der Althessischen Ritterschaft Kaufungen.262 It seems to have been written
for internal advisory purposes only: it left little room for diplomacy or tact. It differs
from the nobility’s Replica, as it is a factual page by page analysis of the perceived
inconsistencies in the Duplica’s argumentation, summarising errors, and pointing
out inaccurate interpretations.
One of the first responses to the landgrave’s text was about his right to demand
taxes without consent. The main critique voiced throughout this text was that the
landgrave considered the nobles to be subjects rather than vassals. The landgrave
had based his arguments on the wrong sources, and hence, he had offended the
nobility’s honour and endangered their welfare and possessions as a result. The
nobility had been deprived of privileges by the landgrave’s claims of necessitas.
Hence, the nobility objected, even though the landgrave was not inclined to listen to
their comments.
Furthermore, in the Duplica, a reference was made to the knights and those in
salaried employment.263 The landgrave’s lawyer had lumped the nobility together
259Duplicae, 38, 45, 54.
260Duplicae, 43–44, 56–57, 77.
261Duplicae, 44 and 46.
262AARK, Uberschicktes Bedencken Siner ebensoher Von Speijer. Uber die Duplic Schrifft
(Repositur 6, Gefach 15, Seite 54, Nummer 5).
263Uberschicktes Bedencken, 8: ‘Die weil über auß vielbesagter Duplicschrifft scheinet daß
darinnen allerhandt frembde Dinge, welche nicht unter vorgedachten zwei puncten gehören, mit
ein geflankhten werden alß die bestellung deß Justitiae weßend das Hoffgericht, die unterm
außschluß genommene unterthanen, die Ritter undt lLohendienste, die Policeij: und Landt
ordtnung und machung eines Landt rechtens etc: so ist nicht unzeitig dabeij zur Bedencken, ob
solches nicht mit gefließenem Vorsatz geschehen daß man entweder die Ritterschafft damit enlake
daruff zue entwertten, und also eo ipso die sache hieher vor das Cammergericht zue ziehen, und
damit verursache, daß man am Kaijßl Hoff eine repulsam bekomme.’
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with individuals in paid employment as subjects. This misrepresentation was one
reason why the nobility had gone to the Imperial Chamber Court: they wanted to be
heard.264 The nobility had been equated with ordinary subjects, whereas they still
maintained an exceptional position, as no ratio was established for tax payments.265
Several arguments were made by the anonymous author to object to the contents
of the Duplica. There was no evidence anywhere that the nobility had objected to the
landgrave’s claim of necessitas. This claim was substantiated by the remark that the
nobility had neither objected to his superiority, nor the tokens of his regalia.
Ultimately, it meant that he was the interpreter of a given situation and the law.266
It may be concluded that the nobility had not objected to the superiority of regal rule,
thereby tacitly accepting the exceptional situation of war as a possible exception.
The author of the commentary countered Landgrave Wilhelm VI’s claims by
pointing out that strict rules had been formulated in the Regensburg Diet agreements
of 1630 on the use of the necessity argument.267 The landgrave had disregarded
these.268 Consequently, the nobility’s meetings were legitimate, and it was Wilhelm
VI who had disrespected tradition.
This peer consultation had not been intended as preparation to undermine the
landgrave’s position, despite the possible claims that the assembly made concerning
the welfare of the principality of Hesse-Cassel.269 Firstly, the nobility legitimately
needed to discuss the curtailment of their right to assemble and discuss issues.
Secondly, they needed to discuss the continuing costs of warfare, despite the 1648
peace treaties—costs that threatened the possessions of both the subjects and
the nobility in the principality of Hesse-Cassel.270 Finally, but most importantly,
the nobility wished to debate amongst themselves how to deal with the matter of the
landgrave collecting taxes without first obtaining the nobility’s consent.271 This
practice harmed not only the citizens and farmers but the nobility as well.272 The
emperor had ordered the 4000 Malter of grain to be returned; the nobles were still
waiting for the landgrave to comply. Contrastingly, the landgrave attempted to levy a
new land tax and tried to coerce the nobility to contribute illegally.273
264Uberschicktes Bedencken, 9.
265Uberschicktes Bedencken, 12, 23.
266Uberschicktes Bedencken, 20–21: ‘Die Ritterschafft redet und führt nichts contra superioritatem
et regalia principis, sondern sagt nur de modo exercendi superioritatem et regalia tam in causis
ordinarijs quam extraordinarijs, alß necessitatis, belli et similium, welches das ubliche herkommen
und observantz quae optimarerum auch iuris et legum interpraes ist, erklären muß.’
267Uberschicktes Bedencken, 5.
268Uberschicktes Bedencken, 5–6.
269Uberschicktes Bedencken, 26–27 and 32–33.
270Uberschicktes Bedencken, 20 and 22.
271Uberschicktes Bedencken, 18-19, 34. See also: von Friedeburg (2003), p. 304.
272Uber die Duplic Schrift, 3, 13, 24–25.
273Uber die Duplic Schrift, 15, 22 and 4, 15, 19.
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The landgrave seemed to have interpreted the nobility’s silence in matters of
taxation as tacit consent.274 According to the nobility, the landgrave bent and
reinterpreted previous verdicts into a more desirable outcome.275 Landgrave
Wilhelm VI’s lawyers had read things into the Replica which were not there, such
as the use of Saxony Law rather than Hessian laws, and the idea that the nobility used
their rights to evade specific responsibilities.276 The nobility responded angrily to
these allegations and improper references: it seemed to them to be a violation of their
honour.277 Strikingly, the nobles did not flaunt their fidelity and loyalty, but instead
complained instead that the landgrave had failed to mention their loyalty.278 Their
responses should not be interpreted as disobedience, as they were merely trying to
protect their privileges.279
That the landgrave’s arguments had been primarily rooted in foreign sources was
considered to be problematic. The views of Spanish, Italian, or other legal scholars
did not apply to the ius publicum, the laws and the customs of the principality, or
those of the Holy Roman Empire.280 According to the author of the commentary,
using foreign sources meant that their references did not apply to the situation of
either Hesse-Cassel or the Holy Roman Empire:281 customs and laws differed
substantially between the various parts of Europe.282 The Aurea Bullae (XV) was
instead used to substantiate the nobility’s claims of the legitimacy of their actions.283
274Uber die Duplic Schrift, 3, 9.
275Uber die Duplic Schrift, 9.
276Uber die Duplic Schrift, 10–11.
277Uber die Duplic Schrift, 10.
278Uber die Duplic Schrift, 10.
279Uber die Duplic Schrift, 21.
280Uber die Duplic Schrift, 1–2: ‘Waß ein die ingedüchten Duplic schriefft allegirte Jura belanget,
seindt dieselben mehrentheils ex opinionibus Doctorum erstlichen hergenommen, welche Doctores
mehrentheils Spannier, Italiäner, undt auß andern fremden nationen seindt, welche in materijs jus
publicum concerntib[us] geschrieben haben, de jure et consuctudine Ihrer herrschafften, undt das
römischl[iche] Reichß undt die privilegia undt herkommens deßelbigen freijer leuthen nation gar
nicht appliciren.’
281Interestingly, the anonymous 1646-document (which deals with—among others—the Marburg
succession) refers to this exact argument. It states that using sources from outside the Empire is of
little use as these sources do not show an understanding of the customs and practices within
‘Teutschland’: It is unknown who wrote this pamphlet, nor is the place of publication known.
However, the arguments are in favour of the landgraviate’s policy to have Hesse-Marburg returned
to Hesse-Cassel, which may indicate the author’s financer as being the landgravine of Hesse-Cassel.
Nothwendiger Bericht, darauß zu sehen, Daß nicht allein die, von Hessen-Cassel erlangte.
(S.I. 1646), 7.
282It is clear what standards should be met to be accepted as a non-foreign author. See for more
information the analysis made by Hirschi (2011).
283Uber die Duplic Schrift, 31.
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4.9.10 Triplica: 26 June 1655
The conflict remained unresolved, despite an invitation issued on 1 May 1655 to
assemble with the landgrave on the day before Ascension Day.284 The evidence for
this comes from the Triplica, presented on 26 June 1655 by Blaufelder’s successor,
Dr Paul Gambs.285 It constituted an official legal reply to the Duplica. Though the
same arguments were used as in the Uberschicktes Bedencken Siner ebensoher Von
Speijer Uber die Duplic Schrift, it should be dealt with as an individual text as the
arguments were voiced more diplomatically. The Triplica, as a supplement to the
Replica, was sent to the Imperial Chamber Court to elucidate specific issues, before a
possible verdict.286
The nobility claimed they were harmed in the Duplica. They had helped
Landgrave Wilhelm VI by accepting his government and supported him on his
return to Hesse-Cassel.287 However, they were repaid with an accusation of the
crime of lèse-majesté and rebellion against the fatherland.288 The nobility wished to
counter these accusations by referring to their deep love of the fatherland. Further-
more they made arguments based upon their respect for and obedience to their
landgrave.289 These matters had been addressed in the Replica and again in this
Triplica. The issue of the nobility as subjects was also addressed.290 The landgrave
could not unilaterally change the various agreements made by his predecessors about
the fief, or the position of individuals or the immunities of the nobility.291 By
accepting the government in 1637, Landgrave Wilhelm VI had agreed to acknowl-
edge these laws, respect noble ancestry, and honour immunities.292 The requisition
of 4000 Malter of grain, under the pretext of necessitas, was seen as an attempt to
evade the nobility’s necessary consent.293 The nobility declared that the welfare of
the principality had been seriously threatened both by warfare, and by the pressure
created by the demand for grain.294
284The Triplicae in the Archiv der Althessischen Ritterschaft Kaufungen (AARK) does not bear a
clear date. The date is, however, readable in HStAM Bestand 255, H140: Triplicae; HStAM
5, 14651 (microfiche) Nr. A4755: one-page pamphlet (invitation; print).
285Eβer (2001), p. 186; Hollenberg and Jäger (1989c).




289Triplicae, 5 and 8.
290Triplicae, 11 and 23.
291Triplicae, 31–33.
292Triplicae, 31–33, 37 ; Triplicae, 32: ‘Justitiae enim et rationis ordo suadet, ut qui à
Successoribus contractibus suos observari defiderat, praedecessoris sui contractus et voluntatem
ipse custodiat ac exequatur.’
293Triplicae, 22.
294Triplicae, 25.
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Despite the imperial approval of such meetings, the landgrave had on various
previous occasions objected to private meetings of the nobility and banned them
once again in 1655.295 The nobility was therefore once more compelled to object to
this injunction. To substantiate their case, they put forward examples the examples
of the Duchies of Jülich and Berg and Eastern-Frisia. Here assemblies had also been
forbidden, but imperial verdicts had eventually ensured that the nobility could meet
again. As the nobility in Hesse-Cassel constituted a legitimate, loyal collegium, it
was their firm opinion that they respected the landgrave’s government, and they were
keen to look out for the best interest of the fatherland and its prosperity.296
The nobility attached great value to the welfare of their subjects; moreover, they
desired to remain within the boundaries of the law. They, therefore, needed to pursue
this trial with great caution, to arrive at a peaceful solution.297 However, the
nobility’s lawyer still felt the urge to adopt a defensive tone, due to the growing
rift between his clients and their opponent, the landgrave.298 Under the pretence of
the emperor’s consent, infringement of privileges, laws, and immunities had
occurred.299 Even when levying land taxes was at stake, the Landstände should
still have been consulted as to whether they were willing to give their consent
because, by the 1536 Homburg consultation, nobles were exempt from taxes.300
The nobility, for their part, would bear the well-being of the landgrave’s subjects and
tenants in mind when assessing a tax request.301 The problem was that the
295Triplicae, 36.
296Section from: Triplicae, 35–37: ‘Es ist ja Reichskündig, daß in erbverbündeten Lands Sachen
wie auch in Frijstifft Magdeburg citra omnem veniae petitionem sich die Ritterschafft so offalß
nötig, vor sich betraget; Ja kaum ein meil mags abgelegenen fürstenthum Braunschweig kammbt
die Ritterschafft und Städte, oder auch jener allein auser geschehen erlaub[nis], so offte sie wollen,
und es nötig achten, zusammen, Jemaßen noch von diesen 1655ten Jahre, warumb wohl und nicht
landkündig wäre, wohe zu machen stände, daß nur biß an osterliche Zeit dieses jahrs die Ritter-
und Landstände zum wenigsten 5 wo nicht 6 conventus propria autoritate serente Ill[ustrissi]mo
Domino gehabt und sich bald nach baden werden, bald nach Hirseck, bald nach Göttingen, bald
gar nach Hannover begeben, vor des Landes Wohlfahrt oder auch Erschwehrungen, wie treue
Patrioten wohl anstehet, fleißig communicieret, sonder mannigliches contradition und befinderung
zu geschweigen daß aus der Pfalz-Neuburgl[iche], wie auch Ostfriesländigschen Agenden bekannt,
daß alß beijder seits Ständen freije conventus gefindert war den wollen, dieselbe beij Kayßerl. Mayl
[iche] mandata poenalia impetriert und erlanget haben. Weilen nun die Heßl[iche] Ritterschafft
und landschafft Reichskündiger weiße ein licitum collegium auch darneben dero oblingen und
Treun-Sorgfalt ist, abgestatteten Pflichten ja Göttlicher und Weltlicher Rechten Befestigen und
Unvordnung nach, auf uns Vatterlandts conservation und Wohlfahrt zu gedancken, Und Ihres
gnädigen landes fürsten Person und fürstlichen Respect unterthänigst zu beobachten, wie nach Ihre
selbst einigen herbeachte freijheit und gerechtigkeit jure divino naturali gentuim ac positivo id
permittente zu vertrethen, auch deswegen, wenn es die Untherfordert, Ihr anlingen dem gnädigen
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landgrave’s policy seemed to be aimed at undermining their immunity and making
the nobility pay taxes, by lumping them together with such commoners as farmers
and citizens.302
The nobility claimed that they retained a positive attitude towards the landgrave
despite all this. They were most willing to advise or participation in deliberations,
especially when their consent was required.303 However, the Triplica claimed that
the landgrave had no longer attempted to engage in talks with the nobles.304 The
Duplica made it seem that the nobility had agreed to the 4,000 Malter of grain in
1648. In contrast, in the Triplica the nobility once more claimed that had not been
consulted.305
The landgrave had a different reading of the Landtag Akten—which endured in
possession of the nobility, and of history in general. This difference frustrated the
nobility.306 They were aware that the prince’s clerk had wielded his pen often and
aptly, whereas they needed to content themselves with less frequent aid due to a less
favourable financial situation. However, the nobility was able to use new insights
and information provided by their lawyers and the current teachings of jurispru-
dence.307 The landgrave referred to some imperial laws, such as the ius privatum,
Aurea Bulla, Recessus Imperii as well as to a Reichsabschied from 1575. However,
the nobility did not want to repeat themselves, as they had substantiated their point in
the Replica.308
Once more, the nobles were deprived of their right of assembly: these meetings
were deemed an act of lèse-majesté. They contested this assessment, and argued that
they needed to give their permission before the levying of taxes. Even though the
nobles were not required to pay tax, they were deeply committed to the well-being of
the fatherland and wished to protect the citizens and farmers from extortion.
4.9.11 Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien (1653–1655)
The collection of the Archiv der Althessischen Ritterschaft Kaufungen contains a
text with the title ‘Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien. Deren man sich bei
Vorstehender gütslicher handlung zugebrauchen.’ It concerns written minutes,





306Triplicae, 9 and 38.
307Triplicae, 15.
308Triplicae, 43.
309AARK, Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien. Deren man sich bei Vorstehender gütslicher handlung
zugebrauchen (Repositur 6, Gefach 15, Seite 54, Nummer 5).
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108 pages containing arguments drafted in favour of the nobility’s view. The
Imperial Chamber Court did not receive this document; therefore, it can be consid-
ered an informal draft. The text is not dated, but there are clues as to when it was
drafted. For example, it must have been written after the death of Landgravine
Amelie Elisabeth, to whom retrospective reference was made.310 Furthermore, the
title refers to negotiations (Handlung), which took place in either 1653 or 1655.
The Memorialien has six sections, marked by Roman numerals. Each contains a
different focus and argument. The themes discussed are shown in Table 4.3.
Fatherland terminology is present in most of the sections, except the first and fifth
part (see Table 4.3). Contrary to the previously discussed texts, religious arguments
constituted a significant component of this text. I will discuss the argumentation used
in this text next.
The first part of the Memorialien311 deals with the ‘Contribution und Immunität
dero Ritterschafft’.312 This section suggests that privileges and previous agreements
with Landgrave Wilhelm VI’s predecessors obliged him to include the nobility in the
decision-making process. The nobility referred to both the exceptionibus sub- et
obreptionis and the Mandatum inhibitorium et cassatorium sine clausula to stress
this point.313 The nobles were obligated to concede to taxations. However, the
nobility did not taxes, and they duly emphasised this noble privilege.
Turning to the Bible, a religious argument was brought to bear on the question of
taxation and government. It was an entirely new line of argumentation that it should
not be confused with the first part of the Memorialien. In that first section historical
examples from the principality were used to substantiate the argumentation. This
second section adds arguments from the Bible and literature to these local historical
sources.314 This section notes that the Jewish people requested a sovereign govern-
ment successfully. The nobility refers to the book 1 Samuel 8: 11 and 12, and




I. Taxation without consent 10 -
II. Religious argumentation on taxation and government 42 1
III. Assemblies to discuss the welfare of the landgraviate 16 5
IV. Jure superioritatis and the nobility’s subjects 20 2
V. Taxation of the nobility’s possessions 14 -
VI. The office of hereditary marshal and the two curiae 4 1
310Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 8.
311Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 3–12.
312Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 3.
313Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 4.
314Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 13–54.
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subsequently follows the interpretation offered by Luther.315 In his commentary,
Luther claimed that it had been sinful to request a king in the first place—referring to
Deuteronomy 15 and 16. Thus, the nobles inferred that there was a limit to princely
power and to the codification of law and civil rights. Necessitas and utilitas publica
must be kept in mind, as well as the well-being of the whole principality.316 Only in
cases of need and violence could a king act according to 1 Samuel 8: 11 and 12.
Harming the subjects was not part of the king’s office, as the examples of king Achab
and the wine-farmer Naboth showed.317 God punished these two kings for their
wrong-doings.
Deliberations about taxation were to be organised in conjunction with the
Landstände of the principality. Even the emperor needed to consult the
Reichsständen in cases of necessitas before he could levy taxes; and, according to
the nobility, foreign kings were under the obligation to ask for consent as well.318 It
was common practice to organise a Landtag and ask the Landstände to agree with
the taxes. Should this process not be followed, then the prince’s actions could and
would be considered tyrannical.319 In 1514 the landgrave, the nobility, the prelates
and the Landschaft discussed how to rule Hesse while landgrave Philipp I was still
underage. Propositions included grievances and the right to ratify taxation.320
The nobility acknowledged that the book of Romans, Chap. 13 discussed obedi-
ence to the government and the payment of taxes.321 They argued, however, that this
constituted no excuse to either levy taxes forcefully, or to violate noble privileges.
The Landstände preferred to preserve peace while maintaining their privileges and
freedoms. Therefore they had shown deference to the landgrave, despite the evi-
dence they possessed in support of their position.322 In times of crisis, their judge-
ment had to be valued; the burden borne by ordinary subjects was an issue that the
nobility was expected to monitor.323 They desired the ongoing collection of
315King James Bible: 1 Samuel 8, verse 11: ‘And he said, ‘This will be the behavior of the king who
will reign over you: He will take your sons and appoint them for his own chariots and to be his
horsemen, and some will run before his chariots. Verse 12: He will appoint captains over his
thousands and captains over his fifties, will set some to plow his ground and reap his harvest, and
some to make his weapons of war and equipment for his chariots.’
316Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 18.
317Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 19.
318Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 22.
319Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 26.
320Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 27–28.
321King James Bible: Romans 13, verse 6: ‘For because of this you also pay taxes, for they are
God’s ministers attending continually to this very thing. Verse 7 Render therefore to all their due:
taxes to whom taxes are due, customs to whom customs, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honor.’
322Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 35–36.
323Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 36.
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resources to be postponed in order to protect prosperity and safeguard the father-
land.324 In other words, the nobility would protect the well-being of the fatherland,
thus protecting the citizens and peasants or tenants from harm and extortion.
Moreover, it would increase the authority of the landgrave if he received the
required permission to levy taxes.325 The nobility went even further by acclaiming
that it would behove a beloved father of the lands to take an active interest in his
subjects in times of both need and prosperity.326 Potestates should be used to
promote prosperity.327 Respecting the privileges of the nobles would be beneficial
to the Landgrave’s reputation, and would ensure their respect and loyalty.328
The third section contains the highest number of references to both fatherland and
patriots. It deals with the nobility’s right of assembly for the purpose of discussing
the welfare of the landgraviate.329 As has been shown in the Replica, Duplica, and
Triplica, there was a heated debate about this specific right. It is therefore not
surprising that the issue is brought to the fore in this text as well. The nobility
claimed they were unaware of any necessity to obtain the landgrave’s permission for
a meeting, even when the defence of the fatherland was the topic of discussion.330
That is when they wished to discuss the fatherland’s peace, prosperity and wellbeing,
and the preservation of their privileges, immunities, and justice.331 The nobility
distinguished legitimate and illegitimate assemblies concerning Charles IV’s Aurea
Bulla, stating that their meetings belonged to the former category. Moreover, the
Imperial Chamber Court had previously ruled in favour of the Landstände.
The nobility described the situation in great detail, emphasising that the accep-
tance of privileges had been part of the arrangement upon Landgrave Wilhelm VI’s
ascension: he would be allowed to govern the principality, however it was the
324Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 36–37: ‘Und die Nottrufft daß landeß erfordert, so muß man
nicht alß bald mit gewald mit enträgliches beschwahrunges und auβaugnung der armen
unterthanen belah des [illigible], bestandes zuerst auf einem landtage beij Ihnen erkundigen waβ
zuthun und herzugebes müeglich, und also Mitt Ihrer bewillung die collectis austelles, waß zu
wollfarth und nutz deß Vaterlandeß dienlich ist.’
325Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 38.
326Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 39–40.
327Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 40.
328Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 42–43.
329Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 55–70.
330Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 56.
331Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 56–57: ‘Dahero dan dero Ritterschafft alß fürstentumbes
landstand und vielmehr dem gantzes corpori universitalis, in fälles, so deß gantzes vaterlandeß
tranguillitet, friede, ruhe, wollfarth und bestes, oder auch die erhaltung Ihrer privilegien immunitet
und gerechtigkeits betreftes, auch ohne zuuer darüber eingeholetes consens deß superioris,
conventus anzustelles und außzuschweibes erlaubt und ohne verwehre ist.’
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nobility’s obligation to watch over the health and prosperity of the fatherland and
warn their ruler when this was at jeopardy.332 The nobility would not undermine the
superioritas of the landgrave at any time.333 Nonetheless, in the case of grievances
or a problematic situation, they would object on behalf of the fatherland to restore its
prosperity.334 During their meetings they had only debated the prosperity of the land,
implicitly stating they had never discussed ousting their landgrave.335 They were
dedicated to the landgraviate and desired to be included in all communications that
might influence its well-being.336
The fourth paragraph of the Memorialien concerns the ‘Landesfurst ratione et
jure superioritatis’ and the position of the noble subjects in the principality.337 In
military matters, the landgrave needed to guide his subjects.338 The nobility
recognised the landgrave as the Dominus Terrae, and consequently mentioned the
iure lustrationis and the iure superioritatis in this context.339 However, a problem
arose when the landgrave needed soldiers, and the nobility’s tenants were asked to
make themselves available.340 Defending the principality in hazardous situations
(cases of necessitas)—which was acknowledged by the nobility—contravened the
authority of the nobility who usually gave orders to their tenants. The Hessian
knights and their subjects would undoubtedly help in defence of the Fatherland.341
Although this could only occur in extreme cases of necessitas, and substantial tax
burdens had to be taken into account, the loyal Patriots honoured the ius
332Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 60–61: ‘Und weils also die landtstände des fürstendumbß
Heßes einmahls Vermüge dero Rechte einmahls Vermüge dero Recht ein licitum collegium sein,
Und deres oblieges und sorgfalt nicht allein nach erheischender inß gemein abgeschworner
huldigunges und respectivè erstattetes lehspflichtes, sonders auch aller sowoll Gott und Geistlicher,
alß weltlichen Rechtes auf daß vaterlandes conservation und wollfahrt und ihres gnediges landeß
fürstes Persohns und hoheit zu verthediges, und für schades zu warnes, wie auch Ihre woll
hergebrachte Freijheites und gerechtigkeits permittente sic jure naturali zuvertretes, auch
daßweges, wenn eß die Noth erfordert Ihr anliegens dem landeß Fürstes mitt gebührender
reverentz in Unterthanigkeit vorzutragens, und ein wachsambeß aug zu habes, Ihnes in allewege
obliget, und gleichwol dero gleiches heilsame zu deß Vater landeß, deßes oberhaupts und
gesambtes gleider ersprießliche berathschlagunges für glicher und anders nicht, alß dürch
conventus und betagunges beschehes, und die consilia, durch welche deß landes fürstes superioritet
(vos [illigible] welcher sie keine dependentz habes) nicht praejudiciret wirdt, zu sammengetrages
werdes kännes.’
333Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 62.
334Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 64: fatherland is used in this context both to refer to the
problematic situation of the fatherland and the prosperity of the fatherland.
335Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 67.
336Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 68.
337Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 71.
338Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 72.
339Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 73.
340Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 75.
341Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 80.
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superioritatis and held it in high esteem.342 The loyal patriots would help to defend
the landgraviate, and there could be no doubt about the nobility’s loyalty towards the
landgrave.
In the fifth part of theMemorialien, the question was raised whether the nobility’s
possessions were liable to taxations, similar to those of a commoner. The nobility
expressed their concern about this proposal: it passed over ancestry and privileges.
The noble liegeman had other services to offer than paying taxes. Quoting Joachim
Mynsinger von Frundseck (1514–1588), they claimed that the exemption was not
offered gratuitously, but as a result of these other services, and necessity.343 In the
case of extreme need (necessitas), the nobility would help out, like commoners and
cities; not only with money but also by providing the necessary military means.
External pressure using taxation, however, was not appreciated.
The nobility, prelates and the Landschaft—which consisted of the 40 main cities
in Hesse-Cassel—formed the principality’s diet. Together, the nobility and the
prelates formed the first chamber of the Curia; the Landschaft formed the second
chamber. The joint meetings of the first chamber and the Landschaft were presided
over by the hereditary marshal.344 The sixth section of the Memorialien dealt with
two issues. Firstly, the position of the hereditary marshal, and secondly, the division
of the individuals into two chambers.345 Though the nobles recognised that the
chambers had the same goal—to work for the benefit of the fatherland—they
stressed that the two chambers should not be merged. The Landschaft held an
entirely different position, as they had fewer possessions than the nobility and the
prelates and, consequently, felt that the Landschaft should be treated differently.
In short, throughout the Memoralien, the nobility’s main argument was that they
should be allowed to assemble and to protect the fatherland. They did accept the
superioritatis territorialis and the Biblical duty to obey their government; however,
this did not entitle the landgrave to impose an extra tax. That would be considered a
form of extortion. The noble subjects explained that they held a unique position in
342Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 83–85: ‘Eß ist Ihnen aber allezeit unterthänig abgeschlages,
und die Uhralte observant remonstrirt wordes, darauf hochgedachte G. Fürstl. Gn. Auch gnadig
acquiesart und deß halbes in die Ritterschafft weiter nicht getrunges, So könte schließlich gebethes
werdes, Sie beij iezan [illigible] geregts Freij: Vnd gerechtigheites zulaßes, und darin nicht zu
betrübes oder mit Newerunges zu beschwehres, hingeges die Ritterschafft sich unterthäniglich
erbiethes, könte vos Ihrer schuldiges devotion, Trew und gehorsam in ewigkeit nicht daß geringste
sinckes zu lassen, Woltes auch ihre unterthanes in solcher bewehr: vndt verfaßung nach mögligkeit
haltes, das Sie aufns [illigible] Nothfall und in casu in-optimate et extremae Necessitatis (welches
Gott gnediglich verhütes wolle) und auf Ihrer fürstl. Gn. gnediges auffboth die allgemeine
Landtfolge mit verrichtes selffes, und darbeij, alß getrewes, redliches und auffrichtiges Patriots
gebühret Leib, guet und blut nebes des Ihre ges more solito et consueto aufffsetzes woltes, dar durch
das in Ihrer Fürstlicher Gnad. ius superioritatis welches die Ritterschafft iederzeit in hohen Respect
gehaltes vndt noch) nicht gegriffes sonders nurt allein des augen[mu]thetes Ugewöhnliches und
natuerliches modum sequelae ab- und einzustelles gebethes würdte [etc].’
343Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 97.
344Neu (2013b), pp. 126–127.
345Ohn Vorgreiffliche Memorialien, 105–108.
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society, which made them tax-exempt. This privilege meant that they could not be
ignored. They were willing to help financially or militarily—in case of necessity—
but attempts to apply pressure or avoid their council would not further the
landgrave’s cause. They wished to do what they deemed best for their fatherland,
regardless of other motivations, and it was their privileges that allowed them to fulfil
this obligation.
4.9.12 (Draft Loco) Quatruplika: 1655
The Quatruplika is a draft (entwurf) written shortly after, and in response to, the
Triplica,. It mainly concerns the injustice caused by the nobility’s court case.346 In
the Quatruplika the landgrave stated his obligations, but he felt hindered in com-
plying with them, as he was still awaiting the verdict. This document refers to
Landgrave Maurice, who had dealt with a similar case at his own discretion.
Furthermore, the matter of taxation is addressed, based on the legal assumption
that necessitas non habet legem.347 The Quatruplika stressed that the landgrave’s
policy had focussed on pro defensione Patria.348
4.9.13 The Agreement: The End of the Legal Conflict:
2 October 1655
Although the ‘Vergleich’ or ‘Vertrag’349 is not a ruling of the Imperial Chamber
Court, it did end the dispute between the nobility and the landgrave, which origi-
nated in 1605/6 and reignited in 1646. Despite our focus on fatherland vocabulary,
which is more or less absent from this text, it is nevertheless essential to study this
final document in the legal debate in order to provide context.
The landgrave, who lacked financial resources, chose to settle matters with the
nobility of Hesse-Cassel without further imperial involvement.350 The nobility were
also interested in reaching an agreement since the acceptance of the Jüngster
Reichsabschied (Lat.: recessus imperii novissimus; 1653-54) significantly dimin-
ished their chances of success if they decided to continue to press their demands.351
Because the imperial text had once more stressed the superioritas territorialis, the
346‘Entwurff loco Quadruplicarum’ [o.O., o.D.], in: StAD E2 Nr. 20/2, unfoliiert, 18 S.
347‘Entwurff loco Quadruplicarum’, 8.
348‘Entwurff loco Quadruplicarum’, 10.
349Vertrag is the term used in HStAM, Bestand 5, 17066.
350Maruhn (2004a), p. 209; von Friedeburg (2007), p. 189.
351Eβer (2001), p. 181; Philippi (2007), p. 4; Maruhn (2004b), pp. 88–89; Maruhn (2004a),
pp. 81–83.
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nobility understood that a verdict by the Imperial Chamber Court would no longer
offer protection, and a compromise in the landgraviate was the best they could hope
to achieve.352 On 2 October 1655, the nobility and the landgrave reached a final
agreement in their long-drawn-out conflict.353 This settlement was signed by
Landgrave Wilhelm VI and the nobility’s negotiators. Though in the case of Jülich
no court was involved, the negotiations to come to an understanding shows a similar
strategy.
The significance of the text has been characterised in two ways. Firstly, because it
was meant to formulate a new relationship between the landgrave and his nobles as a
lex fundamentalis, it has been called a consensual agreement.354 Such an agreement
emphasises the active participation of both the landgrave and the nobility in reaching
the agreement. Secondly, the official nature of the text can be acknowledged using
the subscription of both sides.355 It can be seen as a ‘key document’
(Schlüsseldokument)356 or a ‘constitutional text’ (Landesgrundgesetz).357 This ter-
minology demonstrates the official status of the document, and recognises the
nobility’s active involvement in politics. The principalities gained more of what is
often called ‘territorial sovereignty’.358 Additionally, the princes increased their
sovereign power over that of the emperor, which led to a minimisation of competing
rights.359 It was of little use for the nobility to continue the lawsuit, as they had few
possibilities to intervene in the princely politics nor the internal politics.360 This lack
of intervention did not open the door to arbitrary rule, but the Vergleich indeed
offered a constitutional restraint upon the active participation of the nobility.361
The Vergleich concerned eight different topics, all of which influenced the
agreement.362 These topics were: (1) Landtag meetings and consent in taxation
issues, (2) justice and legal affairs, (3) the religious conviction of Lutheran nobles,
(4) the military service of the nobility’s tenants, (5) permission to levy taxes,
(6) specifications of property, (7) the appointment of the nobility’s highest financial
352Maruhn (2004a), pp. 207–208.
353Hollenberg and Jäger (1989c), p. 57.
354Maruhn (2004b), p. 73.
355Hollenberg and Jäger (1989c), p. 57. Hollenberg also shows that a century later the nobility did
not recognise the text as legally important; between 1731 and 1759 the 1655-agreement was
referred to as: ‘Landtagsabschied’, ‘Abschied’, and ‘fürstliches Resolution’. See: footnote 2.
356Maruhn (2004b), p. 73.
357Ibid., p. 86.
358Puppel (2007), p. 124.
359Ibid., p. 124.
360Author’s translation of: Eβer (2001), p. 185.
361Demandt (1972), p. 266; Demandt (1969); Press (1986), pp. 323–324; Maruhn (2004b); von
Friedeburg (2005); von Friedeburg (2010); von Friedeburg (2007), p. 189.
362‘CCLXVI Fürstliche Resolutiones auf die Ritterschafftliche Gravamina. Vom 2ten October
1655’, in: C.H. Kleinschmidt, (ed.), Sammlung kurhessischer Landes-Ordnungen und
Ausschreiben nebst dahin gehörigen Erläuterungs- und anderen Rescripten, Resolutionen,
Abschieden, gemeinen Bescheiden und dergleichen. 2 Theil .1627/1670 (Kassel, 1767), 240-245.
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representative and the landgrave’s obligations, (8) stipulations concerning nobles’
assemblies. These topics are discussed next.
The §1, which concerns the Landtag meetings, refers to a previous agreement
with Hesse-Darmstadt (1648), regarding the jointly organised Landtag assemblies.
Meetings of the Landstände of Hesse-Cassel were to take place frequently, with the
landgrave as the sole instigator. As the Landstände had retained their right to be
requested to consent to taxes, these meetings were of major significance.363 In any
case, the nobility’s to safeguard their legal privilege to be consulted in matters of
taxation efforts from the previous decade had proved to be a success.
The nobility did not succeed in changing the principality’s legal procedures, as §2
shows.364 The nobility wanted all legal cases to be directed to the landgrave’s court
(Hofgericht), rather than to the landgrave’s chancellery. Unfortunately, difficulties
arose, and the nobles returned empty-handed. An agreement (Nebenrecess; 1648)
with Hesse-Darmstadt was used as a guideline in this matter.
Of the eight paragraphs, §3 (religious conviction) is by far the briefest.365 It
merely states that the nobility, their spouses, and their children could be Lutheran.
The nobility was now allowed to engage Lutheran preachers to hold sermons.366
Even though the issue of religious minorities had previously been addressed at an
imperial level, it was explicitly mentioned in this agreement as well. Hence, it can be
concluded that the nobility considered this matter to be of paramount importance, or
they would not have included it in the negotiations. As the Vergleich was meant to
bring closure to a 50-year-old conflict, it seemed sensible to address the issue that
had caused the breakdown of relations in the first place.
The references made by the nobility to the fatherland in both the Replica and the
Triplica, were repeated in §4 of the Vergleich. Addressing the topic of military
service, the use of fatherland vocabulary seems consistent with the nobility’s usage
of these terms thus far. The text reads that the landgrave could—in times of need—
do whatever he deemed necessary in order to ensure the fatherland’s good order.367
If their tenants needed to assist in defence of the landgraviate—in case of
necessity—the nobles had to be involved too. Their tenants fell under their
363Maruhn (2004a), pp. 86–90; Hollenberg and Jäger (1989c), pp. 58–59 § 1.
364Maruhn (2004a), p. 166.
365‘CCLXVI Fürstliche Resolutiones auf die Ritterschafftliche Gravamina. Vom 2ten October
1655’, in: C.L. Kleinschmidt, (ed.), Sammlung kurhessischer Landes-Ordnungen und Ausschreiben
nebst dahin gehörigen Erläuterungs- und anderen Rescripten, Resolutionen, Abschieden, gemeinen
Bescheiden und dergleichen. 2 Theil. 1627/1670 (Kassel 1767), 242 §3; Hollenberg and Jäger
(1989c), p. 62 §3.
366Maruhn (2004a), p. 87.
367Section from: Hollenberg and Jäger (1989c), p. 62. § 4: ‘Viertens die Landfolge und Musterung
betreffend behalten Ihre F.G., dieselbe vi juris superioritatis et regalium durchs gantze Land ohne
Unterscheid sowohl Ihrer F.G. eigenen Unterthanen alß Ritterschafft Hintersaßen zu exerciren und
darinnen sonderlich gestaltem Zustand und erheischender Notturfft nach zu Versicherung des
Vatterlands heilsame guete Ordnung zue stellen, sich einen Weg wie den andern nicht onbillich
frey und bevor.’
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jurisdiction.368 However, the landgrave could bypass the nobility when he was in
desperate need of resources. Consequently, taxes could be levied without prior
consent, despite the nobility’s right to endorse taxation (§1). Despite the exceptional
provision, these taxes still required authorisation after the fact.369
On principle, the nobility would be requested to endorse the Imperial and Circle
taxes (§5). However, when war broke out, and there was no time to consult them,
necessity overruled this privilege, as quick decision-making was of the essence.370
The following two paragraphs, §6 and §7, deal with possessions and financial
arrangements.371 An administrator—of noble birth—would be appointed to deal
with financial issues, including the details related to taxation. His assignment
entailed the oversight of all taxes in the Lower Principality of Hesse-Cassel.
The role of nobility’s assemblies was restricted solely to private matters (§8).
Matters concerning the landgraviate, in general, could no longer be discussed. A
draft (Resolutionsentwurf) compiled in 1653, had contained an additional restriction,
stating that the landgrave was obligated to approve the order of affairs, even in
private meetings.372 The 1655 Vergleich was less restrictive than this 1653 draft, as
this section was not included. However, it was agreed that the landgrave would be
notified of the place and time of these private assemblies.
These eight paragraphs gave rise to a good deal of controversy among scholars
upon how the document should be interpreted, but there are at least four general
conclusions to be reached. Firstly, the landgrave had not acquired the right to levy
taxes without consent, because the nobility’s privilege had been restored. Con-
versely, in the case of necessitas, other rules apply, but the landgrave was still
under the obligation to account for his actions after the event and in retrospect.
Secondly, the issue of religion had been raised, though, in the light of imperial
regulations, this seemed superfluous. Thirdly, the nobility had not gained the upper
hand in issues relating to justice and financial arrangements. Fourthly, the nobility’s
right of assembly was restricted to a right of consultation on private matters only.
The agreement was a real compromise; the landgrave had not gained limitless power,
nor had all of the nobility’s ancient privileges been honoured.
4.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that throughout the legal debate, the landgrave and the
nobility both used the words fatherland and patriot. In the case of the nobility, calling
themselves patriots meant accepting an office to defend the fatherland, that is, the
368Ibid., p. 63.
369von Friedeburg (2003), p. 284.
370Hollenberg and Jäger (1989c), p. 64.
371Ibid., pp. 64–65§ 6 and § 7.
372Ibid., p. 65.
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principality of Hesse-Cassel. This duty was accompanied by the right to oppose a
ruler. This could only be the case when the prince had overstepped the limits of his
office and did not fulfil his obligations. The self-acclaimed patriot depicted himself
as most loyal, particularly to his fatherland, customs, and privileges. The nobility
defended its obligations by reflecting upon themselves as patriots.373 This reference
seemed to entail its own set of duties to protect the fatherland, and implied the
landgrave’s failure to do so. Based on the information provided in this chapter, it can
be concluded that as early as the 1610s, fatherland terminology was used to criticise
the landgrave, and this continued at least through the mid-fifties.374
The landgrave claimed to have received his power from the emperor. He,
therefore, held the highest power in the principality: the superioritas territorialis.
He should not, and could not, be passed over when the nobility had a complaint, and
this fact nullified any imperial ruling. In perilous times, his duty was to protect the
Lower Principality of Hesse, which could require immediate action. Thus, necessitas
was of vital importance and meant that he could bypass the nobility in order to save
the principality. Proof of his claims was to be found in the literature he quoted, for
even though the sources may have been of foreign origin, his claim of holding the
office of superiorias territorialis was universally accepted.
The nobility resorted to history, pointing to their ancestors from whom they had
inherited their rights and privileges. They stressed their exclusive use of German
scholars—scholars who had lived under the same laws, and not in some ancient or
foreign land—plus the landgrave’s duty to abide by existing customs, to which he
had asserted when he accepted governance. More importantly, the nobility turned to
the history of their principality, a feature which is not mentioned in Stolleis’
synthesis regarding the ius publicum universalis. The nobles frequently referred to
the government and deeds of Philipp I the Magnanimous (1504–1567), his grandson
Maurice ‘the Learned’ of Hesse-Cassel (1572–1632), and the Hessian Chronicle.
The nobility fully accepted the notion of a superiorias territorialis and the idea that
their landgrave should protect his principality, its possessions, and its inhabitants.
Likewise, they believed that situations of necessitas could occur, but that such
situations had been strictly defined by the 1630 Regensburg assembly of the Imperial
Diet. The nobility applied these standards, and concluded that the landgrave could
not make such claims in the present case: the Treaties of Westphalia did not involve
the need for an army. Looking back to their history, they concluded that they were
entitled to assemble and debate the welfare and troubles of their fatherland, and that
they could discuss this issue with the emperor.
The nobility and the landgrave debated how the structure of the Holy Roman
Empire applied to their principality. In the meanwhile, each made arguments based
on the historical setting of the principality of Hesse-Cassel or greater Hesse. This
discussion seems at odds with the nobility’s definition of necessitas, which had been
established by the Imperial Diet. On the one hand, they appeared to be using
373Replicae, 12-13.
374Maruhn (2004a), pp. 24–32; von Friedeburg (2005, 2007).
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arguments from Reichs legislation regarding the abuse of power as defined by
imperial regulations. On the other hand, they insisted on the importance of a
territorial setting of rules and privileges similar to Hesse-Cassel. Both sets of rules
were considered to be of importance. With the best interests of the principality at
heart, and with the overriding desire to force the landgrave into obeying customs, the
nobility was obligated to disregard the landgrave’s wishes in the matter of convening
meetings, and in bringing the matter before the Imperial Chamber Court without the
landgrave’s prior consent. As loyal patriots, they were to act upon their principality’s
laws, customs, and honour, and to comply with the rulings of the Holy Roman
Empire. Their ius publicum territorium was not seen as an isolated part of
law-making, but as active interaction with the ius publicum universale.
Seven characteristics summarise the debate in Hesse-Cassel. Firstly, the trigger
for using the terms fatherland and patriot was not solely the requisition of taxation
without consent. Neither the impact of the ban on private assemblies nor the
humiliating imprisonment of assembly chairmen Von der Malsburg and Riedesel
should be overlooked.375
Secondly, when the landgravine avoided the nobility’s counsel and consent,
pursuing her agenda, the nobility worried that she might want to establish an
absolutus Dominatus.376 The use of fatherland terminology can be attributed to
the need to discuss the threat to the principality and to defend the welfare of the
fatherland.
Thirdly, the nobility of Hesse-Cassel sought legal guidance and presented their
case—punctuated with Latin phrases—before the Imperial Chamber Court. Not only
was the emperor’s judgement sought, but the nobility required it by using arguments
about patriots, the fatherland, and patria in official documents. These documents
explained the purpose of their assemblies and the need to protect their privileges. In
itself, it may not have been extraordinary for the nobility to focus on concepts of
loyalty, customs, and privileges, as those referred to specific, acquired rights.
However, the emphasis on their great loyalty to the fatherland in the legal documents
proves that the terminology could be used instrumentally. Moreover, it was loyalty
to the fatherland, and not to the landgrave, a distinction leaning in favour of the
relevance of the terminology.
Fourthly, the landgrave used the same terminology.377 The landgrave’s lawyers
essentially argued that the landgrave was the official caretaker of the fatherland. The
office of a prince encompassed many duties, but the most critical duty was to protect
peace and prosperity. Those disturbing the peace and tranquillity were to be judged
and sentenced by the landgrave. The argumentation used in the Duplica emphasises
this fact, even though it still incorporated references to patriots and the fatherland.
Fifthly, the ways in which the words fatherland and patriot were applied were
significant. The landgrave did not apply them to himself. The nobility’s usage of
375Maruhn (2004a), p. 47.
376Replicae, 12–13.
377Duplicae, 32–33.
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these terms seemed to be conceived of as a warning signal. The patriots were
considered vigilant guards of the common good and were now invoking this role.
The landgrave recognised their commitment—by copying their use of words—and
thanked them for their efforts. He then pointed out that they, like their ancestors,
should now step back and let him deal with the situation. Thus, the landgrave’s
reasoning was in line with his asserted duty to protect the fatherland.378
Sixthly, and especially in the closing agreement (Vergleich/ Vertrag), it became
clear that not only the nobility but also the landgrave favoured an earlier state of
affairs. The Vergleich rebalances relations, and it seemed neither the landgrave nor
the Landstände increased their power, which may be contributed to the use of
fatherland terminology. The nobility claimed the office of a patriot in order to protect
the fatherland and its welfare. The landgrave had to protect his principality as part of
this office. As such, he accepted hearing and incorporating the warning signals of
‘his’ patriots. The genuflection Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm made to his Landstände
shows a similar recognition of their role as patriots, and possibly as Althusius’
ephors.
Finally, the absence of pamphlets in this conflict is noteworthy but logical,
because the Landstände were able to appeal to the Imperial Chamber Court. It also
shows that there was little chance of invoking the help of other principalities. The
nobility did not air their issues with the landgrave to the rest of the world. This
seclusion is contrary to the approach that the nobility from Jülich chose.
Fatherland terminology intended to describe the fatherland, and the patriots—the
nobility—claimed loyalty to the fatherland rather than their landgrave. This father-
land was in danger because of the detrimental actions of its ruler. Admittedly, by
emphasising the concept of the fatherland, the nobility developed a new role for
themselves and excluded the landgrave. However, it was not necessarily their
preconceived intention to undermine the position of the landgrave; the nobles merely
sought to emphasise that the fulfilment of their duties towards the fatherland was
their prime motivation. Fulfilling the office of a patriot was, at first sight, an altruistic
action. The nobles professed that their higher goal was to protect the prosperity of the
principality, the authority of the landgrave, and their privileges. It must not be
overlooked though, that their ultimate goal was to have their privileges
respected—which was not at all altruistic. Achieving this goal would ensure that
their position remained unchanged and that the nobility retained a prominent posi-
tion in the decision-making process in Hesse-Cassel, and in the levying of taxes. The
nobility strengthened their claims to political involvement by representing them-
selves as one corporate, united body.379
The landgrave applied fatherland terminology as well, which cannot be explained
by the same premise as above. In the Duplica, clear examples have been presented of
the landgrave’s usage of these terms. The landgrave’s most basic argument comes
down to two points: firstly, that he held the fief; and, secondly, that all persons within
378Simon (2004), pp. 22–23, 26–27, 93, 105, 166, 221.
379Harding (2013), pp. 119–120; von Friedeburg (2003), pp. 319–320.
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that fief were subjects, and so under the obligation to obey his rule. In this respect, it
is crucial to note that the landgrave’s lawyers deemed this argument insufficient, and,
consequently, the previously discussed lengthy legal text called the Duplica was
drawn up. It is argued here, that if subjects were allowed to assemble at their
initiative, this would be harmful for two reasons. First of all, the ambiguous nature
of the meetings in the Hessian convents of Kaufungen and Wetter was problematic,
in that they could either deal with private or political matters and might thus be used
to undermine authority. Secondly, even the nobility must act within rules and
regulations.380 It was consequently argued that if the nobility, as subjects, possessed
the right of assembly, farmers and citizens might claim this right as well, which
would be harmful to the entire Holy Roman Empire.381 This argument seems to be in
line with the landgrave’s acclaimed superioritas territorialis and rule over all his
subjects. This legal context shows that the landgrave’s lawyers assumed that it was
the landgrave who took care of the fatherland. However, it does not readily explain
why words like fatherland and patriot were accepted vocabulary, as fief and subjects
could easily have replaced them.
The answer may well lie in the seeming altruism of the office of a patriot. The
landgrave seemed to accept that there was such an office. His lawyers even presented
the Imperial Chamber Court with a historical case in which fatherland arguments
were used. It seemed to have functioned as a wrecking ball that smashed the debate
open. This example argued that the nobility claimed to be loyal to the landgrave in
order to protect the fatherland. They set aside their privileges and immunities while
the landgrave stepped up to defend the principality. In this particular example, the
nobility as patriots had been loyal to the fatherland and the landgrave. The landgrave
copied the vocabulary used by the nobles in order to refer to nobility’s arguments,
and so he accepted the use of fatherland, patria, and patriot in this context. However,
he was also willing to go one step further by turning such arguments around.
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Patriots in France, Political Talks Between
1500s and 1650s
At the start of the sixteenth century, the French were faithful adherents of the Roman
Catholic Church. Throughout Europe, the clergy’s abuse of privileges and power led
to discontent, expressed by people who would become known as ‘Protestants’. The
Catholic Church failed to address these feelings of dissatisfaction and considered
them to be heretical thoughts. Such dismissal led to the birth of the so-called
Protestant Church. The adherents belonging to this church were by no means a
homogenous group: Martin Luther, Huldrych Zwingli, and John Calvin were the
most known influencers. Combined with humanistic and renaissance approaches of
life, these men of the Reformation appealed to many people. The Catholic Church
felt threatened by the rise of these—in their eyes—heretic groups, and saw the
French king as a powerful ally.
The French crown promoted Catholicism as the only true religion and had
Protestants prosecuted. Many chose to flee, but this was only possible if one’s
finances permitted it. Others became façade-Catholics, pretending to be something
they were not.1 Many scholars have argued that this internal disorder became the
primary cause of a series of interrelated wars in France between 1562 and 1598.
Nevertheless, Philip Benedict and others have emphasised that political issues raised
during the period aggravated this internal disorder.2 He quotes a contemporary
Catholic historian François de Belleforest, who stated that the rivalry between, and
ambitions of, the nobility were a cause of much strife and hatred. A contemporary
protestant historian Lancelot Voisin de La Popelinière stated more or less the same:
passions caused troubles and were veiled under the pretence of fighting another
religion.3 The Catholic League (1585) was diffuse in its ambitions: on the one hand,
1van der Linden (2016).
2Benedict (2016).
3Ibid., pp. 60, 63–64.
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it aimed to safeguard the French throne from a Protestant king, but on the other hand,
it also sought to object to tax raises and royal favouritism.4
In this second part, we shift our focus to the Kingdom of France, or more
particularly, to the province of Brittany. I provide an overview of the main political
events from the mid-sixteenth until the mid-seventeenth century, as well as the
developments in political thought. I do this in broad strokes, as a general background
in which to situate the developments of the absence of the use of fatherland
terminology in Brittany (see: Chap. 6).5
5.1 Political Developments: Kings, Children,
and Succession
The French throne had been particularly weak since the mid-sixteenth century.
Henry II was the last person to become king as an adult; all the kings who died
after 1547 had left the throne to an infant.6 During such extended periods of regency,
rivalry amongst the nobility increased, as its members sought to gain access to the
court and convince the young king and his regent to pursue a policy of their liking. If
infant kings and their regents were already a hazard, this was indisputably the case
for murdered kings or the extinction of a bloodline. Jacques Clément mortally
wounded King Henry III (1551–1589), and the king died one day later, on 2 August
1589.7 His brother, the Duke of Alençon, had already died in 1584, which meant that
the Valois-dynasty was extinct.8 According to Salic Law, the French throne had to
go to the closest related male heir of the late king, which in this particular case meant
that a successor was found in the twenty-second degree.9 Predictably, many
questioned the legitimacy of this inheritor, not in the least because the successor
was Henry IV, King of Navarre who had been raised a Protestant by his Calvinist
mother.10 In order to inherit the French Catholic throne, the Catholic baptised Henry
VI had to re-convert to Catholicism.11
During his reign, Henry IV presented himself as a modern king, who sought to
leave feudalism in the past. Hence, his rule is often seen as the start of arbitrary rule,
4Ibid., p. 66.
5Many, in-depth studies into the political history and the history of political thought in France have
been written. This chapter is certainly not meant to repeat this works, but merely sketches
developments. For more information, see for example: Bély (2009); Collins (2021) I would like
to thank professor Collins for allowing me to read parts of his book before publication.
6Collins (2017), p. 102.
7Greengrass (2004), p. 176.
8Bonney (1991), p. 23.
9Mousnier and Spencer (1973), p. 106.
10Bonney (1989a).
11Bonney (1991), p. 30.
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since Henry IV made decisions by merely stating that it pleased him to do
so. ‘Puissance absolue’ meant that the king was not subjected to any other worldly
power—not to the emperor, nor the Pope.12 As a result, Henry IV did not shy away
from alliances with, and support for, Protestants. For example, during the early
stages of the succession crisis in Jülich-Berg-Cleves-Mark he supported the Dutch
and sided with the Protestants. Henry’s choices in foreign politics led to the belief
among the people that he had not renounced his Protestant upbringing. The issue of
religion, combined with the low degree of relative consanguinity, nursed the idea
that King Henry IV had usurped the throne as a tyrannus absque titulo (tyrant
without a title).13 All of these issues seem to have contributed to the king’s murder
on 14May 1610. His assassin François Ravaillac claimed to be a good Catholic, who
had acted upon his true Christian beliefs by committing regicide to remove a
tyrant.14 Roland Mousnier claims that it was the limited toleration of the Huguenots
in the Edict of Nantes (1598) that led Ravaillac to the belief that the king had failed to
convert the Protestants, and had thus forsaken his duties as king (Map 5.1).15
Subsequently, King Louis XIII ascended the throne, under the regency of his
mother Maria de’ Medici. Her regency, however, did not last long. The Italian-born
Queen-mother was suspected of favouring the Italians—especially minister Concino
Concini—who worked in France’s service. In 1617, the regency ended, and Concini
was killed after allegedly resisting arrest.16 Maria de’ Medici was sent into exile to
the Château de Blois. Only seventeen years of age, King Louis XIII accepted
government over France and began to govern in his own right, with the help of his
trusted friend Charles d’Albert, Duke de Luynes. Unfortunately for the young king,
De Luynes passed away only a few years later, in 1621.17 Shortly after the duke’s
death, Cardinal de Richelieu came to the fore. He re-established the relationship
between King Louis XIII and his mother, which led to Cardinal de Richelieu’s rise to
a place in the royal council.
King Louis XIII entrusted Cardinal de Richelieu with the financial affairs of
France, as he had little knowledge of the matter. In 1624, Cardinal de Richelieu
became the first minister and could do as he pleased.18 Although he maintained the
status quo, he encountered some resistance from the Grandees (highest nobles),
mainly from Gaston d’Orleans. Reforming the country turned out to be incredibly
difficult. In legal matters, for example, Richelieu was met with significant resistance
on the part of the aristocracy when he banned duelling.19 In foreign affairs, Richelieu
tried to find allies against the Habsburg dynasty. In France, he tried to gain the
12Collins (2021).
13Bulst (2004), p. 124.
14Bonney (1991), p. 27.
15Ibid., p. 37; Mousnier and Spencer (1973), p. 22.
16Bonney (1981), p. 819.
17Chisholm (1911) Luynes. Encyclopædia Britannica 147.
18Bonney (1992).
19Bély (2009), pp. 206–208.
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Protestants’ support by arranging the marriage of Princess Henrietta Maria to the
Protestant King of England: a downright provocation to the Pope despite the princes
remaining a Catholic. In 1625, France began to move its armies against Spain in
Northern Italy, which aggravated the Spaniards enormously. In order to rally support
for his foreign policy, Cardinal de Richelieu started to influence public opinion using
pamphlets. Having secured political ties with England, the cardinal now turned his
gaze to the revolting Protestants in the stronghold of La Rochelle. After
reconquering it, he shifted his attention to the Habsburg possessions in Northern
Italy once again. France and Sweden got along quite well too, supporting the anti-
Habsburg forces financially and militarily.
By 1630, the health of the king declined, and fears arose that he would soon die.
At this point, the Queen-mother demanded Cardinal de Richelieu’s leave. However,
King Louis XIII, who was satisfied with his minister’s services, refused her demand.
Richelieu’s policies were either applauded by those who sought war against Spain;
or despised by those who held the Spanish in high regard. In 1635, France became
involved in the Thirty Years’ War, indirectly supporting the Hessian and Swedish
Map 5.1 France (seventeenth century). Map by Nicolaes Visscher, Galliae seu Franciae tabula,
qua omnes provinciae, viae angiariae, et aliae res notatu dignae distincte et accurate ostendatur
(1690). Scale: [ca. 1:2,500,000]. Map reproduction courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal Map &
Education Center at the Boston Public Library. https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/
commonwealth:cj82kq901. Accessed November 23, 2020
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troops. Additionally, France started pursuing the conquest of the principalities to the
west of the Loire-river—Alsace—and in the North. In 1635, the Franco-Spanish War
erupted, and France found itself surrounded by the Habsburg dynasty and its
supporters.20 The Spanish Prime Minister Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of
Olivares, hoped to be able to attack France from all sides at once, but this plan
failed. The French found themselves in peril when towns only 120 kilometres away
from Paris collapsed in the face of enemy troops; people began to panic and revolt.
Step by step, the French regained terrain. From 1636 onwards, the Spanish and
French monarchies both suffered from revolts. In both kingdoms the people turned
against their monarchs as a result of the expenses of warfare. Both parties calculated
that perseverance would increase the chances of a victory because internal conflicts
would wear their enemy out. This situation continued until well after Cardinal de
Richelieu’s death on 4 December 1642.21
On the day of King Lous XIII’s death (14 May 1643), it was decided that Queen
Anne and a council were to act on behalf of the minor King Louis XIV. During the
early years of his reign, personal ties to the king himself were virtually absent, and
people depended on their connections to those in the vicinity of the crown—Queen
Anne, Cardinal Mazarin and some extent the Princes-du-Sang (royal princes, closely
related to the crown). Contemporaries considered the period of political instability in
France (1648–1653), commonly known as the Fronde, to be a civil war. The nobles
could not solve the problems, as they had their organisational issues and lacked a
common objective.22 The financial situation of the nobility, and hence their political
interests, varied considerably. High-ranking nobles with many resources were close
to the crown—as they functioned as moneylenders—and had strong patron-client
relations. Collins claims that the causes of the Fronde should be sought in the
financial troubles and pressure in the provinces to help out the crown financially,
and subsequently, in a problematic situation in Paris. Disgruntlement with policy
spread from the peripheries to the capital. He even writes that: ‘[t]he Fronde did not
lead to the breakdown of order; rather, the breakdown of order led to the Fronde.’23
Only through the use of established patron-client-relationships, thus ensuring their
loyalty, was greater evil averted in 1648.24 The consequences of the foreign policy—
war in the Holy Roman Empire and against Spain—influenced the economy in
various ways, and gave rise to the Fronde. War had taken its financial toll, in the
sense of increased taxation, the creation of offices and increasing debts.25
Between 1646 and 1648, it seemed as if Cardinal Mazarin had deliberately tried
to prolong the war to ensure financial gain and to strengthen his position.26 When the
20Medick and Marschke (2013), p. 13.
21Bély (2009), pp. 252–254.
22Bonney (1978), p. 92.
23Collins (2001), p. 86.
24Ibid., pp. 90–97.
25Bonney (1978).
26Bély (1998), Bonney (1981), p. 830; Sonnino (1998), pp. 225–227, 232.
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government did not attempt to end the war, people started to feel anxious. The
parlement endorsed these feelings and objected against new taxes, which were
considered too heavy a burden for the people.27 This first phase of critique and
uprising started in the spring of 1648. It became known as the ‘Fronde of the
Parlement’ or Fronde of the ‘judges’. Cardinal Mazarin’s government allegedly
made two critical errors in this first phase. Firstly, he asked for more resources while
leaving the grievances of officers unaddressed. Secondly, he allowed the Chamber
Saint-Louis, a meeting of thirty-two delegates from the various Parisian bureaucratic
courts, to assemble and make agreements meant to solve officers’ problems. The
instability of the times, however, brought these decisions into question.28 The costs
of Cardinal Mazarin’s government exploded, and a desperate search for finances
started; simultaneously, the Chamber Saint-Louis was in search of a way to lighten
the people’s burden. According to some texts, Cardinal Mazarin’s corruption was at
odds with peace, and, therefore, troublesome. The Fronde was more a rebellion in
the interests of the people than a reform movement.29
In the five years of the Fronde, about 5400 pamphlets were written, reflecting the
public opinion via a plethora of anonymous voices.30 These texts are known as
Mazarinades.31 During the first year, there were only a few hundred, in the following
years, however, the number of pamphlets rose to well over a thousand a year. They
were well-written, probably by professional, learned authors, and addressed the
public problems created by Cardinal Mazarin’s government.32 Not all texts opposed
arbitrary rule, as some did agree with the idea of a strong and centralised state. The
complainants’ primary cause of grievance seems to have been the fact that they just
did not like the Italian cardinal. These pamphlets became a salient way to describe
current affairs, and showed a keen eye for recent developments.
The second phase of the Fronde started with the arrest of three high noblemen: the
princes-du-sang de Condé and de Conti, and their brother-in-law the Duke de
Longueville. Their arrest happened unexpectedly on 18 January 1650—at the behest
of Mazarin himself—and they were imprisoned in the Vincennes-castle. One of the
factors that had contributed to this event was the feud between the prince-du-sang
Condé and Cardinal Mazarin; another was the cardinal’s already unstable position.33
Several authors of pamphlets demanded Mazarin’s resignation, replacing him with
the Prince de Condé, the Duke de Retz or any other high official.34 These requests
show the true nature of the Fronde: it was a battle over which individual or group
27Bély (2009), p. 305.
28Bonney (1984).
29Ibid.
30Jouhaud (1983), Bonney (1989b).
31Collins (2001), p. 96; Jouhaud (1985).
32Most authors seem to have read Machiavelli, according to: Carrier (1969), Collins (2001), p. 96;
Jouhaud (1985).
33Bonney (1981), p. 92.
34Collins (2001), p. 95.
148 5 Patriots in France, Political Talks Between 1500s and 1650s
should have control over the government of France.35 In these pamphlets, the focus
was on the interest of France rather than on the virtues of the people. Those in power
were looking for ways to expand their influence at the cost of their opponents.36
Luckily for Cardinal Mazarin, each step he took was supported by the Queen-regent,
Anne of Austria. However, despite the Queen’s support, Mazarin eventually was
forced to flee, since there was little support for his actions or the increased level of
taxation. The heavy-burdened population revolted against their Italian minister,
whom they believed to be the cause of all their problems. The cardinal left but
swiftly returned, with approximately 6000 mercenaries, just as France opened peace-
negotiations with Spain. The situation with the French Princes-du-Sang also
remained troublesome, as they required an infusion of Spanish money to fund
their troops while negotiating peace. Cardinal Mazarin, on the other hand, was
able to finance his troops by drawing on his vast financial resources to finance his
troop.37
5.2 Governmental Organisation: Tasks, Taxes, and Ties
In the early 1500s, French society, was unequal, both in terms of status and in terms
of income. As a result of the medieval feudal system, the government was divided
into many hands.38 The nobility held many privileges over their tenants and the
inhabitants of their dominion, allowing them to cast judgments, rule their property,
and collect taxes. Nevertheless, they were still bound to the French king, as he was
the one who allowed them to govern their land in exchange for advice and military
aid (consilium et auxilium). The God-given sovereign power of the French king
was—in the words of Bodin: inalienable, indivisible, and perpetual.39 His tasks
shifted gradually, firstly from finding legislation to making laws, by kings such as
Francis I. Subsequently, his seventeenth century-successors started to administer the
legislation.40 The king was assisted by a small group of people, each with his own
expertise, who took part in a large council.41 This council was divided into four




38Collins (2001), pp. 8–9.
39Ibid., p. 16.
40Ibid., p. 6.
41Ibid., pp. xxi–xxii, 16.
42Based on: Moote (1971), p. 3.
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affairs,43 Conseil d' état et des finances,44 Conseil des finances,45 and the Conseil
des parties.46 The protection of the people became more and more a task of the royal
government and these councils, especially after the 1628-recapture of La Rochelle.47
With officials holding positions as minister (this French word means literally
‘servant’), counsellor or secretary, the system developed towards one in which
every area of France was assigned to a specific minister. There were many office-
holders involved in ruling France all of whom were stationed in Paris. These
officeholders seemed to slowly replace the old feudal structure, slowly breaking
the position of the Grandees down.48
King Henry IV had the habit of signing documents with the phrase ‘for such is our
pleasure.’49 This phrase has often been interpreted as a sign of arbitrary rule.
However, too much has been made of this phrase, as it only meant that the king
had the undivided right to make laws, but was still accountable to God, and bound by
God’s laws. If this were not the case, he would become a tyrant.50 In short, the
administration of France focussed on three things: it administered justice and made
policy, it fought wars, and it levied taxes to pay for these wars.51 France largely
depended on officeholders who had bought offices in their lifetime; however,
whether the office was bought or not depended to a great extent on the crown’s
need for money. Being a judge was considered a part of the standard noble
prerogative, and those non-nobles who bought the office became, therefore,
known as noblesse de robe, in contrast with the noblesse d' épée. The creation of
offices was one way in which wealthy merchants could become part of the nobility
and move up the social ladder.52
Levying taxes and applying and administering justice in civil cases remained
difficult, since much depended on local customary law and cooperation of local
assemblies of the états, for example in the Pays d'État. Depending on the history of a
region, there could be room to negotiate the amount of taxes to be paid. There were
three different types of regions: pays d' élection, pays d' états and pays d'imposition.
The latter were regions that were the result of recent conquests. Here, an appointed
royal intendant would oversee the levying of taxes, while much of these areas’
original tax-system remained intact. Most of France fell into the category of pay d'
élection. Here as well, an appointed intendant (intermediate) oversaw the imposition
of taxes. It was not possible to buy this office since this might lead to corruption. The
43Council for general policy-making.
44Council for financial affairs.
45Council for acquirement and distribution of revenues.
46Council for the supervision of justice.
47Collins (2001), p. 9.
48Moote (1971), p. 35.
49Collins (2001), pp. 2–3.
50Bély (2009), p. 36; Collins (2001), pp. xx–xxi.
51Collins (2001), p. 10.
52Ibid., p. 22; Collins (2003), p. xiv.
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impôts (taxes) were collected with the aid of the élus (Eng. elected). The pays d'
élection had little autonomy, and since the Estates-General did not assemble, there
was hardly any room to negotiate about taxes.53 During the seventeenth century,
there was a change in the people who were held responsible for the taxes. Taxes had
to be collected by a local parish, who had an obligation to collect the whole sum.
However, if not all the money was collected, the parish was bound by the principle of
common constraint. The parish itself had to pay the missing part.54 Another system
of tax collecting was applied to direct taxes, where tax-farmers would pay the crown
a fixed sum of money, and consequently could do as they pleased.55
The number of pays d' état steadily diminished in the seventeenth century. The
most well-known were Béarn, Dauphiné, Guyenne, Languedoc, Burgundy, Pro-
vence, and Brittany. After 1650, only the last three still held this position. Here,
requests for taxes went through the états, who could negotiate—to some extent—
and decide the distribution of taxes. Low direct taxes were beneficial to the nobility,
as their tenants would still be able to contribute to the nobles’maintenance as part of
their duty.56 Patrons who had access to the crown could negotiate the terms of their
taxes. No intendant would oversee the taxes since this was a provincial matter.57
Together with the aforementioned specialised councils, the king ruled his coun-
try. The prime minister, that is Cardinal de Richelieu, and later Cardinal Mazarin,
could make proposals, which the king would then approve. The king also had
governors, mostly relatives or clients, who did his bidding in the provinces. He
was continuously short on money and needed to find ways to finance his expenses.
Selling offices provided an income, but loans were still necessary. Hence, financiers
became incredibly crucial to the system, not in the least because they also bought
equipment for the army. The conventional system of justice monitored the financers,
but the king decided on protection against prosecution for his much-needed
moneylenders.58
The most notorious taxes in France were the taille and the gabelle. The taille was
a land tax introduced during the Middle Ages in order to obtain more money quickly
and eventually became a standard royal tax. People despised it, (just as they despised
the gabelle (salt-tax)) since it directly influenced the income of the inhabitants.
Although the gabelle was an indirect tax, salt was a much-used product, and hence
the tax had a substantial impact as well. During the late sixteenth and the seventeenth
century, tax-farmers collected most taxes. Initially, the king had an obligation to
assemble the Estates-General, but this did not continue after 1614. Tax-farmers paid
the king the requested amount upfront, in exchange for the right to collect money in a
53Bély (2009), pp. 54–63.
54Collins (2001), p. 26.
55Ibid., p. 26; Bonney (1979).
56Collins (2001), p. 24.
57Bély (2009), pp. 54–63.
58Ibid., pp. 54–63.
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specific geographical area. It should not come as a surprise that this office was often
accused of extortion.
With the influence of the feudal system diminishing, a new system of importance
arose: the patron-client relationship.59 Patronage is to be understood as a situation in
which a person actively builds a social network of people (clientele)—often of lesser
status—with a particular political intention, aiming to influence or control a society’s
decision-making. Under this system, clients earned protection and favouritism in
return for their loyalty and service to the patron.60 Most of this happened informally.
For example, the nobility could be asked to be the godfather of a farmers’ child, but
peers could also request such favour. Divisions were not necessarily made among
noble and non-noble lines; money, personality, private interest, personal affection,
and loyalty were of more importance.61 Self-interest dominated the patron-client
relationship, and could thus shape political actions.62 This self-interest also explains
the ease with which alliances changed and loyalties shifted.
5.3 Political Thought: Sovereignty, Reason, and Patrie
During the Middle Ages, the duties and obligations of princes within their jurisdic-
tion were ill-defined, and can be characterised as a process of ‘testing the limits.63
During the fifteenth and sixteenth century, governments steadily obtained more
power, due to the increasing efficacy of the means used to govern a growing number
of people. There was increasingly more contact with other parts of the world. This
was partly caused by trade, but also by monetarisation as a result of the development
of banks. Furthermore, the success of the printing press made it possible for a
prince—and others—to disseminate texts, in order to inform people on decisions
that were made and implemented.64 At the same time, dynastic ambitions gave rise
to more wars. As a result, princes sought ways of finding the means to pay their
armies through increased taxations, using tax-farming, or by borrowing money from
wealthy merchants.65
Throughout Europe, princes and their Landstände or états—or whatever name
they held—explored the limits of their powers. In France, Jean Bodin’s Les six
Libres de la République (1576) settled the matter. Breaking with the medieval
59Kettering (1986), p. 409.
60Ibid., p. 410.
61Schalk (1986).
62Kettering (1986), p. 411.
63Kossmann (2000), pts 2. Popular Sovereignty at the Beginning of the Dutch Ancien Regime, 133.
64Ibid., p. 134.
65von Friedeburg RCF (2010) State Forms and State Systems in Modern Europe. In: European
History Online (EGO) published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz. http://www.
ieg-ego.eu/friedeburgr2010-en. Accessed 30 January 2019.
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interpretation of rights and obligations, Bodin reasoned that: ‘[. . .] firstly, that the
sovereign wielded all political power, and secondly that this power derived from the
right to legislate.’66 In other words, all power was ascribed to the King of France,
with some possible exceptions. With this innovative approach, Bodin managed to
address two issues. Firstly, the disagreements over what the king could and could not
do. Secondly, he addressed the king’s increased sphere of influence. Instead of an
ever-growing list of attributed powers, Bodin worked with a positive list.67
Addressing sovereignty did make Bodin sound something like an adherent of
arbitrary monarchy, which he denied since he stated that a prince should not overstep
the boundaries of ‘[. . .] divine, natural or fundamental laws nor, for example, levy
taxes arbitrarily.’68 Bodin’s positive list broke with medieval traditions and inter-
pretations of attributed power, and centralised all power in the monarch. Bodin
himself defined it as follows: ‘La souveraineté est la puissance absolue & perpetuelle
d’une République, que les Latins appellent majestatem’.69 The book, written in
French, gained much attention, as it was immediately accessible to a broad audience.
With that, Bodin’s book outpaced the ideas of the ‘reason of state’, which, with
the exception of Machiavelli’s Il Principe, were not yet written down, and therefore
circulated only among the high nobility. Referring to the amoral prince of Machia-
velli was often not done; however, it did influence thinking about the role of princes
and the ‘state’. Giovanni Botero’s (c. 1544–1617) interpretation of ‘reason of state’
was published in 1589 in his Della Ragion di Stato. Botero understood it as a means
of preserving the kingdom or principality (the ‘state’).70 As Maurizio Viroli
explains, the prince and his principality still formed a closely intertwined unity:
the ‘reason of state’ and the ‘state of the prince’ were the same thing. According to
Viroli, this becomes clear when Botero initially fails to address the issues of
sovereignty or give a definition of a ‘state’ but then does define the latter as ‘[. . .]
a firm rule over a people (un dominio fermo sopra popoli)’.71 Botero rejected the
search for ‘great things’, which, according to Machiavelli, would have been the
greatest achievement of a prince to pursue.72 According to Botero, a prince should
possess four classical virtues:
[. . .]if he wants to maintain his dominion over a people, a prince needs to rely on justice and
liberality, which help him keep the love of his subjects, and prudence and valour, which are
the conditions of a good reputation.73
66Kossmann (2000), p. 141.
67Ibid., p. 141.
68Ibid., p. 141.
69Bodin (1576), p. 122; Foisneau (2013), p. 326.
70Foisneau (2013), p. 330.
71Ibid., p. 330.
72Viroli (2005), p. 253.
73Foisneau (2013), p. 331.
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Here, Botero differs from Bodin’s definition of good government, as he ascribes
five characteristics to the—impersonal—term, sovereignty. Firstly, the king had the
power to create legislation applicable to everyone.74 Secondly, the king was decisive
in declaring war and making peace.75 Thirdly, the king could assign offices.76
Fourthly, the king functioned as the highest court of appeal.77 Finally, the king
was able to grant clemency.78 If the prince (for example, the King of France)
administers sovereignty well, he is a good prince. In other words, how well a prince
performs defines the type of government over the principality: it is the performance
of the prince, the extent to which he lives up to Botero’s ideal that determines
whether a particular government is monarchical or tyrannical. Alternatively, in the
words of Foisneau, the difference between Bodin and Botero is that they have: ‘[. . .]
the perspective of an unlimited normative authority in the one case, and as an art of
ruling in the other case [. . .]’.79 Richelieu boldly interpreted Botero’s reason of state
as an excuse to violate people’s personal lives under the pretext of pursuing France’s
interests.
Furthermore, under Richelieu, the role of the king—as sovereign—was much
more focussed on administering legislation to France, the land given by God to the
people of France. The juridical and theological roles of the king merged into one
another, and profoundly influenced perceptions of the term sovereignty.80 Again, the
reason of state and the interests of the prince became two sides of the same coin.
The wars of the sixteenth century—whether called wars of religion, or civil
wars—were perceived as a severe threat to the survival of the country.81 This ‘threat
to the very survival of the patrie [during the Wars of Religion] called forth one of the
most massive outbursts of patriotic writings of the early modern period’.82 Never-
theless, the content of these writings may well have been the result of much earlier
discussions about the organisation of government, and the question of what the
latter’s core business was supposed to be. The prince should preserve, and provide
for, the res publica (commonwealth), or, in French, the bien public.83 Between 1547
and 1610, this subsequently shifted from a focus on the ‘bien du pubic’ to the ‘bien
74Bodin (1576), p. 221‘[. . .] c’est la puissance de donner loy à tous en general, & à chacun en
particulier.’
75Ibid., p. 221‘[. . .] comme decerner la guerre ou traicter la paix, qui est l’un des plus grands poincts
de la majesté, d’autant qu’il tire bien souvent après soi la ruine, ou l’asseurance d’un estât.’
76Ibid., p. 228‘[. . .] d’instituer les principaux officiers [. . .].’
77Ibid., p. 231‘[. . .] c’est à sçavoir du dernier ressort.’
78Ibid., p. 236‘[. . .] la puissance d’ottroyer grace aux condamnés par dessus les arrests, & contre la
rigueur des loix, soit pour la vie, soit pour les biens, soit pour l’honneur, soit pour le rappel du ban, il
n’est pas en la puissance des Magistrats, pour grands qu’ils soyent, d’en donner un seul poinct, ny
de rien alterer des jugements par eux donnés.’
79Foisneau (2013), p. 332.
80Ibid., p. 333.
81Nice (2006).
82Ibid.; Ranum (1975), p. 45 quoting here: W.F. Churche ‘France’.
83Collins (2021), chap. introduction.
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de la chose publique’, and finally to the ‘bien de l’Estat’.84 With that, officials
manoeuvred away from intrusive popular activities and pronounced that France was
raised above personal interests. According to Collins, authors often petitioned the
king, asking him to act for the good of the patrie as well.85 As such ‘[. . .] in a
Republic, the patriotic citizen who believes the war to be against the interests of the
common good, shows his patriotism precisely by speaking out against it.’86 In
December 1576, Henry III used the expression ‘the honour of God, the service of
the king, and the good (bien) and peace (repos) of the patrie’ in a letter.87 When
Henry III disbanded several meetings of the états, this was perceived as a violation of
the commonwealth.
As from 1594, the word Estat or ‘state’ began to appear frequently at every level
of political communications. Collins mentions that the city of Abbeville took an oath
to conserve ‘his [Henry IV’s] state and crown’.88 He illustrates that the word Estat
competed with the term patrie; the terms could be used interchangeably. The term
patrie applied to towns and provinces, but also the Commonwealth of France.89 It is
important to note that a strong emotional connection seems to be indicated when the
term patrie was applied. The term estat, on the other hand, was less emotionally
charged. For instance, when the états of Brittany sent an envoy to negotiate with the
English Queen for support, their diplomat was pressed to act on behalf of the patrie,
meaning Brittany.90
According to Marc Greengrass, the term patriot, in particular, was used during
periods of war and turmoil during the sixteenth century to monopolise favours.91
Patriot illustrated one’s passions.92 Protecting the patrie from the king was a
dangerous act, as can be illustrated by the cases mentioned above of Jacques
Clément and François Ravaillac as they believed that the king did not uphold the
Catholic faith.93 Such excesses may have contributed to a decline in the use of the
term patriot in political communications at the highest levels, for example, in
political texts of provinces such as Brittany. By the beginning of the seventeenth
century, the term patrie was replaced by estat, or ‘state’ in most forms of commu-
nications.94 At the local level and in religious texts, however, the term patrie was
84Ibid., chap. Henry IV.
85Ibid., chap. Henry IV.
86Ibid., chap. introduction.
87Collins, chap. Henry IV: citing Le Roux, Un Régicide au nom de Dieu, 64.
88Collins, chap. Henry IV: quotes here Abbéville, 483.
89Ibid., chap. Henry IV.
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still used.95 There is still much more research to be done into the when and where,
and the changes in the application, of the local use of the word patrie in Brittany.96
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Chapter 6
Brittany: Pay d’États and Don Gratuit
(1648–1652)
Many Parisians participated in hostilities against Cardinal Jules Mazarin in 1651.
This unrest was known as ‘the Fronde’1 and had started in May 1648. In the
peripheries of France, such as Brittany, early flurries of the civil war went mostly
unnoticed by the inhabitants. However, by 1651, Armand-Charles de La Porte, Duke
de la Meilleraye (1632–1713) and Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot
(1616–1655)2 were quarrelling over who had the right to preside over the états. It
was the former—a client of Cardinal Mazarin—received a severe warning from his
patron, rather than the latter. Prince-du-sang of Condé, as well as his brother the
Prince-du-sang of Conti, supported Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot.3
Armand-Charles de La Porte, Duke de la Meilleraye heeded this patron’s urgent
warning. However, his long-time friend Henri Charles, Duke de la Trémoille
(1620–1672) did challenge Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot’s presence in
Nantes.4 The arising conflict resulted in a military intervention, which removed their
challenger from the 1651 états assembly.5 His removal angered Henri Chabot, Duke
de Rohan-Chabot, who went on to complain at the parlement of Rennes, where the
judges sided with him. In Rennes, the parlement’s judges published a decree that
stated that Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot was to preside over the Assembly
in Nantes. With this protest, they became notorious for obstructing the états in
1The French word Fronde means ‘sling’. Slings were used to smash the windows of Mazarin-
adherents.
2To avoid confusion with Henri II, Duke de Rohan (21 August 1579 – 13 April 1638), Henri
Chabot, Duke de Rohan (1616 – 27 February 1655) will be referred to as ‘Rohan-Chabot’. Henri
Rohan-Chabot married Marguerite (1617 – 9 April 1684) duchess of Rohan-Glé, the only daughter
of Henri II duke de Rohan. Pocquet (1913), p. 427.
3Ibid., p. 428; Kettering (1986), p. 417.
4Le Page and Godin (2009), p. 64.
5Pocquet (1913), p. 429.
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Brittany.6 However, the parlement’s verdict was ignored, and the judges subse-
quently ruled that the états’ proceedings were altogether invalid and henceforth, the
assembly should quit their session.7 When they assembled in 1651, the états of
Brittany faced tax requests by the government in Paris to be used to fight the Franco-
Spanish War. At the time of the previous sessions, the Thirty Years’War was fought
and financed. As a result, the need to protect the Breton tenants from financial
extortion, or to safeguard noble interests from excessive French interference, could
theoretically have led to the use of arguments that deployed fatherland terminology
in order to protect Brittany. Strikingly enough, it was not applied and hence this case
differs enormously from those of Jülich and Hesse-Cassel.
The assembly’s session sought to deal with the tax requests from Paris and, of
crucial importance, in upholding good relations with those in government. Brittany,
as one of the few remaining, pays d’état, was to organise its internal financial affairs
as it held a particularist position within France. As such, its political situation is
comparable with other principalities in Europe. However, differences in demo-
graphics and geography need to be acknowledged. Brittany’s population was esti-
mated at 1,802,000 around 1660 and was almost entirely Catholic.8 Brittany
measured about 30,000 square kilometres, so there were approximately 60 inhabi-
tants per square kilometre. By way of comparison, this is ten times the size and
population of the previously discussed principalities of Jülich and Hesse-Cassel.
Furthermore, the composition of the nobility in Brittany was entirely different.
Breton noblemen were very heterogeneous in income, property size and possessions.
Considerable differences in income and possessions also led to significant differ-
ences between the richest and poorest nobles. During the 1651 assembly, even
though not everyone had turned up, over 230 noblemen and 14 church officials
were counted; 36 cities were represented as well.9
The above-described polemic between the three presidents of Brittany—that is,
among the most important noble families—was directly related to the Fronde.
Opposition to Cardinal Mazarin and his policies led to the parlement’s outright
opposition to his wishes. The parlement followed Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-
Chabot, and fought against the états, which was led by the Dukes de la Meilleraye
and de la Trémoille in 1651. Despite opposition against extra-provincial taxation and
Parisian influence, the Assiettes do not include the words fatherland, patria (patrie)
or patriot. It was not that the vocabulary was unknown; it was applied in religious
hagiographies, which means that the words and their meanings were known.10 It also
meant that they were used in a specific context, which was not political.
Being an ancient Catholic Church province, as well as an independent principal-
ity initially, Brittany had fixed and recognised geographical boundaries.
6Collins (2003), p. 210.
7Kettering (1986), pp. 422–423.
8Croix and Goubert (1980), p. 152; Dunkley (1972), p. 4.
9C2655, 1–11.
10Nice (2009), p. 116.
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Furthermore, in the years examined here, the tax burden was much lower than in
other years. When measuring the taxations in grams of silver, the tax burden in
Brittany was not high at all compared to the German principality of Jülich. The
political context in Brittany was very different from that in the German principalities.
In Brittany, maintaining the status quo and compliance with princely politics was the
best way to protect noble privileges. By doing so, the chances of the king deciding to
incorporate the province of Brittany into France shrunk. The advantage to the crown
of incorporating Brittany was clear: the crown could then exert power directly and
levy taxes without the cooperation of the états. This advantage was outweighed,
however, by the political stability and mutual benefits derived from maintaining the
status quo, as had been shown in the sixteenth century. In essence, direct taxation
would lead to tax evasion. Thus, both parties made sure that the system worked. For
the higher nobility, there was no need to resist or object to this state of affairs.
Moreover, the patronage of highly placed elites in the vicinity of the crown ensured
excellent communication and the possibility of conducting tax negotiations.
The province of Brittany was considered one of the wealthiest parts of France,
especially during the seventeenth century, although it did experience some decline.
Using William Beik’s analysis, Collins remarks that Brittany was run by a ‘class
system’ rather than by a ‘society of order’.11 Three groups of people formed the
elite in Brittany: (1) the nobility, (2) the legal and judicial elite; and, (3) mer-
chants.12 The French monarchy needed to cooperate with all three groups to be
able to achieve anything in Brittany. The elite did not correspond with the états, as
ranking did not run according to wealth. For example, many nobles were consid-
ered impoverished with incomes of 6000 livres a year, whereas the rich had
incomes exceeding 30,000 livres annually.13 Due to these differences in wealth
and interest contingent upon possessions, the états formed a heterogeneous whole.
Social climbers also occasionally emerged from the second and third group. They
could be far wealthier than the poorest noblemen and act as moneylenders to or buy
offices from the crown.
Brittany was only 700 km away from Jülich (Düsseldorf), and a mere 880 from
Hesse-Cassel (Kassel). Interestingly enough, the nobility in each of these areas
approached their discomfort with princely politics differently. I have shown how
the nobility of Jülich struggled to come terms with the problems at hand and voicing
their concern, learning along the way. The nobility in Hesse-Cassel left us with a
lawsuit, which was neatly penned down by their lawyer(s) who were paid to
forumalate a sophisticated line of argumentation. The relationship between the
heterogeneous Breton nobility and their French King’s government is the crucial
factor in this chapter. The complicated relationship between Brittany and France is
explained first, in order to understand how this particularist province stood out, and
how Cardinal de Richelieu wanted to cherish this position. I follow this discussion
11Collins (2003), pp. 2–4.
12Ibid., p. 3.
13Ibid., pp. 67–68.
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with a focus on the moment that there were noticeable tensions in Brittany: the years
1649–1651 and an increase in taxations. The Assiettes—proceedings of the états—
provide us with information of what went on during the assemblies and show why
the nobility was lenient with princely policy. They were to bend, not to break (Map
6.1).
6.1 Brittany’s Early History: Successions
and a Forced Union
The Breton War of Succession was fought between 1341 and 1365, leading to the
creation of the états in its wake.14 This war can be considered a derivative of the
Hundred Years’ War. John de Montfort (1295–1345) claimed the duchy based on
Map 6.1 Brittany (seventeenth century). Map by: Willem and Jan Blaeu, “Britannia Ducatus.”
1635. Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center, https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/
commonwealth:cj82kr622 Accessed November 23, 2020. Map reproduction courtesy of the Nor-
man B. Leventhal Map & Education Center at the Boston Public Library
14Le Page and Godin (2009), p. 22.
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the fact that he was the half-brother of the previous duke, Jean III. The English crown
supported Montfort in his attempts to gain Brittany. His opponent in this conflict was
his cousin Joanna of Penthiève (1324–1384), wife of Charles of Blois (1319–1364).
As Charles of Blois was the French king’s nephew, Joanna could rely on the crown’s
support.15 Duke Jean III, who had no male heir, had initially wanted to leave the
Duchy of Brittany to the French crown, but the Breton nobility objected. When the
duke died in 1341, the matter of succession was still undecided, and the both John of
Montfort and Joanna of Penthiève attempted to seize control.16 The decisive battle of
Auray (1364) concluded the war: here, the pro-Penthiève armies of Blois and
Bertrand du Guesclin were defeated. Charles of Blois died.17 The Treaty of
Guérande was signed a year later, and the widowed Joanna abdicated in favour of
John de Montfort’s son, John V (1339–1399).18 The war of succession meant that
John V needed tax money to secure his claim, and therefore the étatswere assembled
in 1352 for the first time.19 The états included the clergy, nobility and the third
estate.20 Every nobleman aged over 25 represented The nobility by and, most
importantly, by the nine barons of Brittany. The towns and cities represented the
third estate. The number of their representatives gradually increased (to 21 in 1577
and 44 in 1614) due to demographic and economic developments.21
The House of Montfort ruled for over a hundred years until Francis II of Brittany
fell off his horse and died shortly after signing the Treaty of Le Verger (1488)—
which stated that the King of France needed to consent to a marriage of a Breton
Princess.22 Francis II left behind two female heirs: Anne (1477–1514) and her sister
Isabeau (1478–1490). The nobility was left to protect the duchy on behalf of the
eleven-year-old heiress. They did so by concluding a treaty with King Henry VII of
England (1457–1509) in 1489 in order to prevent French annexation. Unfortunately,
Henry VII proved unreliable as he signed the Treaty of Étaples (1492) with France
2 years later, allying England with France. Soon afterwards King Charles VIII of
France (1470–1498) invaded Brittany, forcing Duchess Anne to marry him.23 In
order to secure the independence of Brittany, Anne had married Emperor Maximil-
ian I (1459–1519) by proxy but—logically—the marriage was never consummated.
She had done so without the consent of the French king, who therefore claimed she
had violated the treaty between France and Brittany. Since the couple were engaged
in 1486, it was argued that this marriage fell outside the Verger treaty.24 King
15Cornette (2005), pp. 267–286.
16Le Page and Nassiet (2007), p. 16.
17Ibid., p. 16.
18Markale (2004), pp. 25–29.
19Le Page and Godin (2009), p. 93.
20Ibid., pp. 21–65.
21Ibid., p. 25.
22Le Page and Nassiet (2007), p. 92.
23Major (1980), p. 94.
24Le Page and Nassiet (2007), p. 167.
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Charles VIII felt threatened by his total encirclement by the Habsburg dynasty and
invaded Brittany. As Emperor Maximilian I failed to help Duchess Anne, the French
King forced the young duchess to marry him in 1492; the marriage by proxy was
annulled. Anne of Brittany, as Queen of France, actively tried to protect the rights
and privileges of ‘her’ Brittany, despite her husband’s exertion of power by jure
uxoris (title by right belonging to his wife).25
When Charles VIII died only six years later, the widowed Queen Anne remarried
the new king, Louis XII, to continue the personal union between France and
Brittany.26 Louis XII was already married at the time and had to see his previous
marriage annulled. Louis XII married Anne of Brittany in 1499, the contract
including an explicit clause that specified that the two dynasties would remain
separate, and the institutions and legislation of Brittany would be upheld.27 The
marriage produced no male heirs and consequently, King Louis XII married off his
eldest daughter and heiress of Brittany, Claude (1499–1524),28 to his cousin Francis
I (1494–1547), who was the next in line to rule France under the Salic Law.29 The
marriage was much against his wife’s wishes, as Anne had wanted her eldest
daughter to marry King Charles V of Spain, in the hope of cementing a Spanish-
French alliance. The queen had wanted her youngest daughter Renee (1510–1575) to
inherit Brittany.30 King Louis XII’s desired that the heir from the marriage of Francis
I and Claude of Brittany, Henry II (1519–1559), would unify Brittany and France,
ending Breton independence.
King Francis I, however, did not want to wait for one of his heirs to unite Brittany
and France; he wanted to rule Brittany himself. In 1532 he invited the états of
Brittany signed a union in Nantes.31 The Edict of Plessis-Macé overruled the clause
in his marriage contract on the Breton independence.32 Brittany did hold a unique
position within France as a pays d’états, which meant that the levying of taxations
went via the états and that the ancient privileges of the land were upheld.33 Although
Brittany was no longer sovereign but part of the Kingdom of France, it was still a
particularist region as one of the pays d’états.34 The edict of Plessis-Macé did
guarantee Breton privileges and liberties.35 The King of France and by the états of
25Ibid., pp. 112–113, 130–133.
26Ibid., pp. 120–124; Major (1980), pp. 94–95.
27Croix (1993), pp. 13–15.
28Le Page and Nassiet (2007), p. 141.
29Ibid., pp. 147–151.
30Ibid., pp. 142–144.
31Cornette (2005), pp. 418–427; Le Page and Nassiet (2007), pp. 157–164; Nice (2009), p. 11.
32Nice (2009), pp. 11, 99; Berbouche (1992), pp. 521–522; Croix (1993), p. 13.
33Le Page and Godin (2009), p. 33.
34Pays d’état were: Dauphiné, Guyenne, Languedoc, Burgundy Provence and Brittany. After 1650
only the latter three held this position. The others became pays d’elections. Nice (2009), pp. 14–15;
Major (1980), p. 566.
35Dunkley (1972), pp. 26, 40; Major (1980), p. 94.
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Brittany benefited both from the edict. The crown, on the one hand, recognised the
états’ privilege in consenting to taxation and therefore abstained from the creation of
offices and stationing military forces. The états, on the other hand, were reticent
because they wanted to prevent displeasing the French King and endangering their
liberties and privileges.36 The king later imposed taxes without first seeking consent,
which led to protests and tax evasion, and resulted in much lower tax yields than the
crown had initially envisioned.37 A permanent parlement was created in Nantes in
1554 but this was moved to Rennes in 1561.
The Chambre des Comptes (Eng: Court of Account or Audit) was allocated to the
city of Nantes.38 The Breton position that it should run its own affairs also implied
that taxes such as the taille, aides and the gabelle, as well as indirect taxes, were not
collected in Brittany.39 During the seventeenth century, the French government
looked for new ways of obtaining money other than borrowing from Italian and
German bankers.40 Collins describes an essential change made by Queen-mother
Anne of Austria: she made the pays d’états borrow the money, and then pass it on to
the crown.41 As the province could borrow money at a much lower interest rate, they
were forced to contract loans in order to provide Paris with the sums it demanded.
The états also became responsible for paying the interest to the moneylender, which
raised the tax burden.42 The king requested a Don Gratuit, or ‘free gift’ from 1614
onwards instead, and the états always granted it—though the sum could vary.43 Like
Béarn and Navarre, Brittany remained a principauté or pays d’états.44 As such, it
provided a steady source of income for the French crown.45 Assenting to the Don
Gratuit instead of collecting a regular tax protected the province’s liberties, and the
only visible change in the governmental structure of Brittany was the replacement of
the Duke of Brittany by a governor from France.46 This regular, formalised means of
requesting taxes by France totally differs from the ad hoc way of convening in the
Holy Roman Empire.
Arguably the power of the crown to review, change, or invalidate the états’
actions did threaten the independence of Brittany.47 The états could only assemble
36Dunkley (1972), pp. 26, 40; Major (1980), p. 94; Nice (2009), p. 15.
37Nice (2009), pp. 99–101.
38Collins (1997), p. 621; Le Page and Godin (2009), pp. 21–65; Croix (1993), pp. 13–14; Nice
(2009), pp. 15–16; Dunkley (1972), pp. 19–20; Berbouche (1992), p. 523.
39Collins (1997), p. 152; Bonney (1992), pp. 35, 41.
40Collins (2001), p. 60.
41Ibid., pp. 62–63, 151–152.
42Collins (2003), p. 205.
43Dunkley (1972), p. 45.
44Le Page and Nassiet (2007), pp. 15–16; Bonney (1989).
45Croix (1993), p. 15.
46Dunkley (1972), pp. 26, 46, 233–234.
47Ibid., p. 28.
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when the king summoned them, usually in Nantes, Rennes or Vannes.48 The
participants of an assembly without royal permission would have been prosecuted
as criminals.49 However, the états and the royal government seem to have worked
well together, and it was the états who managed provincial affairs.50 Brittany’s
unique position was not only established by its particularist position, but also by its
unique position as pays d’obédience or church province to the papal power.51 It fell
outside the 1516 Concordat of Bologne, which meant that the Pope and not the
French crown had the right to appoint bishops. The king chose to ignore this rule and
used his right of régale to fill in vacant dioceses.52 The king misused his royal right
to appoint non-Bretons to these positions, which led to protests.53 The religious
position was underlined through hagiographies to defend the Breton churches and
officials.54 In 1636 the Dominican monk Albert Le Grand was commissioned to
write a book titled Les vies des Saints which much impressed the états.55 According
to Jason Nice, the text was essential, as ‘[. . .] the Estates of Brittany ensured the
endurance of the sense of Breton identity produced by Albert Le Grand.’56
48Ibid., pp. 28, 92.
49Archives départementales d’Ille-et-Vilaine (Rennes), Fonds général des états de Bretagne
(C) C2777, 20 October 1651/ C2655, 53: ‘Veu par Le Roy en son Conseil[,] la Requête presentée
à sa majesté par les Gens des trois Etats du pays et Duché de Bretagne contenant que depuis
l’union de la dite province à la couronne, ils se sont Toujours maintenus dans une parfaite
obeissance et dans les privileges d’assembler leurs Etats par la seule permission de sa majesté
Sans qu’aucune autre puissance subordinée les puisse convoquer, empecher, ni separer et
néanmoins En l’année 1649 Sa Majesté ayant Envoyé ses commissions et lettres particulieres
aux villes et communautés de la province pour assembler les d[ittes] Etats generaux du Royaume,
Le parlement de Bretagne auroit pris sujet de s’assembler sur la lecture de quelqu’une des d[ites]
lettres de cachet adressées à des communautés et par une Entreprise auroit donné deux arrêts les
11 et 24 Mars au dit an 1649 portant defenses à toutes personnes de quelque ordre et qualité qu’ils
soient de se trouver aux dits Etats, ni s’assembler sous ce pretexte à peine d’Etre procedé contre
eux comme criminel par toutes voyes Extraordinaires dont seroit informé, ce qui est entreprendre
sur l’autorité de sa majesté et sur la liberté et privilèges de la d[itte] province que sa majesté est
très humblement suppliée de maintenir et à tant requeroient qu’il luy plaise casser et revoquer les
dits arrêts des d[its] Jours 11 et 24 mars 1649 et faire défenses à la d[ite] cour de parlement
d’entreprendre d’ordonner à l’avenir aucune chose sur l’assemblée le lieu ou l’ordre de la
convocation des Etats de la d[itte] province quand il aura plû à sa majesté [de] les permettre à
peine de desobeissance, Vû aussi les dits arrêts et tout consideré, sa majesté etant en son conseil la
Reine Regente sa mere presente, a cassé et annullé les arrêts donnés au parlement de Rennes des
11 et 24 Mars 1649 comme donnés par attentat, a fait defenses au dit parlement d’Entreprendre
d’ordonner à l’avenir aucune chose sur L’assemblée le lieu et l’ordre de la convocation des Etats
de la d[itte] province, fait au conseil d’Etat du Roy sa majesté y étant, La Reine Regente Sa mere
presente Tenu à paris[,] Le 13e Jour de Juillet 1651. Signé de Lomenie.’
50Dunkley (1972), p. 29; Collins (2003), pp. 23–25.




55Le Grand (1637) as referred to in; Nice (2009), p. 109.
56Nice (2009), p. 116.
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1582 constituted a significant year in Brittany’s history, Philippe Emmanuel de
Lorraine (1558–1602), the duke of Mercœur, cousin to the Duke of Guise, became
governor in that year.57 The reason for his appointment was that the French King,
Henry III (1551–1589), had married Mercœur’s half-sister Louise de Lorraine-
Vaudémont (1553–1601). Despite this close connection to the French crown,
Mercœur sought to use his position as leverage to liberate Brittany from French
rule. He was one of the claimants to rule Brittany as an independent duchy again. He
based his claim on his marriage to an heiress of Brittany, Marie de Luxemburg,
Duchess of Penthiève (1562–1623) who was a distant relative to Johanna de
Penthiève.58 Unsurprisingly, the new governor was firmly in favour of upholding
the unique and independent position of Brittany in France, or rather, independently
of France. The result was that increasing tax requests from the French king led to a
war in Brittany.59
The Duke of Mercœur sided with the Spanish. King Henry IV (1553–1610) sent
an army to fight to the Duke of Mercœur but met with defeat at the Battle of Craon
(1592).60 It took until 1598 to defeat the governor’s troops at the city of Angers. To
ensure control over Brittany, King Henry IV married his illegitimate son César,
Duke de Vendôme, to Françoise de Lorraine, Duchesse de Mercœur and Duchesse
de Penthiève (1592–1669) in 1608.61 Shortly after his father’s murder (1610), the
Duke de Vendôme increased his interest in Brittan, presiding over the états for the
first time that same year, even though he had been governor since 1598.62 The duke
started to receive regular payments from the assembly three years later. Duke de
Vendôme was also able to rule more independently after the death of his father, as
long as the young King Louis XIII received his tax money. Duke de Vendôme used
the money that he received from the états to finance a hundred-man strong personal
guard–a guard that he used to rebel against the king, alongside the Prince of Condé
and other nobles.63 In order to restore peace after this rebellion, King Louis XIII and
his mother visited some of the western provinces. In August 1614, just two months
before the meeting of the Estates-General in Paris, the king and his mother stayed in
Nantes.64
In the following year, 1615, the états were not assembled, allegedly because the
Prince of Condé had rebelled again, and this would prejudice the meeting. The
following year, taxes were requisitioned without the consent of the états, triggering
protests and a good deal of anger.65 In 1617, the Duke de Vendôme deceived the
57Bonney (1991), p. 53.




62Cornette (2005), p. 436.
63Ibid., p. 528; Rothrock (1960), p. 304; Collins (2003), p. 142.
64Major (1980), p. 437.
65Ibid., p. 438.
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états, claiming that the king needed only the usual amount of taxation; yet it turned
out that the king had requested an additional 600,000 livres.66 Two years later, the
governor informed the assembly that he wished to create another personal guard, and
so needed money. The états granted the request, but under the condition that paying
the captain of the guard would be their responsibility. They hoped to ensure that the
said captain would be loyal to the états and not merely to the governor.67 In 1626,
Governor Duke de Vendôme was convicted of partaking in the Calais conspiracy: an
unsuccessful plot to assassinate Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal-Duke de Riche-
lieu.68 The César, Duke de Vendôme had to resign from the office of governor of
Brittany.69 Pons de Lauzières-Thémines-Cardaillac, Marquis of Thémines
(1553–1627) and Marshall of France since 1616 succeeded him, a client of Cardinal
de Richelieu, who died within a year of accepting the office, leaving the office vacant
until 1631 (Fig. 6.2).70
6.2 Cardinal de Richelieu’s Influence and Cardinal
Mazarin’s Guidance
From October 1626 onwards, Richelieu, Cardinal de occupied the newly created
office of Grand Master and Supreme Head of the Navy and Commerce.71 He united
various admiralty functions to strengthen and modify the navy and merchant fleet.72
From a military perspective, alterations were necessary to build up a fleet and avoid
another ‘La Rochelle’.73 The nobles profited from Cardinal de Richelieu’s plans
because the cardinal considered free trade to be of vital importance to the Breton
economy and—from an economic perspective—it was useful to keep on the right
side of the Bretons.
Nevertheless, the états did not agree to his plans to establish a maritime monop-
oly. They objected to the creation of a special court for maritime affairs as they
feared losing influence.74 Cardinal de Richelieu quietly used the Breton institu-
tions—such as the états—to implement his plans for the naval reforms, but he did
not change the institutions themselves.75 The parlement, as well as the third estate,
were critical of this process, as they were made up mainly of jurists from towns who
66Ibid., p. 439.
67Ibid., p. 440.
68Nice (2009), p. 107; Collins (2003), pp. 187–188; Major (1980), p. 562.
69Bonney (1988), p. 159.
70Nice (2009), p. 107; Collins (2003), pp. 189–190; Major (1980), p. 564.
71Pocquet (1913), pp. 394, 399–400; Dunkley (1981), pp. 1–2; Dunkley (1972), p. 110.
72Dunkley (1981), pp. 1–2.
73Pocquet (1913), pp. 392–393; Collins (2003), p. 187.
74Pocquet (1913), p. 396.
75Collins (2003), p. 187.
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feared the loss of influence.76 Luckily for Cardinal de Richelieu, the clergy and
nobility were favourable to his plans. Firstly, the nobility—with little risk of losing
status or influence—wished to see free commerce.77 Secondly, the presence of seven
Royal Attendants at the états weighed in Cardinal de Richelieu’s favour. The king
paid these men, and consequently, they argued in favour of the royal policy. By
placing loyal clients, Cardinal de Richelieu attempted to change the policy in his
favour.
Cardinal de Richelieu obtained the position of governor over Brittany in 1631.78
It was a much-coveted position, because the governor was the highest authority in
the province. The prince of Condé requested the king to appoint Cardinal de
Richelieu as the next governor, after the César, Duke de Vendôme was placed
under house arrest for conspiracy in 1626, and his successor Marshal de Thémines
died.79 The Duke de Retz, on the other hand, wanted Queen-mother Marie de’
Medici to become a governess—due to her substantial influence in religious affairs,
and the aptitude she showed in other offices. In the end, an amendment to the Retz’s
proposal made it possible for Cardinal de Richelieu to hold the position between
1626 and 1640.80 It has been suggested that the cardinal wanted to become governor
of Brittany in order to force the province towards direct taxation and a form of
arbitrary rule. However, the existing system of Don Gratuit functioned well and
provided for Cardinal de Richelieu’s financial needs.81 In pursuit of his plans for the
navy, he gradually shifted his focus toward the possibility of warfare with the
Habsburg dynasty in both the Holy Roman Empire and Spain.82 Unless the états
were convinced that the privileges and liberties of Brittany would be respected, they
would oppose such policies.83
Cardinal de Richelieu used relatives to act on his behalf and fulfil his duties
during periods of absence. Whenever vacancies arose, Cardinal de Richelieu placed
trustworthy friends or relatives in these positions, strengthening his power and
ability to control the affairs more fully.84 As a result, he had many clients in place
to champion the crown’s interests. Although the parlement did not appreciate such
overt nepotism, it did leave Brittany’s privileges and its political structure intact and
ensured the états functioning.85 The états frequently debated taxes and articulated
grievances, but there were no serious threats to the province. Strikingly, despite the
growing influence of Cardinal de Richelieu and his allies, neither the structure of
76Dunkley (1972), pp. 128, 258; Dunkley (1981), p. 3.
77Dunkley (1972), p. 66.
78Ibid., p. II.
79Pocquet (1913), pp. 401–402; Collins (2003), pp. 187–196; Nice (2009), p. 107.
80Pocquet (1913), pp. 402–403; Dunkley (1972), pp. 132–134; Major (1980), p. 566.
81Dunkley (1972), p. 99.
82Ibid., p. 1.
83Pocquet (1913), p. 138.
84Ibid., p. 138; Le Page and Godin (2009), p. 51.
85Berbouche (1992), p. 525.
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Breton politics nor its privileges were harmed, and the elites in Brittany thrived. The
relationship was not entirely one-sided, and the elites could likewise use nepotism to
gain the king’s favour and obtain profitable offices.86 The elites could keep the king
content, remain in power and protect their people from paying too many taxes—due
to their direct communications with Paris—while obtaining profitable offices.
Whereas the états mostly went along with this state of affairs and remained discreet
in their protests, the opposition from the parlement to Cardinal de Richelieu’s naval
plans was more visible and hostile.87
The états were the highest authority in the province.88 The influential Breton elite
was present at each of the assemblies—they received personal invitations to join.
The lower elites could attend if they so desired.89 Unlike the higher elites, however,
their attendance was not obligatory. Those who did, were often there accompanying
their patron; otherwise, they often could not afford to participate.90 The patron-client
networks of Brittany’s elite were heavily dependent upon the king’s favour, as it was
ultimately the king who granted offices and possessions.91 Even though bishops and
abbots gained their appointment only through royal favour, this did not stop them
from blocking royal policies, even after Cardinal de Richelieu established his
governorship.92 Cardinal de Richelieu may have had an influential position in
Brittany, however his shipping and trade reforms did not go as smoothly as he had
hoped.93 Both the opposition of the Breton parlement and the displeasure of the
seaside cities contributed to the failure.94 Cardinal de Richelieu’s inability to be
personally present in Brittany undoubtedly influenced the situation, but France’s
active engagement in wars against the Habsburg dynasties also played a role.
During most of the period in question, Charles Marquise de la Porte, Duke de la
Meilleraye acted on behalf of his uncle, Cardinal de Richelieu. He received regular
instructions about his uncle’s wishes, especially when it came to requesting the Don
Gratuit from the états.95 According to Jason Nice, frustrations with the états’
unwillingness to meet the king’s demands led De la Meilleraye to remark in 1636
that Brittany lacked affection for their (French) king.96 Passion was no issue for
Cardinal de Richelieu when pursuing his policy in Brittany.97 Cardinal de Richelieu
rushed France into the Thirty Years’War, leaving his plans for Brittany in the hands
86Dunkley (1972), p. 65.
87Berbouche (1992), pp. 523–524.
88Dunkley (1972), p. 53.
89Ibid., pp. 1, 58, 61.





95Pocquet (1913), pp. 408–418; Collins (2003), p. 193.
96Nice (2009), p. 107.
97Ibid., p. 393.
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of his trusted clients. He joined the Swedes against Emperor Ferdinand II, hoping to
weaken the Austrian-Habsburg dynasty. This long-term plan also influenced the
decision to go to war with the Spanish Habsburg dynasty.98
Following the death of Cardinal de Richelieu, Queen-mother Anne of Austria
became governor of Brittany.99 The Duke de la Meilleraye had recommended her,
and he still governed the province in her absence. In practice, little changed as Duke
de la Meilleraye had previously represented Cardinal de Richelieu and simply
remained active in office. The duke supported Cardinal Mazarin who now ruled
France together with the Queen-mother, since King Louis XIV was still a minor.100
As Queen-mother and regent, Anne had promised King Louis XIII to “‘never
abandon’ Cardinal Mazarin.”101 Thus, in the case of Brittany, the patronage of
Queen Anne became one with the patronage of the first minister. The queen was
determined to guarantee her son’s succession by proceeding with her late husband’s
foreign policy.102 To Cardinal Mazarin, it was beneficial to be the queen’s favourite,
as this effectively prevented possible rivals from attacking his position.103
Anne’s decision to pursue the war policy of Cardinal de Richelieu, and her late
husband, King Louis XIII, was heavily criticised by the high nobility.104 The Cabale
des Importants (1643-4), or ‘strife of the important’, was meant to overthrow
Cardinal Mazarin’s power in Brittany and preferably in the whole of France.105
One of the participants in this affair was François de Bourbon-Vendôme, son of the
former governor Duke César de Vendôme. He attempted to murder Cardinal Maza-
rin but failed. Cardinal Mazarin responded by playing a balancing game: on the one
hand, he controlled the noble uprising to the best of his ability; on the other hand, he
sought and achieved military successes against the Habsburg armies. Victories such
as the Battle of Rocroi (18-19 May 1643), only days after King Louis XIII’s death,
did much to reinforce his position.106
According to Richard Bonney, to force the Habsburgs into a peace settlement,
France organised military interventions.107 Unfortunately, France did not reach an
agreement. Although the Battle of Lens (1648) concluded the Thirty Years’ War
with the Austrian Habsburgs, the Franco-Spanish war with the Spanish Habsburg
dynasty was not part of the treaties. Malcontent with Cardinal Mazarin’s inability to
end the Franco-Spanish War was expressed in Paris during the Fronde, but other
98Ibid., p. 393..
99Ibid., p. 420.
100In 1661, Armand de la Meilleraye (son of the aforementioned duke) married Hortense Mancini,
one of Mazarin’s nieces. Pocquet (1913), p. 427; Berbouche (1992), p. 535.




105Pocquet (1913), p. 420.
106Bonney (1978), p. 51.
107Ibid., p. 51.
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parts of France—such as Brittany—remained relatively quiet. Cardinal Mazarin’s
patronage and the favourable tax climate had much to do with the complaisance of
Brittany.108 Illustratively, Cardinal Mazarin was displeased with the 1647-assembly
of the états over which Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot presided. Henri
Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot was not a client of the first minister and was disliked
as a result.109 In contrast, Cardinal Mazarin’s approval of the meetings in 1645 and
1649 when the Henri Charles, Duke de la Trémoille presided over them, are notable
since he vigorously defended the plans of the queen-mother and her favourite.
6.3 The États and the Parlement of Brittany
During the seventeenth century, the frequency of assemblies held in Brittany varied.
Collins demonstrates a frequency of every year in the late 1620s and every other year
from 1630 onwards.110 According to his study, it was upon the états’ request that the
assembly took place in 1649 and 1651, and not in the intervening year or the
following year 1652.111 Meetings earlier in the century usually lasted less than
19 days. Cardinal de Richelieu’s influence on the province, however, resulted in
lengthier assemblies that lasted for up to a month. The trend towards longer sessions
continued throughout the 1640s and 1650s when financial and social troubles took
root, at which point the assemblies could last for well over two months.112
The assemblies tended to keep to a relatively standardised schedule. The royal
representatives were invited—or, strictly speaking, ordered to attend. On the first day
of each assembly, they read the Kings’ official letter and delivered speeches. On the
second day, the attendants received information on how much money was requested
for the Don Gratuit.113 The royal commissioners and the president of the étatswould
then draw up the schedule for each day. Topics had to be brought forward 24 h in
advance; decisions were only valid with the signature of the president.114 Voting
could be public or secret—depending on the wishes of attendees.115 Tensions
generated by the support of and opposition to Cardinal Mazarin were noticeable in
the 1647-parlement—precisely when the Parisian judges met in December.116
Despite this opposition, the Armand-Charles de La Porte, Duke de la Meilleraye
108Kettering (1986).
109Pocquet (1913), p. 428.
110Collins (2003), pp. 208–209.
111Ibid., p. 207.
112Ibid., p. 198; Dunkley (1972), pp. 92–93.
113Dunkley (1972), pp. 73, 96, 260.
114Ibid., p. 73; Berbouche (1992), p. 523.
115Dunkley (1972), p. 97.
116Berbouche (1992), p. 530.
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managed to pacify the parlement. Also, it is essential to keep in mind the events that
took place in Paris, even though violence was not part of the Fronde in Brittany.117
6.3.1 États Assembly and Parlement of 1649
On 29 April 1649, the états of Brittany received a letter written on behalf of Louis by
the grace of God, king of France and Navarra.118 The text explained the current
affairs in which France was actively involved and outlined the matters of importance
which had occurred over the past few years: the end of the Thirty Years’War and the
war between Spain and the Dutch Republic. The letter stated that the peace treaty
was favourable for the common good,119 but adds that the treaty did not conclude the
Franco-Spanish War that sparked in 1635. A conflict of interest caused the failure to
obtain peace with the Spanish Habsburgs: concluding peace would give a wrong
impression of the French force.120 The letter elaborated on the nature of the conflict.
Also noteworthy was the mention of ‘the civil war’ in Paris and in several provinces
that could lead to the dynasty’s destruction.121 The letter voiced a complaint: the
government felt it had earned the respect, obedience, loyalty, and affection of its
subjects, but was instead met with unrest and civil war. The government sought the
means to resolve the conflict. There was a reason why the états received such a letter.
Though formal, the tone of the letter seems to be somewhat flattering towards the
Bretons while addressing their generosity. The king expected ardent affection of his
Breton subjects and a contribution to the welfare of the land in its present need.122
The Crown voiced their gratitude for the état’s role in collecting contributions and
taxations. The assemblée had to deal with reforming and restoring justice, police,
and discipline in the province of Brittany.123 Furthermore, the fouages ordinaires
117Ibid., pp. 530–531.
118Archives départementales d’Ille-et-Vilaine, C2776 and C2654, 492: ‘Louis par la grâce de Dieu,
Roy de France et de Navare [sic].’
119This refers to the the Peace of Osnabruck (Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis) on
24 October 1648.
120C2776, 29 April 1649 / C2654, 493: ‘Il est survenu depuis Tant d’obstacles à nos bons dessins
qu’il faut encore continuer nos soins et notre travail pour reduire par la force nos ennemis à la
raison, il est vrai que les hollandois nos alliés qui avoient avec nous soutenu pendant treize ans les
plus grands efforts de la guerre ont quitté la partie, et nous ont abandonné en faisant leur paix
particuliere, mais nous sommes Restés assés puissans pour maintenir nos avantages, aussi Est-il
certain que quand nous avons consenti à la paix de l’Empire ç[’]a été en faveur du bien public et
pour faire connoitre notre bonne disposition à celle d’Espagne.’
121C2776, 29 April 1649 / C2654, 493, 494.
122C2776, 29 April 1649 / C2654, 495.
123C2776, 29 April 1649 / C2654, 495–496.
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(hearth tax—a property tax) had been set at seven livres to pay the gendarmerie.124
The government, however, needed more money and supplies on top of the fouages.
Another letter was written on the same date, on behalf of the king, and addressed
to Duke de la Meilleraye. He was asked to preside over and to facilitate the meeting
organised in the city of Vannes when the états assembled in June.125 Various
noblemen received letters dated 29 April 1649 as well, including Baron de Ponchau
Connilleau. He was informed about the role that the Marquise de la Porte, Duke de la
Meilleraye, was to play in the upcoming meeting and was asked to assist him.126
Subsequently, Count de Vertue, governor of the city of Rennes, was informed of the
meeting on 17 June in Vannes and the presence of Duke de la Meilleraye.127 The
count was likewise expected to be present in Vannes. The same applied to the regular
advisor of the États’ financial counsellor’s seigneur Gobelin, seigneur Sanguin, and
seigneur la Bedoyere, and the General Prosecutor, all of whom received invitations
to attend the Assembly and see to an orderly meeting.128
Commencing on 16 June 1649, the états assembled in the city of Vannes.129 The
opening line of the minutes stated that the king assembled them to deliberate on
finances.130 Formalities dominated this first day of the assembly; the names of those
present were read out, and privileges were enumerated and recognised by the king
through a letter drawn up in 1647. The king highly valued the loyalty of the three
états, according to the letter written on 15 November 1647.131 It also referred to
several essential privileges, rights, immunities and liberties, especially granted to
124C2776, 29 April 1649 / C2654, 496.
125C2776, 29 April 1649 / C2654, 498–499.
126C2776, 29 April 1649 / C2654, 499–500.
127C2776, 29 April 1649/ C2654, 501.
128C2776, 29 April 1649/ C2654, 501, 503, 504, 505.
129C2776, 16 June 1649/ C2654, 507.
130C2776, 16 June 1649/ C2654, 508: ‘Les gens des Trois Etats du Pays et Duché de Bretagne
assemblés par autorité du Roy en la ville de Vannes’ ; and C2776, 16 June 1649/ C2654, 511.
131C2776, 5 November 1647 / C2654, 514: ‘Louis par la grace de Dieu, Roy de France et de
Navare [sic] [,] à tous presents et a venir, Salut, nous avons été dûement informés de quelle
affection nos très chers et bien amés sujets les Gens des Trois Etats de notre Pays et Duché de
Bretagne se sont portés au service des Roys nos prédecesseurs combien fidelement ils se sont
maintenus et conservés sous les obeissances depuis que cette Province a été alliée et beaucoup plus
depuis L’union d’icelle à cette couronne.’ [The text continues in the next footnote.]
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them by King Louis the Just.132 It seemed there was a causality: due to the nobility’s
loyalty, the king respected the nobility’s rights and privileges.133
Four issues were dealt with in the course of the assembly. Firstly, as Collins notes,
the états of Brittany granted the king a sum of 1,700,000 livres in 1649; these ‘dix
sept cent mille’ are known as the Don Gratuit.134 According to Collins, the fact that
it was 900,000 livres less than the états paid in 1647 prevented the bankruptcy of
Brittany.135 In order to arrive at this amount, attendees of the meeting pledged
contributions. These could vary from a few hundred, to thousands of livres,
depending on their assets.136 The états pronounced their motivation for agreeing to
the request stating that the money usage was for necessities.137 These voluntary
contributions were given under the assumption that the king would respect the états’
privileges about consultation and consent in matters of taxation. Brittany pushed to
be allowed to collect the contribution on its own, without interference.138 One
concrete measure to be taken in the following years that would raise funds was the
tax on beer, cider, and fruit brandy.139 A day after proposing these measures, it
became evident that not everyone agreed with them - especially regarding the third
estate. The third estate was much averse towards annual allowances for the Gran-
dées.140 Usually, these fees would help to gain support from highly placed nobles
who were often in the vicinity of the crown, but they also meant a financial burden.
Secondly, another war-related issue was brought up during the assembly. St.-
Malo hosted Spanish prisoners, and the états addressed the cost of their nourishment
and general imprisonment.141 There were other problems as well, and officers who
132C2776, 5 November 1647 / C2654, 514: ‘Et comme pour ses considerations ils sont grandement
recommandables nos dits predecesseurs les ont cheri et aimé et pris soin de les Traiter
favorablement sur tous leurs autres sujets, les ayant gratifiés de plusieurs notables et importans
privilèges, droits, immunités, libertés et franchises qui de regne en Regne successivement leur ont
été continués spécialement par le defunt Roy Louis le Juste notre très honoré Seigneur et père que
Dieu absolve qui de son règne a reçû des preuves et temoinages particuliers de l’inviolable devo
[tio]n des d[its] gens des Etats à l’obéissance qu’ils doivent à cette couronne Lesquels se seroient
volontairement portés à acheter le Domaine alienné de la dite province qu’ils ont Entrepris à leurs
propres coûts et depens ce qui nous convie à embrasser toutes les occasions de leur procurer Toute
sorte de Bien et de contentement, et leur faire connoître le desir et le soin que nous voulons prendre
de leur repos et conservation, de quoy les ayant fait assurer par les commissaires qui se sont
trouvés de notres part en leur derniere assemblée [. . .].’
133C2776, 5 November 1647/ C2654, 515.
134Collins (2003), p. 208; Pocquet (1913), p. 423.; C2776, 14 July 1649 / C2654, 570: 1,700,000
livres.
135Collins (2003), p. 207.
136C2776, 24 July 1649 / C2654, 632–634.
137C2776, 16 July 1649 / C2654, 576.
138C2776, 8 July 1649 / C2654, 561–562
139C2776, 21 July 1649 / C2654, 589–608.
140C2776, 22 July 1649 / C2654, 609–611; Collins (2003), p. 207.
141C2776, 22 June 1649/ C2654, 524–528; C2776, 23 June 1649/ C2654, 528–529; C2776, 19 July
1649/ C2654, pp.582–587; C2776, 25 July 1649 / C2654, 643–674.
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did their duty faced obstructions. The example given was the nuisance faced by those
collecting the gabelles. The états decided upon a cinquante livres fine, or 50 livres,
for anyone who harassed the tax collectors.142 Thirdly, grievances concerning the
malpractice of a particular individual named Meaut Marchaud were addressed. He
had allegedly used violence and overstepped the boundaries of his office, violating
the privileges of the pays.143 The états suggested that the parlement should address
the matter, since it was a legal concern. Lastly, some complaints worried that the
freedom of trade was in jeopardy.144 As freedom of trade was a vital part of
Brittany’s economy, the assembly started an investigation and requested a written
rapport.
During the Vannes-meeting, an old letter from the king, dated 18 May 1648, was
read. It stated the importance of following and obeying the king’s decisions.
Strikingly, the assembly increased its speed in decision-making after that—finalising
the meeting merely two days later.145 The assembly had taken 35 days to reach its
conclusion, with its final meeting taking place on 25 July.
6.3.2 États-Assembly and the ‘Rump’ Parlement of 1651
The états of Brittany received a letter written on behalf of the king on 23 August
1651. It referred to the upcoming assembly on 25 September in the city of Nantes.
The format was that of an ordinance, stating that the invitees must be present.146 The
following men received a personal invitation, as they were to play a role in the
organisation and communication of the assembly: Comte de Vertu, Marquis de
Coastin, Sieur de Harrouy, Sieur Sanguin, Sieur Huchet, and Sieur Morice.147 The
letter also stated that the commissioners had shown their affection to be in the king’s
service, especially by satisfying their ruler’s financial desires.148 Despite the king’s
strict orders, the assembly delayed, and the first reports were only written on the
28 September, while by the 30 September the assembly still awaited several
members.
A conflict arose during this meeting of the états, between Henri Chabot, Duke de
Rohan-Chabot, Armand-Charles de La Porte, Duke de la Meilleraye and Henri
Charles, Duke de la Trémoille. 149 In this conflict between the three presidents,
142C2776, 5 July 1649 / C2654, 552–555.
143C2776, 22 June 1649 / C2654, 524–528.
144C2776, 19 July 1649 / C2654, 582–587.
145C2776, 23 July 1649 / C2654, 611–616.
146van Peteghem (1996).
147C2776, 23 August 1651 / C2655, 13–24.
148C2776, 23 August 1651 / C2655, 24.
149Pocquet (1913), p. 424.
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patron-client relations played a significant role. 150 The governor was theoretically
supposed to preside over the assembly, but in reality, the lieutenant general usually
did the honours. The queen-mother—acting as governor—had delegated her official
tasks to the Marshal of France, the grandmaster of the artillery and lieutenant-general
of Brittany, Duke de la Meilleraye.151 The duke did not often preside over meetings
either, so the task rotated among the highest nobles of Brittany.
Cardinal Mazarin directed his client not to interfere with the House of Rohan-
Chabot.152 However, Duke de la Meilleraye’s friend Henri Charles, Duke de la
Trémoille contested Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot’s claim to preside over
the assembly.153 Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot had openly sided with the
Frondeurs and the Princes of Condé and Conti.154 Other noblemen were hesitant
about siding with Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot because they wanted to
retain Cardinal Mazarin’s favour.155 Attempts to promote César, Duke de Vendôme
as chairman of the 1651 assembly failed, and tensions rose.156 Not for the first time
did Armand-Charles de La Porte, Duke de la Meilleraye opt for an armed interven-
tion; soldiers actively intimidated those nobles who intended to attend the Assem-
bly.157 This intimidation was so effective that when the meeting finally started on
30 September, it was noted that some people refused to participate.158 The military
intervention led to the removal of Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot from the
city of Nantes.159 Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot left for Rennes where he
met with judges from the parlement.160 According to Pocquet, the judges voted in
favour of Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot’s presiding over the états. The
assembly was again delayed for a few days, but eventually, they cast aside the
parlement’s verdict.161 The états were not impressed and stated that the legitimacy
of their assembly depended solely upon the king’s authority.162 Under pressing
circumstances, such phrasing was used to please the king.
150Ibid., p. 426.
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158C2776, 30 September 1651 / C2655, 25–27.
159Kettering (1986), p. 422.
160Cornette (2005), pp. 524, 547–549.
161Pocquet (1913), p. 430; Kettering (1986), p. 422.
162C2776, 20 October 1651 / C2655, 49.
178 6 Brittany: Pay d’États and Don Gratuit (1648–1652)
The judges were angered, and royal intervention was needed.163 At this point, the
king made it known that he wanted the états to welcome both Henri Chabot, Duke de
Rohan-Chabot and César, Duke de Vendôme at the assembly.164 The parlement
continued their rebellion, most commonly referred to as the ‘Fronde of the Breton
parlement’.165 The états deliberated and decided that they would continue their
assembly without further ado and would not stop despite the arrêts of the
parlement.166 The états then addressed the king, stating that the judges were not
acting in the interest of Brittany.167 The king informed the assembly that to gain his
support, they would need to consent to the taxes that he had requested.168 The
parlement thus wrote a new injunction stating that any decision made by the états
was null and void, on 24 October 1651.169 The next day, the états warned their
opponents that representatives of the city of Rennes were no longer welcome at their
meeting and that this situation was likely to worsen, indicating an escalation in the
conflict.170 Once again, a royal intervention was required. The parlement was
pressured to withdraw all of their accusations and lift their injunction. The judges
allegedly jeopardised the defence of the province.171
The assembly had been called together to deal with three issues in particular:
taxes, the appointment of a new treasurer, and discuss the freedom of trade. After
lengthy deliberations, the negotiations over Brittany’s financial contribution led to a
Don Gratuit of 1,700,000 livres—the same amount granted by the previous assem-
bly.172 A letter from the king was read on 17 November 1651.173 In that letter, he
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171C2776, 17 November 1651 / C2655, 100–103; C2776, 13 December 1651 / C2655, 219–220.
172Collins (2003), p. 208.
173C2776, 17 November 1651 / C2655, 98–99: ‘De Par le Roy, Très chers et bien amés[,] les
deputés que vous nous avés Envoyés, de même que l’arrêt que nous vous avons prononcé sur les
Remontrances qu’ils nous ont faite[s] de votre part sont des temoins irreprochables de l’affection
que nous vous portons et du desir que nous conservons de vous maintenir en une entiere Jouissance
de vos libertés et privileges, et comme ils vous ont Eté accordés par nos predecesseurs pour des
recompenses de vos services et des marques de la satisfaction qu’ils en avoient et de votre fidelité
nous en donnant journellement de nouvelles marques, c’est bien le moins que vous puissiés attendre
de notre grace et nous souhaiterions qu’il y en eût de nouvelles à vous faire, afin que vous
connussiés que la Bienveillance de laquelle nous vous honorons, surpasse de beaucoup celle que
vous avés ressenti de nos ancestres. Aussi esperons nous que vous ne seres pas moins disposés à
nous donner des marques de vos bonnes volontés qu’à ceux[-]la, et nous[-]mêmes en d’autres
occasions En avés Temoigné, et comme ce bon prince ne desire Etre assisté de ses bons sujets que
lorsque la necessité des affaires le requiert, et d’employér outre les moyens qu’ils contribuent Tous
ceux qu’on retire d’ailleurs pour leur conservation et celle de l’État, il peut avec Justice esperer
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stressed that the subjects must aid the crown by paying their taxes in order to keep
the kingdom secure and prosperous. The law would be used to punish those
opposing the king without cause, since the king was upholding the dignity of the
country and the reputation of the nation, and France was currently under attack by
foreign principalities. It is essential to realise that this is the only explicit reference to
the word nation during this crisis. However, in this context, the word is used with a
specific reference. The reference to ‘nation’, therefore, reads like a literary trope—a
personification—that is bestowed with a reputation. As the author of the letter is the
king himself, it may even be read as an indication that his reputation was threatened
if people needlessly rose against his rule while under foreign attack. Regardless, it
was evident that the word was not used to claim an office. Firstly, the word nation
was used by the king, who was already the sovereign of the country; he did not
acquire a new office by using this vocabulary. Secondly, the words patriot or
fatherland did not accompany the word nation. The king did not need a new office,
so a word to describe the office of a patriot was not in question.
The impatience of the king, his advisor, Cardinal Mazarin, and his mother, the
queen—was expressed in a letter read out upon arrival on 5 December. This letter
clearly stated that the king’s support depended upon the consent of the états
concerning taxations.174 The long duration of the assembly probably contributed
to the general sense of discontent. At that moment, it had already lasted for 39 days
and would continue for another 18 days yet. The états were left with little room to
negotiate, and eventually gave in. As a result of the estate’s acquiescence, value-
added taxes on beer, cider, and fruit brandy were raised. The collection of the fouage
remained the duty of the province of Brittany as this was most efficient,175 and
several noblemen offered money.176 Another financial issue discussed was allow-
ances for grandees, precisely that of the Prince of Condé.177
Bernardin Poullain, the province’s treasurer, had died in 1648; thus, the états had
to discuss the appointment of a new treasurer or syndic.178 It was an essential
position with taxes to be collected, as the syndic also oversaw the payment of
interest.179 Queen Anne had demanded Brittany’s advancement of taxes from
qu’ils s’y rendront faciles, il s’agit presentement de soutenir la Dignité de l’État et la reputation de
la nation attaquée par l’Etranger, et il faut de plus s’opposer à ceux de nos sujets qui se sont elevés
contre nous sans en avoir eu aucun pretexte, Et qui font voir par leur conduite que la fin qu’ils s’en
sont proposés n’est autre que de diminuer l’autorité Royale, à l’abry de laquelle vous vous
ejouissés de vos fortunes; comme nous n’avons jamais rien si ardemment desiré que devoir la
chretienneté en paix.’
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1645 onwards, and with the états as debtor they covered the interest as well.180 The
function of the treasurer was proven to be of significance when troubles arose after
the death of Poullain.181 A lawsuit had followed his death, instigated by his creditors
and heirs, and the états discussed this legal procedure, as many of the creditors were
among the attendees and pushing for action.182 As it turned out, Poullain owed quite
a few people money, and his late father Michel Poullain had even contracted some of
these debts as early as in the 1620s and 1630s.183
The third topic placed on the agenda of the étatswas the establishment of freedom
of trade.184 On 7 December 1651, an official request to re-establish the freedom of
trade was made, since trade formed a vital part of the Breton economy.185 In line
with these troubles, the issue of foreign prisoners in St. Malo was also briefly raised
on 3 November, when a letter written on 13 December 1650 was brought forward.
The costs of guarding and feeding these people had caused financial pressure and
needed to be addressed.186
Henri Chabot, Duke de Rohan-Chabot protested even more aggressively than
before, despite the royal warnings. He found shelter from the king’s army in the city
of Angers.187 The états were thankful for the military solution and continued their
deliberations. The assembly ended in mid-December: the parlement was still mal-
content and not at rest; though it ceased its resistance, it did not revoke its sanc-
tions.188 Rennes did not obey the orders given by Duke de la Meilleraye.189 He
visited the city in order to clarify issues with the parlement and used his influence to
successfully persuade the majority of the judges to side with the clients of Cardinal
Mazarin.190 Despite duke’s best efforts, the tensions with the parlement were still
unresolved at the next assembly of the états in 1653.
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6.4 The Tax Burden in Brittany
For Brittany, the Assiettes meticulously recorded the taxes. As there was no property
damaged due to actual warfare, the amounts stated can be considered to be the total
costs. Table 6.1 indicates the requested taxes. The rows in bold are the years the états
assembled. The amounts in taxes of these years are split over the year of the
assembly and the subsequent year. Except for the years 1642–1644, the amounts
are divided into three.
Table 6.1 clearly shows that the tax load in Brittany fluctuated. Comparing these
data with those of Jülich, it becomes clear that the tax burden in Brittany was higher
at the lowest point (0.22 g of silver per inhabitant more than in Jülich; 1652 is the
lowest point in Brittany vs 1642 in Jülich). Nevertheless, as Brittany’s figures give a
complete overview, whereas those of Jülich do not contain the costs of damages, it is
difficult to give a complete outline. The sharp fluctuations in Jülich were of signif-
icant influence on the perceived tax burdens because of prompt payments due to
requisition made. The atmosphere in Brittany was more relaxed as états themselves
organised tax distributions, and no direct requisitioning took place. The tax burdens
















1636 1,000,000 1,000,000 9.84 9,838,905.4 5.8
1637 1,000,000 1,000,000 8.69 8,685,378.6 5.1
1638 1,200,000 1,200,000 8.69 10,422,454.3 6.1
1639 1,200,000 1,200,000 8.69 10,422,454.3 6.1
1640 1,275,000 1,275,000 8.69 11,073,857.7 6.5
1641 1,275,000 1,275,000 8.66 11,035,425.7 6.5
1642 966,667 966,667 8.32 8,046,210.1 4.7
1643 966,667 966,667 8.32 8,046,210.1 4.7
1644 966,667 966,667 8.32 8,046,210.1 4.7
1645 1,100,000 75,000 1,175,000 8.32 9,780,307.1 5.8
1646 1,100,000 75,000 1,175,000 8.32 9,780,307.1 5.8
1647 1,300,000 100,000 1,400,000 8.32 11,653,131.9 6.9
1648 1,300,000 100,000 1,400,000 8.32 11,653,131.9 6.9
1649 850,000 75,000 925,000 8.32 7,699,390.7 4.5
1650 850,000 75,000 925,000 8.32 7,699,390.7 4.5
1651 850,000 75,000 925,000 8.32 7,699,390.7 4.5
1652 850,000 75,000 925,000 7.76 7,174,432.3 4.2
1653 1,150,000 75,000 1,225,000 7.34 8,992,218.3 5.3
1654 1,150,000 75,000 1,225,000 7.34 8,992,218.3 5.3
Sources: tax to the king is based on: Collins (2003), pp. 208–209. The worth of the Livres Tournois
is based on de Wailly; Hoffman et al. (2000). The number of inhabitants has been set on 1.7 Million
inhabitants. All other are own calculations
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expressed in kilos of grain and then recalculated into kilocalories, as has been done
in Table 6.2.
Each year, the price of wheat could differ and therefore, the hectolitres of grain
that could be bought with the silver varied (second and third column). The kilocal-
ories obtained from one kilogram of (organic) wheat has been set at 1680 kcal. The
amount may have varied over the years, depending on the fertility of the soil. The
number of insecure food days can be calculated by measuring the kcal in the total
amount of organic wheat and dividing that by the FAO-calculated food insecurity
measure of 2100 kcal per person per day. When divided by the number of inhabi-
tants, the number of days of food insecurity can be calculated—these are expressed
in kcal. For Brittany, 1.7 million inhabitants are used as a figure. In 1651 the
financial measurements equalled the worth of approximately 6 days of food insecu-
rity or just hunger. In 1654 the worth of taxations equalled a worth of nearly 20 days
of hunger.
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insecurity
1636 71 137,981.5 13,798,145.2 23,180,883,947 11,038,516 6.5
1637 55 156,710.7 15,671,072.6 26,327,402,001 12,536,858 7.4
1638 52 201,310.6 20,131,061.2 33,820,182,735 16,104,849 9.5
1639 44 238,026.2 23,802,622.5 39,988,405,708 19,042,098 11.2
1640 42 262,016.3 26,201,631.9 44,018,741,528 20,961,305 12.3
1641 50 219,209.1 21,920,912.3 36,827,132,731 17,536,730 10.3
1642 53 150,466.8 15,046,676.2 25,278,416,070 12,037,341 7.1
1643 46 176,482.9 17,648,293.8 29,649,133,605 14,118,635 8.3
1644 44.01 182,826.9 18,282,686.0 30,714,912,504 14,626,149 8.6
1645 36 269,407.7 26,940,768.3 45,260,490,777 21,552,615 12.7
1646 30 328,264.3 32,826,431.9 55,148,405,607 26,261,146 15.4
1647 28.32 411,480.6 41,148,064.6 69,128,748,500 32,918,452 19.4
1648 46 251,356.4 25,135,635.3 42,227,867,335 20,108,508 11.8
1649 63 123,172.5 12,317,251.5 20,692,982,450 9,853,801 5.8
1650 52 146,691.4 14,669,138.5 24,644,152,646 11,735,311 6.9
1651 57 134,224.6 13,422,458.6 22,549,730,483 10,737,967 6.3
1652 43 167,728.8 16,772,881.3 28,178,440,618 13,418,305 7.9
1653 28 326,538.5 32,653,853.9 54,858,474,589 26,123,083 15.4
1654 21 420,708.3 42,070,825.7 70,678,987,238 33,656,661 19.8
Sources: Grams of silver per hectoliter of grain: Rahlf (1999). These measures have been used
because the ‘average’ prices have been used, since prices throughout Europe did not differ too
much. Detailed pricelists are available for France but seem to lack for Brittany. Number of
inhabitants has been set at 1.7 million inhabitants
6.4 The Tax Burden in Brittany 183
6.5 Conclusion
In the case of Brittany, fatherland terminology was absent in the political sphere, but
this does not necessarily mean that the terminology was absent altogether. As Nice
showed in his study, these words were known and applied in Brittany, though more
at a cultural-religious level. It is clear that the political terminology in Brittany
differed from that in the two discussed German principalities. Efficient communi-
cation and relatively cordial relations between the highly ranked nobility of Brittany
and the Mazarin-government positively influenced the amount of tax Brittany had to
pay. For the Parisian government, it was essential to respect a particularist province,
as the états were able to borrow much money against a much lower interest rate than
the crown. Maintaining and strengthening this relationship was therefore very
important to the Breton nobility. Tax requests from the government in Paris were
challenging to negotiate. The multi-layered états would also have caused some
difficulty by objecting to princely politics. Hence, strategically stationed clients in
the états helped to obtain the taxes without much resistance. As the request for
taxations of 1649 showed, not everyone agreed with the amount, though in the end,
an agreement on the amount of taxes was reached. However, the third estate opposed
the allowances of Grandees. As no fixed sum had to be paid to the Grandees to keep
them satisfied and preserve their favour, there was considerable room to negotiate.
Their connections within court circles were beneficial. Not only did they allow
informal negotiations, but they also worked in favour of those seeking office, and
in keeping taxes as low as possible.
There was no war fought inside the Breton borders—the actual Fronde seems not
to have affected it directly. Taxation formed a possible threat, but it only affected
those with little income. The high elite profited from warfare, as they could lend
money against a high-interest rate. Moreover, in 1649 and 1651, close ties with the
crown made it possible to negotiate lower tax-burdens for the pays d’état of Brittany
before the meeting of the états, as it would have bankrupted them. Maintaining the
états’ privileges and autonomy was an essential issue for the nobility. As long as
their values were not threatened, the nobility was not likely to apply a new termi-
nology. Such words would have jeopardised their relationship with the king.
The situation in Brittany can be summarised by focussing on four steps in the
process of requesting taxes. Firstly, when in need of money, the French king did not
requisition the taxes, at least not in Brittany. Instead, he sent an ordinance to the états
inviting them to assemble.191 The highest noblemen received it personally, assuming
their presence and their help organising the meeting. There seemed to be little room
for objections to the friendly request, but there was some room for negotiations: in
both 1649 and 1651, the états requested not to be assembled in the following year.192
Secondly, there was little room to protest, as the crown could interpret this as
disobedience to the crown and a violation of the feudal relationship. The Assiettes
191C2776/ C2655, 13–24.
192Collins (2003), p. 207.
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reminded the nobility that the king would reaffirm the privileges granted to the états
once the matter of taxation was resolved.193 Where discussions about the distribution
of taxes occurred, there is no trace of no open resistance against the policy that
caused the increase. The Assiettes show that obtaining this reaffirmation was of
considerable significance to the états of Brittany. Their unique history of indepen-
dence as both a duchy and a church province, and the privileges resulting, had been
respected. They continued to be respected even after the union with France in the
sixteenth century. Judging from the general history of France, there was a realistic
threat to the independent position of the province.194
Thirdly, Cardinal Mazarin’s government kept a close watch on ongoing assem-
blies, as the disputes of 1651 showed.195 Duke de la Meilleraye, as acting governor
and client of Mazarin, was not to intervene in the affairs of Duke de Rohan-Chabot.
However, when the situation escalated, and intervention did take place, it seemed
that Mazarin accepted the situation, as he was slow to respond. However, when the
rump parlement of Rennes blocked the decisions taken by the états in Nantes, a letter
on behalf of the king arrived stating that the judges’ verdict was not in Brittany’s
interest.196
Finally, the états dealt with matters of taxation in debates that went back and
forth, and numerous private discussions behind closed doors. In order to reach an
agreement, the états had to reach a consensus about Don Gratuit. Large sums of
money were demanded: 1,700,000 livres in both 1649197 and 1651.198 Though this
was substantially less than in 1647 (2,600,000 livres) and 1653 (2,300,000 livres), it
did not mean that the assemblies finished their debates quickly. 199 It took them
weeks to determine where the money had to come from, who had to pay, and who
was still in default. A consensus was always reached about the Don Gratuit.
However, the commissions for the Grandees were—at least in 1649—a matter of
debate. 200 The third estate did not want to take part in this, as they felt they were
contributing enough. When we measure the tax burden in grams of silver per capita,
it shows that the highest demand was still less than 7 g. The lowest demand was a
little over 4 g/inhabitant. The demand is higher than the calculated demands in
Jülich, but Brittany could spread the payment and had no additional costs of warfare
or war-related damage. In contrast to the two German principalities, the tax load of
Brittany is both the gross and net burden. When measured in days of food insecurity,
it led to a minimum of 5.8 days of hunger (1649), and Brittany experienced even
more than 18 days of hunger in 1647 and 1654.
193C2654, 514.
194Bonney (1989), pp. 161–177; Dunkley (1981), p. 1.
195Collins (2003), pp. 197–198, 210; Kettering (1986).
196C2776, 17 November 1651 / C2655, 100–103; C2776, 13 December 1651 / C2655, 219–220.
197C2776, 14 July 1649 / C2654, 570; Collins (2003), p. 208.
198Ibid., p. 208.
199Ibid., p. 198.
200C2776, 22 July 1649 / C2654; Ibid., p. 207.
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In Brittany, fatherland terminology was absent from the political scene. The états
or the nobility, in particular, made no objections against the king’s policy. Duke de
Rohan-Chabot did voice his disagreement with the clients of Cardinal Mazarin on
how to preside over the états. This 1651 example reveals that many different
interests were pursued within the province, and in the Kingdom of France itself.
The heterogeneous composition of the états seems to have scattered the resistance
against the warfare of Cardinal Mazarin, who continued Cardinal de Richelieu’s war
policy against the Habsburg dynasty of Spain. The inhabitants of Brittany did not
suffer war-related burdens such as billeting, plundering, or other atrocities as the
German principalities did. Therefore, the perceived impact of the war was much
smaller. This difference may have contributed to the absence of fatherland
terminology.
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Comparison of the Cases
This study set out to show that the nobility fiercely objected to dynastic warfare and
the increased ad hoc needs for taxes to pay the armed forces required do the fighting
or defending. The nobility perceived both warfare and taxations as a tremendous
threat to the welfare of their fatherland and the inhabitants. Discussing this perceived
peril was impossible within the existing power structure, as it would likely be
considered an act to undermine the princely government. Since both DukeWolfgang
Wilhelm (Jülich) and Landgravine Amalie Elisabeth (Hesse-Cassel) had already
begun their reign under problematic circumstances, this placed their relationships
with the nobility under pressure. The French King Louis XIV neither started his rule
over Brittany amidst a war of succession, nor was his dominion entirely occupied.
Brittany had owned the French crown for over a century, though it held a particu-
larist position as a pays d’état.
Based on research by Von Friedeburg and Vroomen with a focus on fatherland
terminology in Hesse-Cassel (1646–1651) and the Dutch Republic (1618–1619;
1650; 1672) respectively, I formulated two hypotheses. Firstly, when—in small
territories—the interests of a subordinate group were confined, fatherland terminol-
ogy was used to address the situation. Secondly, fatherland terminology was used by
relatively homogeneous interest groups who expressed their critique on politics, as
there were only limited existing options to bring about change. The research on
Hesse-Cassel was expanded by adding Jülich to the scope to test these hypotheses.
To contrast these two small principalities, the large, heterogeneous particular prov-
ince of Brittany is added to the equation. Hence, I was able to compare the two
factors that could influence the arguments: homo- or heterogeneity of the nobility,
and the economy of scale. I selected tumultuous times: the last part of the Thirty
Years’ War and the Fronde, to make the situations comparable to each other. This
conclusion is structured along the lines of the hypotheses mentioned above.
© The Author(s) 2021
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7.1 Answering Hypothesis 1: Within Small Principalities
Fatherland Terminology Is Used
Brittany was a vast territory of about 30,000 km2 and around 1660, had an estimated
population of 1,802,000.1 It had a significant economy of scale, which was beneficial
as the burden of taxations could be spread over the broad population. The size of this
particular province also influenced the hierarchical structure of the nobility, creating
a large group of noblemen with varying amounts of income and influence. Agricul-
ture and maritime activities characterise Brittany’s economy.
The taxes levied in Brittany were not directly aimed at protecting the province
itself. As such, the taxations could have generated opposition, as there seemed to be
no link with their perceived benefits. However, this practice did not seem to bother
the états, as long as their autonomy in other aspects of governing was respected.
Having to pay taxes to the King of France was not necessarily different from having
an independent duke, as it meant that the états could still protect their ancient
privileges. In other words, little had changed when they accepted the French king
as their ruler in 1532. Any complaints were to be addressed to the (acting) governor
of the province, or directly to Paris; likewise, Paris decided on the amount of taxes to
be collected; tax distribution and collection still fell under the jurisdictions of the
états. With that, the king and états maintained the status quo; there were still only
two ‘participants’ in the debates. Before the unification with France, a duke and the
états governed Brittany;2 after the union, the King of France—being the Duke of
Brittany— still assembled the états when in need of taxation. Before the unification,
there was no court to which to appeal when communications failed. In the post-1532
period, the only two ‘participants’were the états and the acting governor on behalf of
the absent king.3 Although it was possible to discuss irregularities and problems with
the governor, the king would decide in such matters.
The états’ had enormous freedom to levy the taxes necessary to pay the crown. As
they could decide on their own where the money would come from, they were able to
spread the burden evenly over the population, primarily since there was no
requisitioning of funds at short notice. As long as their privileges were respected,
the états were cooperative, and there was no need to use fatherland terminology. It
also worked the other way, as long as the états were cooperative and did not use—
what the king could perceive as—offensive language, their privileges were
respected.
The two small German principalities within this study confirm the application of
fatherland terminology in small—German—principalities. Jülich and Hesse-Cassel
shared some characteristics. The economy of scale in these principalities was
minimal. The population of 215,000 and 375,000 inhabitants respectively, bore the
1Croix and Goubert (1980), p. 152; Dunkley (1972), p. 4.
2Le Page and Godin (2009), pp. 21–65.
3Dunkley (1981).
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financial burdens warfare; with only a limited number of nobles who jointly objected
to the government and policy of their prince.4 The number of cities within each
principality—and their involvement in politics—was negligible; most wealth came
directly from agriculture.
The nobility perceived the amount of the requisitioned taxes as disproportionate;
moreover, the duke and landgravine had failed to obtain the nobility’s permission to
collect taxes at all. The small principalities had only little variation within its group
of nobles, who mostly shared the same interests. Taxes targeted the resources of the
nobility’s tenants, which indirectly affected the nobles themselves. On top of the
contributions, the two principalities suffered from roaming troops plundering and
raiding the area, the billeting of soldiers, and other—unspecified—atrocities of war.
The nobility unanimously voiced their complaint about the prince’s arbitrary or
tyrannical rule.
The nobility in both German principalities used the terminology of fatherland and
patriot to address their fatherland’s problems. Their princes mirrored this terminol-
ogy, as they gradually adopted the word use themselves. In Jülich, the terminology
seemed to have become applicable to the duke himself;5 in Hesse-Cassel, the
landgrave used the terminology to indicate an error in the argumentation of the
nobility: if the nobility of Hesse-Cassel were true to their word—that is, loyal
patriots—they would leave matters to the landgrave’s judgement.6 In addition, any
threats to the fatherland were taken seriously but were the responsibility of the
landgrave.
A striking difference between the two principalities was their divergent approach
to printed documents. Within the European context, pamphlets were used to invoke
help from outside the principality. It was seen as a last resort to argue the case against
the violation of the fatherland or patria. Within the Holy Roman Empire, the last
resort in conflicts was the Imperial Chamber Court or the Aulic Court. Arguably
there was no need for pamphlets here, but rather lawsuits, which constituted an
institutionalised form of complaint. The nobility of Jülich did use pamphlets as they
may have deed foreign aid more effective. Strong support from the Dutch Republic
could have encouraged the nobility because it was almost inevitable that help would
come if requested. Hesse-Cassel, on the other hand, could not count on such an
alliance. The Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt even had his eye on the principality.
This threat worked in favour of making the case at the Imperial Chamber Court,
where the court could pressure the landgrave, without needing to invite outside
military intervention.
The taxes in Jülich—that is, the amounts that were specified by the Landstände—
and those in Brittany are, to an extent comparable. By expressing the worth of the
respective currencies, the Reichsthaler or the Livres Tournois, in grams of silver, the
4Boehncke and Sarkowicz (2010), pp. 64–65; Tornow (1974), p. 22.
5JL Akten 51, 6 May 1652, 1–2. (The second letter on the same date.)
6Duplicae, 32–33.
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tax-burdens become comparable. Figure 7.1 shows the results per inhabitant, using
the calculations as explained earlier.
Figure 7.1 clearly shows that although Jülich may not have had the lowest tax
burden in the early 1640s, it went up quickly and exceeded that of Brittany. The
overview given for Brittany is as complete as it can get and shows that the amount of
taxes varied between 4 and 7 g of silver per inhabitant per year. In Jülich this amount
fluctuated between 4 and as much as 12 g of silver per person per year. However, this
does leave out material damages.
When these grams of silver are recalculated into kilos of grain and then into
kilocalories, the image becomes slightly different (see Fig. 7.2). That is to say, the
differences vary a lot less, due to the amounts of grain that could hypothetically have
been bought with the silver. The tax burden of Brittany fluctuated far less than that of
Jülich. A spike characterises the burdens in Jülich in the year 1646 with a burden of
12 g of silver per inhabitant (Fig. 7.1) or 31 days of hunger (Fig. 7.2). Such
fluctuations coincide with the increase in used fatherland terminology as the nobility
sought a way to criticise destructive princely politics. One could argue that Brittany
suffered under a relatively heavy burden as well, as it never fell below a burden equal
to 5 days of endangered food security, and even endured 19 such hypothetical days
in both 1647 and 1654. However, Brittany only suffered from financial burdens and









Tax-pressure per inhabitant in grams of silver
Brittany Jülich
Fig. 7.1 Comparative tax burdens of Jülich and Brittany, in grams of silver/inhabitants
(1639–1652). Source: Table 3.1 and Table 6.1
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7.2 Answering Hypothesis 2: Homogeneous Interests
Stimulate the Use of Fatherland Terminology
The excessive taxation and consequences of the Thirty Years’ War caused signifi-
cant problems. Forcing inhabitants to pay enormous amounts of taxes was perceived
as a tyrannical act that led to the use of the fatherland terminology in the German
principalities. This usage indicated a claim of the temporary, presupposed office of a
patriot, being the defender of the threatened fatherland (patria) and the welfare of its
inhabitants. The defenders of noble blood were compelled to resist the disastrous
politics of the prince because the war burdened the population to a point where
livelihoods were severely affected. The emergence of this new terminology came
about by changes in the field of political theory; likewise, legal argumentation was
required to substantiate claims by the nobility. The events that took place shaped the
content and meaning of the terms. Interestingly, these events are often considered to
be exclusive to the fields of social or military history, and are hardly ever fused with
political, legal, or intellectual history. The original documents produced by the
Landstände of Jülich and Hesse-Cassel between 1642 and 1655 substantiate these
conclusions.
The war damage demonstrated that the inhabitants in the principalities perceived
many threats. The ineffective policy of Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm or the warmonger-
ing attitude of Landgravine Amelie Elisabeth made the situation worse, according to
the nobility whose pleas fell on deaf ears. So they searched for alternatives. In Jülich,
the 1627-lawsuit had failed to influence the duke’s policy. Consequently, the




























Fig. 7.2 Comparative tax-burdens of Jülich and Brittany, in a number of days below 2100 kcal
(1639–1652). Source: Table 3.2 and Table 6.2
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themselves as the defenders of the fatherland, hoping to re-open lines of communi-
cation with the duke.
In Hesse-Cassel, assembling within the principality proved hazardous, with the
arrest of spokespersons and such assemblies being banned.7 The nobility felt that
their privileges were severely violated and brought matters to the Imperial Chamber
Court. They turned to arguments based on the fatherland and their being a loyal
patriot, which functioned as a warning vehicle for the landgravine. This terminology
seems to have been the nobility’s last resort, designed to open up communication,
and it worked in the end.
The heterogeneous états of Brittany, which had a myriad of interests at stake, did
not use the terminology in a political context. Brittany’s different social-historical
background may explain this difference. Here, the wealthy noblemen—or wealthy
merchants—could profit from money lending, so they could afford to buy influence.
The governor acted on behalf of the king and benefited greatly from his patron. This
arrangement also revealed the benefit of strong ties between patrons and clients.
These more personal relationships eased negotiations, even as direct communica-
tions were rendered more difficult with hundreds of participants.8 There was no third
party to mediate. Within this framework, the états maintained their privileges,
especially about taxation, which was possible only by maintaining the status quo.
If the king had wanted to incorporate Brittany into France to govern it directly and
levy taxes without the cooperation of the états, he could have done so—and Bonney
has shown that this occurred in other parts of France.9 Nevertheless, this well-
functioning distribution of responsibilities did not invite changes.
In Brittany, differences in wealth and the patron-client relationship with Mazarin
shaped debates and influenced their outcome. Duke de Rohan-Chabot was sent away
from the assembly as his interests were not the same as Cardinal Mazarin’s—or, of
the cardinal’s clients. The majority wanted to maintain their privileges and immu-
nities by cooperating with Cardinal Mazarin. Duke de Rohan-Chabot certainly
believed in preserving noble privileges and those of Brittany; however, he favoured
the Prince of Condé and their plans for a new government did not involve Cardinal
Mazarin.
Based on these three case studies, I argue that the heterogeneity of the assembly in
Brittany contributed to the absence of fatherland terminology. Its patron-client
relationships attributed to eased communications: on the one hand, Mazarin and
the high nobility enjoyed such a relationship; on the other hand, the high nobility and
their clients within Brittany also functioned in this way. These relationships were
strengthened by the fact that consent to the demand for taxes encouraged the French
crown to respect the nobility’s privileges. Within the Holy Roman Empire, argu-
ments with the words patriot, patria, and fatherland were made. The Thirty Years’
War caused much damage in both Jülich and Hesse-Cassel. The nobility in both
7Maruhn (2004), p. 47.
8C2655, 1–11.
9Bonney (1989).
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principalities displayed their discontent with their rulers, Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm
and Landgravine Amelie Elisabeth of Hesse-Cassel respectively.
I found open resistance against the deprivation of income as a result of dispro-
portionate burdens and damaging princely politics only in small economies of scale
with a (relatively) homogeneous estate. The Landstände of Jülich and Hesse-Cassel
both faced threats to their income and that of their tenants by direct and imminent
warfare and related burdens. In Brittany, the terminology was not unknown but not
used in political discussions, despite the turmoil of the Fronde and its Breton
derivative of 1651. Here the highly ranked elite profited from its client-relationship
with the crown and the king’s government. Instead of fearing for their tenants, the
keys to their decision-making were gaining offices, money, and interests. These
interests may have collided with the concerns of other, lesser nobles and subjects.
Nevertheless, these different interests divided the Breton états and silenced all
criticism.
7.3 Final Remarks
The use of fatherland terminology may not have occurred often in the Holy Roman
Empire, but it was instrumental. When applied with some repetition, and with the
same meaning and goals, it did have an effect. Both in the Duchy of Jülich and the
Landgraviate of Hesse-Cassel, the nobility used the terminology to open communi-
cations without being accused of rebellious actions against their ruler. In the long
run, the terminology was copied by the prince, or at the very least, by his lawyers.
Shifting the focal point from loyalty to a prince, towards loyalty to the fatherland,
was a development central to the terminology studied here. Supporting a failing or
harmful policy that went against the common good was troublesome. Therefore, a
verbal shift to the blameless fatherland that experienced much peril and turmoil was
a safe option to which real objections were hardly possible. In line with the medieval
concept of dominion and the duty to protect this principality, the Landgrave of
Hesse-Cassel quickly caught up with the terminology. He pointed out that it was
indeed his duty to protect the principality, and so he would. In the case of Jülich, it
was precisely the de facto rule that seems to have caused some difficulties here, as
the de facto Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm, could not claim rule over the dominion Jülich
and his policy caused much harm.
Focussing on policies that harmed the fatherland could not be seen as a traitorous
act: it was aimed at the common good and did not directly accuse a prince. The group
of people who felt compelled to so (the patriots), was only a small group of people.
In the case of Jülich, they could afford to travel to Cologne, and were able to have a
debate on these affairs. In Hesse-Cassel, only noblemen attended the Kirchhain
assembly and, subsequently, supported the legal suit. The sources do not mention
any commoners involved, except when referring to the victims of war. As soon as
these inhabitants of non-noble birth had participated in the debates, accusations of a
full-blown rebellion would likely have emerged. Here we may see the influence of
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Althusius’ ephors who—as a small group of magistrates—hold the office to point the
prince right. It was tactical to place the discussion in the context of those of noble
birth, protecting their tenants and other inhabitants of the principality, and avoiding
any hint of revolt or rebellion.
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HAB: 258.20.15 Quod, Placcaet Gepubliciceert By ende van wegen d’Erf-
vereenigde Lantstanden. Uyt de Ridderschap ende Steden der
Lantschappen Cleve, Gulick, Berge, ende Marck tot Conservatie
van haer Privilegien (4, n.p. 1651).
HAB: M: Gm 3621 (2)/
VD17 23:308525B
Dero Chur: Brandenburgisch. Fürstlich. Durchl. De dato den
13. Iunij abgelassene kurze Anzeig anstatt Manifests unnd
darauff Ihrer Fürstlich. Durchl. PfalzNewburg außgefertite
Bestendige Widerlegung, zu mehrer Instruction, also
beyeinander in Druck gegeben (n.p. 1651).
HAB Gm 3621 (8) Wir Landtstenden auß Ritterschafft und Statten der
Erbvereinigten Landtschafften und Herzogtumen, Gülich, Cleve,
Berg, und Graffschafft marck u. (n.p. 1651).
HAB: A: 32.38 Pol. 17 Placcaet Gepubliciceert By ende van wegen d’Erf-vereenigde
Lantstanden. Uyt de Ridderschap ende Steden der Lantschappen
Cleve, Gulick, Berge, ende Marck tot Conservatie van haer
Privilegien (8, n.p. 1651).
Kn. 05536a Erf-Vereenige der Landtstenden uyt Ridderschap ende Steeden
der Hartogdommen Gulick, Cleve, Berge, ende der
Graefschappen, Marck ende Ravensperg (n.p. 1647).
Kn. 05537a Aenmaning schrijvens van de Hooghmogende Heeren Staten
Generael der vereenigde Nederlanden. Aen den deurluchtigen
heer hartog van Nyborgh, &c (’s Gravenhage 1647).
Kn. 05539a Klaer bewys dat de Ho: Mo: Staten Generael gherechtight ende
verbonden zijn tot de garantie ende maitenüe vande privilegien,
vry ende gerechtigheden der Landt-stenden inde landen Gulick,
Cleve, Berge, Marck ende Ravensbergh (n.p. 1647).
Kn. 6968 Kort Bericht, waerom Sijn Cheurfursteleijke Doorluchticheyt van
Brandenburgh is bewogen ende veroorsaeckt worden, eenighe
Plaetsen inde Vorstendommen Gulick ende Bergh in te nemen.
(n.l. 1651).
Kn. 6969 Kort Vertoogh In plaets van een Manifest. Waerom Sijn
Cheurvorst: Doorluch: tot Brandenburgh, eenige plaetsen in de
Vorstendommen Gulick en Bergh in te nemen, bewogen en
veroosaeckt geweest is. (Dordrecht 13 June 1651).
Kn. 6970 Vorstelijck Palts Niewbvrgse Fundamentele Wederlegginge,
Tegen’t ongesondeerde Kort Bericht, Waeromme Sijn Cheur-
Vorstel. Doorl. van Brandenburgh, is bewogen eenige Plaetsen
inde Vorstendommen van Gulick ende Bergh in te nemen, zijnde
alleen die daerinne so specieuse voorgestelde Relgie, een deck-
mantel van de voorghenomene gheweldadige invasie door de
Troupes van gemelte Cheurv. Doorl. begaen. Ghetranslateert uyt
het Hooghduyts (n.p. 1651).
Kn. 6971 Placcaet Van Wegen Sijne Vorstelijcke Doorlucht. Den Heere
Hertog van Nieubvrg, Teghen ’t gene dat den Heere Cheur-Vorst
van Brandenborgh heeft laten affigeren den 13. Iunij 1651. tot
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verschooninge ende verbloeminghe vande onghefondeerde ende
gewendadige invasie inde Landen van Gulick ende Bergh
(Leiden 1651).
Kn. 6972 Mandement van sijne Roomsch Keyserl. Majesteyt, tot Cassatie
ende Annullatie van’t Cheur-Brandenburghsche voor desen
Affigeerde Placaet, aen de respective Standen der
Vorstendommen Gulick, ende Bergh (n.p. 1651).
Kn. 6973 Missive van Sijne Roomsch Keyserl. Majesteyt aen de Heere
Cheur-vorst van Brandenburg, Improberende die inde
Vorstendommen van Gulick ende Bergh ghedaene Invasie,
vermanende ende bevelende den selvede Wapenen neder te
leggen (n.p. 1651).
Lünig, Johann Christian, ed. Das Teutsche Reichs¼Archiv, und zwar Pars specialis nebst dessen I.
II.III. vnd IV. Continuation, worin zu finden, Die merckwuerdigsten Allianzen und Buendnisse,
Manifesta, Armistitia, Friedens¼Schluesse, Recesse, Concordata, Erb¼Verbrüderungen,
Vereinigungen, Verträge und Vergleiche in Religions¼und Profan-Sachen, Pacta Familae, Statuta
Primogenituræ, Lehen¼Brieffe, Expectanzen und Unwartschafften, Ehe¼Beredungen, Reverse,
Kauff¼und Wiederkauffs ¼ Contracte, Obligationes, Cossiones, Renunciationes, Testamenta,
Codicille, Geist¼ und Weltliche Ritter¼Ordens ¼ Statuta, Capitualitones, Gan¼Erbschafften,
Commercien¼Tractate, Stapel¼ und Niederlags¼Gerichtigkeiten, Privilegia und andere Diplo-
mata. Dritter Theil, Der Vierdten Abtheilung,Dritter Absatz, Leipzig: Lanckisch, 1713
Hesse-Cassel
HAB: M: Gm 4 404 [o.n.] Nothwendiger Bericht, darauß zu sehen, Daß nicht allein die, von
Hessen-Cassel erlangte, und in Truck außgelassene, die vorlengst
abgeurtheilte, zu Grond verglichene und trewer geschworne, also
genante Marpurgische Successionis-Sach betreffende Responsa ad falsa
narrata erheilt, und denen consultirten Juristen Facultäten und andern
Rechtsgelehrten, in facto viel verschwiegen, tehils verleugnet, und theils
anders, als sichs in der That und Warheit befindet, vorbracht, sondern
auch in punctio Juris die, in solchen Responsis befindliche Argumenta,
fast ins gesambt in der Bestandigen Grundlichen Widerlegung der
Casselischen vermeynten Rechtlichen Deduction bereits refutirt, und
abgefertiget worden, also daß Justitia Causae Hasso-Darmstadinae
dardurch zumahl nicht enervirt, noch geschwache werden könne oder
möge, (S.I. 1646).
HAB: A: 46.7 Jur. 2 Feurborn, J., Nothwendige außführliche Special-Widerlegung deren in
Hessen-Casselischen publicirten also gen. Wechsel-Schrifften
gerühmbten,gleichwohl aber gantz unbegrundeten, Rettung eines, von
Weiland herrn Landgraf Wilhelmen zu Hessen u., hochlöblichen
Undenckens, sub data Cassel den 19. Aprilis Anno 1630 an herrn
Georgen, herrn Philipfen und Herrn Friderichen, beede hochlöblicher
gedächtniss alle Landgrafen zu Hessen u. abgegangenen Schreibens
[. . .] (Giessen, 1647).
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